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I. Preface
Given what is everywhere the purpose of commerce, the global company will
shape the vectors of technology and globalization into its great strategic fecun-
dity. It will systematically push these vectors toward their own convergence,
offering everyone simultaneously high-quality, more or less standardized prod-
ucts at optimally low prices, thereby achieving for itself vastly expanded markets
and profits. Companies that do not adapt to the new global realities will become
victims of those that do.
Theodore Levitt (1983)
It has long been known that the steady formation of a global economy provides
auspicious opportunities and imminent threat to firms around the globe. Still, at
the time Theodore Levitt wrote his famous article on the globalization of markets,
the focus on individual firms had not yet reached the agenda of mainstream trade
economists. But the predominant theories of comparative advantage had already
been outgrown by the data, showing that a substantial and increasing share of world
trade was happening between similar countries and within industries.1 The subse-
quent integration of product differentiation, imperfect competition and economies
of scale into formal trade models implicitly began to shift the focus towards the firm
level. Yet, it was not until newly available firm-level data provided evidence of sig-
nificant heterogeneity among trading and non-trading firms that the spotlight fully
hit the individual business entity.2
By now there is a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, showing how
the productivity distribution of firms has important repercussions on the gains from
trade.3 Most notably, periods of trade liberalization have been found to be accom-
panied by a shift in market shares from low-productivity to high-productivity firms.
1 See for example Grubel (1967) and compare Krugman (1980).
2 See for example Bernard and Jensen (1999)
3 See Melitz (2003) for a seminal theoretical contribution and Bernard et al. (2012a) for a survey of
the empirical literature.
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Understanding this shift is of inherent economic interest as high-productivity firms,
leading the race for technological innovation, determine the productivity frontier
and well-being of current and future generations. Yet, the productivity of firms is
not given exogenously and firms fight fiercely to avoid exiting the market and to
stay ahead of competitors when facing the challenge of globalization. In the end,
these adjustments at the micro level shape the firm productivity distribution endoge-
nously. Accordingly, the extent of market share reallocation from low productivity to
high productivity firms becomes itself a function of these adjustments, determining
the size of trade induced productivity effects at the aggregate level.
The following three chapters provide new insights on the channels of adjustment
that firms resort to in order to adapt to the new global realities, including larger
markets, foreign competition and increasing uncertainty. Specifically, chapter II ex-
amines how internationally active firms are affected by exchange rate volatility and
discusses how exports and imports at the firm level can be orchestrated to reduce
their exchange rate exposure. Chapter III shows how the reorganization of produc-
tion across borders and the decentralization of management structures can help firms
to reduce costs and improve quality, allowing them to increase their share of the
market. Finally, chapter IV analyzes how firms adjust investments across time in re-
sponse to an increase in foreign competition. Each of the chapters is a self-contained
contribution, shortly presented in what follows.
Chapter II deals with exchange rate uncertainty. From the firm perspective, ex-
change rate movements are largely unpredictable. Accordingly, they imply a con-
stant threat to the price-cost margin of trading firms. This is confirmed by recent
firm-level evidence, showing that large swings in exchange rates are often not re-
flected in foreign price adjustments because firms adjust markups in order to hold
foreign demand constant.4 As I am going to argue in the first chapter of the disser-
tation, instead of adjusting markups, firms can in principal hold demand and profits
constant if they properly align intermediate imports and final good exports in terms
of exchange rates. An appreciation of the domestic currency with respect to the ex-
port market, threatening foreign demand, then at the same time leads to an increase
in purchasing power with respect to intermediates sourced from abroad. Accord-
ingly, firms can reduce the cost component of foreign prices, keeping the final price
expressed in the foreign currency constant despite an appreciation of the domestic
currency. Exchange rate induced price shocks at the output level are then offset by
4 See for example Berman et al. (2012).
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corresponding adjustments at the input cost level.
The chapter empirically addresses two questions related to this mechanism. In the
first part, I determine the degree to which exporting firms can expect intermediate
imports to offset the effect of exchange rates on total firm sales. Related to the ap-
proach of Amiti et al. (2014), I propose a stylized theoretical framework that allows
me to structurally estimate the exchange rate effect on total firm sales conditional on
exports and intermediate imports at the firm level. I use manufacturing firm-level
panel data from seven European countries to estimate the model. Taking the regional
pattern of firm trade as given, my results suggest that controlling for the alignment,
i.e. co-movement, of the export and intermediate import related exchange rates is
crucial.
I determine the relevant exchange rates for exports and intermediate imports as
the trade weighted geometric average of bilateral exchange rates, where weights are
chosen according to either final good export or intermediate good import flows at
the industry level. The co-movement of the two resulting effective exchange rates is
then measured by the elasticity of the intermediate import with respect to the export
weighted exchange rate. Surprisingly, my results suggest that sourcing intermedi-
ates from abroad reinforces the export related exchange rate effects on average. The
reason is that export destination markets and input sourcing regions are not well
aligned for the average firm. This differentiates my results from Amiti et al. (2014),
who find international sourcing on average to offset some of the export related ex-
change rate effects on prices for Belgian firms. Yet, in line with the theoretical predic-
tions, the offsetting effect is confirmed in my data provided that the co-movement
between export and intermediate import weighted exchange rates is high. Then even
a moderate amount of offshoring can completely offset the exchange rate effect on
sales that is working through exports.
Given that I find the offsetting effect of international sourcing to be contingent on
the alignment of exchange rates, the question arises whether firms are taking the ex-
change rate co-movement into account when deciding on sourcing regions. Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that firms are indeed trying to reduce exchange rate exposure
via offsetting international activities, an attempt that has been termed operational
hedging. Consequently, the second part of the paper looks at the regional sourcing
pattern of firms and relates it to regional export decisions and the co-movement of
exchange rates. To my knowledge, this is the first systematical analysis addressing
this question. In line with the operational hedging mechanism, I find the probability
3
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of a firm importing from a specific region to increase in regional exporter status if and
only if the elasticity of the intermediate import with respect to the export weighted
exchange rate is high. I further find that the role of regional exporter status as a
predictor of regional sourcing is reversed in highly volatile regions if the elasticity is
low. Exporters are then less likely to source from the region because imports would
reinforce exchange rate uncertainty. These results hold after controlling for alterna-
tive area characteristics that determine the probability of regional sourcing. I take
these results as evidence for operational hedging.
Chapter III is joint work with Dalia Marin and Jan Schymik. We analyze the effect
of organizational choice on the international competitiveness of firms within their
export market. Specifically, we link the organization of firms to their export success,
using the same firm-level data that was used in chapter one. Because information
on exporting is only available for 2008, chapter III constitutes a cross-sectional anal-
ysis.5 Two margins of organizational adjustment are considered: offshoring and the
decentralization of decision making. We propose that firms that reorganize produc-
tion internationally can reduce costs and increase price competitiveness while firms
with decentralized hierarchies empower their knowledge workers and can compete
on global markets with innovativeness and quality.
The paper thus aims at the overlap between the literature on heterogeneous firms
in a global environment and the role of organizational choice for firm productivity.
Accordingly, we shift the focus away from exogenously given productivity distri-
butions and towards specific firm-level decisions that determine the relative market
position. We motivate the empirical analysis with a stylized model, linking orga-
nizational decisions to export market shares and product quality. First, following
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), we show how firms can import intermedi-
ates to reduce production costs. Second, we propose a mechanism where shifting
decision rights to lower levels of the management hierarchy incentivizes knowledge
workers to increase their creative effort. This fosters the implementation of new
ideas and ultimately translates into higher product quality.
We test the following predictions that we derive from the theoretical framework:
First, offshoring and better product quality increase the competitive position of a
firm within its specific export market. Second, decentralization of decision author-
ity leads to improvements in perceived product quality and innovation. And third,
the effect of decentralization on quality and innovation is particularly strong if the
5 In chapter II the focus lies on total firm sales for which panel data is available.
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conflict of interest within the board of managers is large.
In order to measure the competitive position of a firm in its specific export mar-
ket, we construct a world export market share, using data on firm exports as well
as trade flow information from the set of firm specific industries. We exploit varia-
tion in wages paid by intermediate good producers in typical sourcing regions and
variation in the skill intensity of input production to identify how offshoring af-
fects export competitiveness. We exploit regional variation in religious beliefs and
trust across Europe in order to identify the effects of a decentralized management
on product quality. In line with the predictions, we find offshoring to increase the
global market share of firms and a strong positive association between a decentral-
ized management and product quality. Furthermore, we find this effect to be less
pronounced if the share of family board members is large, indicating a low conflict
of interest within the board of managers.
In chapter IV, which is joint work with Philippe Fromenteau and Jan Schymik, we
empirically assess how exposure to foreign competition affects firm investments into
durable and nondurable assets. If firms determine investments into different types
of assets according to profit expectations, a foreseeable reduction of future price-cost
margins can discourage long-term investments. Accordingly, we would expect a
relative shift of investment expenditures towards assets that pay off early.
In order to guide the empirical analysis, we formalize the implied trade-off in
marginal investment returns in a stylized model. We consider firms in a two-period
economy, choosing between short- and long-term investments. Short-term invest-
ments reduce marginal costs today and thus yield an immediate benefit. Investments
into more durable assets reduce future production costs and thus pay off according
to the future market environment. Because an increase in competition reduces prof-
its in period two, the marginal return on short-term investment increases relative to
the marginal return on long-term investment. Our model predicts the resulting com-
positional effect in investments to be less pronounced for larger firms, because their
market power shields them from competitive pressure.
In order to test these predictions, we use panel data for all available manufacturing
firms that are stock listed in the US. Specifically, we derive a within-firm difference-
in-differences estimator that resembles the theoretical framework. Similar to Gari-
cano and Steinwender (2016), we exploit variation in durability across asset groups
to distinguish between short- and long-term investments. Investments are measured
by expenditures into different asset categories. We then estimate how changes in the
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sectoral degree of foreign competition affect the within-firm composition of invest-
ments. In accordance with the theoretical framework, we find that tougher compe-
tition leads to a relative shift towards short-term investments and that this effect is
more pronounced for smaller firms. We argue that this effect is causal, controlling
for alternative channels such as uncertainty, export market size effects or financial
constraints. Furthermore, we exploit the Chinese WTO accession in 2001 as an alter-
native source of exogenous variation.
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Rate Risks
II.1. Introduction
Internationally active firms represent only a small fraction of all firms. Nevertheless,
above average performance implies that their impact on aggregate economic activity
is much larger than their number suggests. Using US data for the year 2000, Bernard
et al. (2009) find that trading firms, a mere 4.1% of all firms, accounted for as much
as 41.9% of employment outside government and education.1 In the light of these
findings, and spurred by the increasing availability of firm-level data, a major puz-
zle from macroeconomics has recently reemerged and come under the scrutiny of
microdata analysis: why have exchange rates so little effect on the real economy?2
A large body of literature, dealing with the exchange rate disconnect, has revealed
that much of the puzzle can be traced back to incomplete pass-through of exchange
rates into prices.3 Thus, a devaluation of the dollar does not necessarily imply
cheaper US imports for the rest of the world and accordingly no expenditure ad-
justments. The focus on firms’ sourcing behavior can be seen as the latest addition
to this literature. It is driven by the insight that internationally active firms are of-
ten exporting final goods and importing intermediate goods at the same time.4 If
I have benefited from the access to the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit database, managed by
Bruegel and funded by the EU 7th Framework Programme ([FP7/2007-2013] under grant agree-
ment no. 225551), as well as by UniCredit.
1 Bernard et al. (2009), tables 14.1 and 14.3.
2 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) for an explicit formulation of that puzzle.
3 See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Burstein and Gopinath (2014) for reviews of the literature.
Classical explanations for this inelasticity of prices include price rigidities in the local currency
(e.g. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008)), firms adjusting the profit margin (e.g. Atkeson and Burstein
(2008)) and local-currency distribution costs (e.g. Goldberg and Campa (2010)).
4Bernard et al. (2009) find that of the 41.9% of US workers employed in trading firms, about 73%
are employed in firms that are both exporters and importers (compare Bernard et al. (2009), table
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both flows are denominated in the same currency, an appreciation, usually increas-
ing the price tag on foreign sales, also implies higher purchasing power with respect
to intermediate inputs. This reduction in costs helps firms to counter the increase in
prices of goods sold in the foreign market, effectively preventing changes in foreign
sales.
Adding to this branch of literature, this paper provides new firm-level evidence
from European manufacturing firms, supporting the hypothesis that the missing link
between exchange rates and the real economy is partly due to imports of interme-
diate goods. Yet, in difference to earlier results, I find the mechanism of offsetting
exchange rate effects to hold for a subset of firms only. Specifically, I analyze to
what extent export and intermediate import flows are denominated in the same cur-
rency and find that for many firms the alignment appears to be rather weak or even
negative. This has important implications: if the exchange rate with respect to ex-
porting regions moves independently from the exchange rate with respect to sourc-
ing regions, the offsetting effect described above disappears. If exchange rates are
negatively related, the effect of exchange rates on export sales is reinforced through
intermediate imports. This is what I find for the average exporting firm in my sam-
ple.
From the macro perspective, this is an important finding because it implies that
the link between intermediate imports and the exchange rate disconnect puzzle is
specific to only a subset of importing firms, namely those with a positive alignment
of export and intermediate import related exchange rates. Amiti et al. (2014) con-
ceptually acknowledge this limitation, but, because they do not consider the full
distribution of the measure of co-movement, their approach does not bring to light
its empirical significance. To my knowledge, the present paper is the first to put the
co-movement of exchange rates in the foreground.
The following analysis addresses two questions related to the effects of interme-
diate imports on the rate of exchange rate pass-through. The first part of the paper
determines the offsetting effect of intermediate imports on the exchange rate pass-
through into total sales, contingent on the co-movement of exchange rates. Tech-
nically, this part is closely related to the exchange rate disconnect literature. The
second part of the paper asks whether exporters take into account the co-movement
of exchange rates when deciding on sourcing regions. It connects to the hedging lit-
14.1). As a study by the OECD for 2006 confirms, intermediate imports are thereby the dominant
trade flows in OECD countries, representing 56% of the total trade in goods and 73% of the total
trade in services. (compare Miroudot et al. (2009)).
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erature and, to my knowledge, is the first approach of addressing this question in a
systematical manner.
In order to guide the empirical specification for the first part, I propose a stylized
theoretical framework where demand is derived from standard CES preferences and
firms set prices with a fixed markup over marginal cost. Marginal costs are deter-
mined by the composition of domestic and foreign inputs and firms can sell their
output at home and abroad.5 Partially differentiating the expression for sales with
respect to the export weighted exchange rate leads to a simple structural estima-
tion equation. For exporting firms, the structure predicts a positive association be-
tween sales and the foreign currency value. A potentially countervailing association
is established when the firm is offshoring, i.e. purchasing inputs from abroad. A
devaluation of the export related exchange rate then implies increasing input costs,
provided that the co-movement between export and intermediate import related ex-
change rates is positive.
I estimate the equation for log-changes in sales over the years 2004 to 2013, using
a large sample of manufacturing firms from seven European countries, including
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.6 The dependent variable is regressed on
log-changes in the real effective exchange rate as well as interactions with the share
of exports in total sales and the share of imported intermediates in total interme-
diates, i.e. offshoring. Following the literature, the effective exchange rate is con-
structed as a trade weighted geometric average of bilateral exchange rates, where
weights are chosen according to export flows at the industry level. Because I expect
the coefficient on the offshoring interaction to be contingent on the co-movement
between the export and intermediate import weighted exchange rates, I add a triple
interaction with a corresponding measure.7
I find the results to be in line with the theoretical predictions. Specifically, ex-
porting firms on average face higher demand after a devaluation of the domestic
currency. The effect is countered by imported intermediates if the co-movement be-
5 As my data does not provide information on the evolution of exports and imported inputs over
time, I assume the optimal import and export decision to be sunk at the time of observation.
6 Different from earlier studies that relied on price-level or export data, the structure I propose is
built upon firm-level variables that are easily available. This enhances the applicability to different
data sources considerably.
7 Note that the industry weights used in the construction of the intermediate import weighted ex-
change rate are chosen according to imports at the input industry level, using Input-Output (IO)
coefficients to determine the importance of each input industry in the firm’s output industry. For
simplicity, I will use the terms import weighted exchange rate and intermediate import weighted
exchange rates interchangeably.
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tween export and import weighted exchange rates is high enough. The coefficients
of interest have the expected sign and are statistically significant. This implies that,
for exporters, offshoring can in principle have a dampening effect on the exchange
rate elasticity of sales. My data thus confirms earlier findings, showing that multiple
foreign operations have the potential to provide an operational hedge against the ex-
change rate uncertainty facing exporters. Yet, different from earlier studies, I find the
co-movement of exchange rates to be too low for the average firm in my sample. As
pointed out earlier, importing intermediates then reinforces the exchange rate effects
due to exporting.
In terms of economic significance, my findings suggest that doubling the average
sample rate of exchange rate devaluation from 0.3% to 0.6% increases the growth
rate of sales by about 8.8% for the average non-offshoring exporter. For the average
offshoring exporter, the corresponding increase more than doubles to 18.5%. Thus,
instead of offsetting the effect of exchange rates on sales working through exports,
offshoring appears to reinforce it on average. I find offshoring to work as a hedging
device only for firms that, by purpose or luck, choose an offshoring region with high
hedging potential, i.e. a high co-movement between export weighted and interme-
diate import weighted exchange rate. Thus, the best possible hedging region, with
a co-movement indicator at the 99th percentile, completely offsets the export effect
on sales with an import share of only 7%, while the same amount of offhoring can
increase the export effects by more than 73% if the co-movement indicator is very
low, i.e. at the 1st percentile.
In the hedging literature, it has long been recognized that the exchange rate expo-
sure of firms is effectively reduced when the firm engages in multiple international
activities. The underlying mechanism has often been referred to as natural hedg-
ing.8 As the term natural suggests, the hedging effect is implicitly assumed to work
through random diversification. For existing empirical studies, this assumption was
usually sensible, given that most of them are dealing with data on large multina-
tionals. But in the light of the results described above, the assumption needs to be
qualified when small and medium-sized firms with limited international activity are
concerned. For the average exporting firm in my sample intermediate imports tend
to reinforce the effects of exchange rates, thereby increasing exchange rate exposure.
This implies that most firms willing to engage in operational hedging9 activities will
8 See Clark (1973) for an early formulation of the natural hedging hypothesis.
9 Because my findings suggest that hedging requires a non-random choice of sourcing regions for
most firms, I will refer to operational hedging instead of natural hedging from now on.
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have to carefully consider the exchange rate characteristics of export and sourcing
regions.
This consequently provokes a question that has been barely addressed in the liter-
ature: do firms take into account the hedging potential when choosing an offshoring
region?10 Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that they do.11
In order to address this question more formally, in the second part of this paper
I regress regional offshoring choices on regional exports and their interaction with
exchange rate characteristics. Regional exports are included as an indicator of ex-
change rate exposure and because, keeping constant regional characteristics, sunk
cost of regional entry and network effects would predict that firms should be rela-
tively more willing to import from a region that they already know. Nevertheless, if
the region is highly volatile in terms of exchange rates and if firms dislike exchange
rate volatility, then even regional exporters might not like to source from that region.
Again, these results are contingent on the co-movement between import and export
weighted exchange rates. If this co-movement is low for a given region, sourcing
would reinforce the volatility effect of exports and, controlling for other area specific
effects, firms would be wise to import from other regions. But once the co-movement
exceeds a certain level, the high volatility of exchange rates can be effectively hedged
through intermediate imports. Because higher volatility implies a higher risk level,
I would then expect firms to be relatively eager to match exports with intermediate
imports from a given region.
The analysis delivers results that are in line with these predictions. As expected,
10 Amiti et al. (2014) indirectly approach the issue by determining whether the co-movement between
export and import weighted exchange rates at the firm level is increasing in import intensity.
Finding no significant relationship, they conclude that hedging is not systematic. Yet they do not
address the choice of sourcing countries explicitly.
11In its annual report 2007, German car manufacturer BMW explicitly proclaims that "[f]rom a strate-
gic point of view, i.e. in the medium and long term, the BMW Group endeavors to manage foreign
exchange risks by ’natural hedging’, in other words by increasing the volume of purchases denom-
inated in foreign currency or increasing the volume of local production." (BMW Group Annual
Report 2007, p. 63). Similar intentions are expressed in the annual reports of Toyota (2007, p.77)
and Volkswagen (2009, p.188). While these very large multinationals are not representative of the
manufacturing sector, a survey conducted by the Canadian export credit agency EDC among 260
exporters suggests that operational hedging might actually be relevant to a large number of ex-
porters. The authors of the report note that "[a]lthough, natural hedging is an important tactic for
firms of all sizes, [...] small firms are particularly drawn to the use of natural hedging strategies."
Overall, the report finds almost 60% of the respondents to engage in operational hedging activi-
ties (EDC (2009), p.6.). The report defines natural hedging as the attempt "to match revenues in a
foreign currency with payments in that same foreign currency." Note also that Friberg and Huse
(2014) derive counterfactual profit distributions for BMW and Porsche and find that operational
hedging reduces exchange rate exposure.
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the data suggests that the probability of importing from a region is, on average,
higher for regional exporters. Thus, ignoring any exchange rate risks, exporting
increases the probability of importing by 15.9 percentage points. Factoring in the
average level of exchange rate volatility significantly reduces this effect to 4.3 per-
centage points for an average level of co-movement between the export and the in-
termediate import weighted exchange rate. Thus, firms tend to avoid exchange rate
risks. But additionally, the sourcing decision depends critically on the indicator of
exchange rate co-movement. Accordingly, the positive effect of regional exports on
regional imports increases to 7 percentage points in regions with high co-movement
of exchange rates (90th percentile) but decreases to 2 percentage points for regions
with low co-movement (10th percentile). The effects are more pronounced in high
volatility regions (75th percentile of the volatility distribution), where an exporters
facing high co-movement of exchange rates tends to be 4.2 percentage points more
likely than a non-exporter to source from that region, whereas firms facing low co-
movement tend to be on average 3.5 percentage points less likely. These findings
represent a clear pattern in the choice of importing regions that is in line with the
mechanisms explained above. I interpret them as evidence for directed operational
hedging.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II.2 summarizes the related
literature. Section II.3 presents the theoretical framework. Section II.4 introduces
data sources, key variables and discusses the empirical identification. Section II.5
presents estimation results for the theoretical framework. Section II.6 introduces the
estimation equation for local sourcing and discusses the results. Section II.7 con-
cludes.
II.2. Related Literature
The paper connects two strands of the literature that have so far been developed
apart from each other. On the one hand, there is a recent literature that focuses on
imports and global value chains in order to explain the exchange rate disconnect
puzzle. On the other hand, there is a branch of the finance literature that deals with
the exchange rate exposure of multinationals and discusses reasons and means to
deal with it.12 Both strands have provided evidence suggesting that international
12 Note that this paper also relates to a literature that examines the relation between exchange rate
volatility and trade flows. It is surveyed in McKenzie (1999) and Clark et al. (2004) and I will
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sourcing is effectively hedging the exchange rate risk of exporters. Accordingly, the
question arises whether firms might be actively directing their international activi-
ties towards hedging opportunities. This paper adds to both strands of the literature,
providing new evidence for effective and directed operational hedging in the Euro-
pean manufacturing sector.
The first part of the paper relates to the pass-through literature with its recent
focus on imported intermediates. This literature is looking at price adjustments
in response to exchange rate variations and usually requires highly detailed data
on prices or volumes. The analysis then follows from a structural decomposition
of prices into markups and marginal costs. Proceeding this way, Athukorala and
Menon (1994) use Japanese industry-level data and find evidence for an indirect
effect of exchange rates on export prices that is operating through the cost of im-
ported inputs. Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008) review empirical work and find that
after accounting for the variation in markups, structural models of pass-through
tend to produce substantial residual variation that could be due to movements in
marginal costs. Fauceglia et al. (2012) use Swiss industry-level data and find high
pass-through rates of exchange rates into import prices, concluding that importing
intermediates potentially allows exporters to benefit from operational hedges.
But while these studies have confirmed the role of imported intermediates for
pass-through at the sectoral level, evidence at the firm level remains relatively
sparse. Using French firm-level data, Berman et al. (2012) estimate a pass-through
regression at the firm level and find that importing firms increase their prices more
than others in response to a devaluation. While they attribute this effect to a rise in
input costs, the underlying mechanisms are not formally addressed and their anal-
ysis remains silent about the relationship between export and import weighted ex-
change rates. Amiti et al. (2014) develop and test a structural model of variable
markups at the firm level that explicitly accounts for the role of imported interme-
diates and the co-movement between export and import weighted exchange rates.
They find imported intermediates to significantly reduce pass-through rates in their
sample of Belgian firms.
My work is closely related to the approach of Amiti et al. (2014), given that they
explicitly consider the role of exchange rate co-movement for pass-through rates at
the firm level. Yet, different from these authors I measure pass-through into total
sales instead of prices. This allows me to extend the analysis to several countries
briefly return to it in section II.6.
13
II. Operational Hedging
but implies that price and volume adjustments remain closely entangled. Accord-
ingly, I abstract from markup heterogeneity in the structural model.13 Instead, I give
more weight to the structural co-movement between import and export weighted
exchange rates and allow the measure to vary continuously in the empirical applica-
tion.
The paper is also closely related to Greenaway et al. (2010). Similar to the ap-
proach presented here, they focus on (export) sales rather than prices. Using data on
UK manufacturing firms, they find an appreciation to reduce exports. Furthermore,
they find an offsetting effect through imported intermediates. They also distinguish
export and import weighted measures of the exchange rate but do not account for
exchange rate co-movements. Furthermore, their measure of offshoring is not firm
specific.14
The second part of the paper shifts the focus towards the notion of exchange rate
exposure. This concept originates from the business and finance literature and pro-
vides the basis for most of the hedging analysis. Authors like Heckerman (1972)
and Shapiro (1975) define exposure as the sensitivity of the firm value to changes in
the exchange rate. Among others, Jorion (1990) and Bodnar and Gentry (1993) have
therefore used stock market values to assess the exchange rate exposure of multi-
national firms. Because these studies struggle to find significant effects, Bartov and
Bodnar (1994) propose that the net exposure of multinationals depends on the rela-
tive size of foreign costs and revenues and that failure to measure exposure might
be the result of offsetting cash flows. Using data on 409 US multinationals, Choi and
Prasad (1995) provide evidence consistent with the idea.15
Accordingly, some authors have acknowledged the role of internationalization as a
hedging device.16 That firms actively determine their international activities accord-
13 Note that this in theory implies a complete pass-through for firms that source domestically only.
Empirically, I will add markup controls in order to allow for heterogeneous pricing-to-market.
14 The role of imported inputs for pass-through is also confirmed in recent findings at the macro-
level. Thus, Ahmed et al. (2015) and Ollivaud et al. (2015) document a significant drop in the
elasticity of aggregate manufacturing exports to the real effective exchange rate over the last two
decades. They propose the expansion of global value chains as one of the major reasons for that
change over time. Note that while the literature has proposed various determinants of low levels
of pass-through, global value chains are especially suitable when it comes to explaining a change in
recent years. Note also that Leigh et al. (2015) do not share the view of an increasing disconnect at
the macro level but acknowledge the role of international production fragmentation in explaining
a low pass-through of exchange rates into export prices.
15 See Muller and Verschoor (2006) and Bartram et al. (2010) for more recent results on the determi-
nants of exchange rate exposure.
16 The question of whether and why firms hedge against exchange rate risks is not the focus of the
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ing to operational hedging potential has, to my knowledge, only been addressed in
theoretical contributions. Thus, Broll (1992) derives a model of risk averse multina-
tionals and finds that, in the absence of forward markets, profit maximization leads
to active operational hedging. Chowdhry and Howe (1999) show that operational
hedging can be efficient even in a world with fixed quantity forward contracts, as
the alignment of revenues and costs allows for flexible exchange rate hedges that
are contingent upon sales in the foreign country. Empirically, most of the litera-
ture has focused on the relation between financial and operational hedges. Opera-
tional hedges are mostly treated as the result of predetermined geographic diversifi-
cation rather than a specific match of import and export weighted exchange rates.17
Thus, none of these papers provides evidence for firms actually choosing locations
according to hedging potential. Additionally, because exposure is measured through
changes in stock values, most of the literature has focused on large multinationals
and fails to acknowledge the role of operational hedging for a broader set of firms.
present analysis but has been covered in several papers. Dumas (1978) introduces market imper-
fections such as capital market segmentation or bankruptcy costs in order to restore the relevancy
of the financial hedging decision. Rodriguez (1981) presents results from interviews with financial
officers of US multinationals and suggests that risk aversion might play an important role when
it comes to exchange rate hedging. Mayers and Smith (1982) provide a more general discussion
of corporate demand for insurance. A short overview of alternative theoretical assumptions that
justify hedging activities is given Mian (1996).
17 Examples include Houston and Mueller (1988) who note that more geographical diversification
should tend to reduce the need for hedging but find no evidence for that effect in data on US
multinationals. Makar et al. (1999) and Allayannis et al. (2001) also use measures of geographic
diversification as a proxy for operational hedges and assess the effect of dispersion on the financial
hedging decisions of firms. While the former find operational hedging to substitute for financial
hedges, the latter find both types of hedges to be complementary. Pantzalis et al. (2001) show that
operational hedging in terms of breadth and depth of the multinational network lowers exchange
rate exposure after controlling for the presence of financial hedges. Ito et al. (2015) focus on the
relationship between the choice of invoicing currencies and both, the need and effectiveness of fi-
nancial and operational hedges. A summary of the hedging literature with a focus on Europe can
be found in Döhring (2008), who points out that operational hedges, involving high sunk costs, are
typically used to reduce longer-term exposure to economic risk, while transaction risk can be eas-
ily hedged using standard financial products. In general, the literature distinguishes transaction
risk, economic risk and translation risk. While transaction risk refers to the impact of exchange
rates on committed cash flows, economic risk refers to uncertain future cash flows. Translation
risk refers to the impact of exchange rates on the valuation of assets and liabilities denominated
in a foreign currency. Compare e.g. Döhring (2008). Recent survey evidence regarding hedging
from a sample of 804 Swedish firms is presented in Amberg and Friberg (2015).
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II.3. Theoretical Framework
In order to guide the empirical specification, I propose a stylized Dixit-Stiglitz frame-
work of internationally active firms. Using CES preferences keeps the structural
equations tractable, but still flexible enough to provide useful predictions on the re-
lation between exports, offshoring and exchange rate exposure.18
I define marginal costs to be a simple weighted average of domestic and foreign
wages, with i representing the firm specific but exogenous physical imported in-
put share and Ei representing the import weighted exchange rate in price notation
(E€/$):19
MC ≡ (1− i)w€ + iw$Ei (II.1)
Given marginal costs, we can write domestic and foreign prices in the usual
markup formulation:
p€ = µ ·MC (II.2)
p$ = µ · τ ·MC ·
1
Ex
(II.3)
where µ is the markup, τ represents iceberg trade costs and Ex is the export
weighted exchange rate. Note that the markup is determined by the fixed elastic-
ity of substitution σ.
The total sales equation can be written in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz notation:
rtot = r€ + Ex · r$ = R€
[
p€
P€
]1−σ
+ Ex · R$
[
p$
P$
]1−σ
(II.4)
where rj and Rj resemble firm revenues and GDP respectively in country j and Pj
18 Note that in this framework the costs of imported intermediates remain the sole determinant of
the exchange rate pass-through into exporter prices, because a constant elasticity of demand ef-
fectively fixes the markup, muting any pricing-to-market effects. Compare e.g. Goldberg and
Hellerstein (2008).
19 All values are measured in local currency and multiplied with the corresponding exchange rate
where necessary. Thus, foreign labor costs w$ are expressed in Dollars and need to be multiplied
by the intermediate import-weighted exchange rate in order to enter the domestic marginal cost
formula which is expressed in Euros.
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is the country specific price aggregator, all measured in local currency.
Partially differentiating equation (II.4) with respect to the export weighted ex-
change rate (Ex) and multiplying with the total change in the exchange rate yields
the following results:
∂rtot
∂Ex
· ∆Ex = σ · Exr$ ·
∆Ex
Ex
− (σ− 1) · rtot · IS ·
dEi
dEx
Ex
Ei
· ∆Ex
Ex
+ εr (II.5)
where the εr captures general equilibrium adjustments in domestic and foreign
aggregate demand and IS is the share of imported intermediates in value terms.20
This equation has an intuitive interpretation and could, in principal, be directly
estimated. Specifically, equation (II.5) shows that the change in total revenues due
to a devaluation of the domestic currency is composed of two effects.21 The first
term on the right hand side is the direct effect. It is positive and implies that total
sales increase after a devaluation when the firm is exporting (r$ > 0). This term
captures both, the positive effect on foreign sales that is due to the lower conversion
of domestic prices into foreign currency, and a second effect that is due to the higher
conversion of foreign revenues into domestic currency. The second term captures
the indirect effect of importing. It is indirect, because here we are looking at changes
in the export weighted exchange rate. Thus, the indirect effect crucially depends
on the elasticity of the import with respect to the export weighted exchange rate, as
only the former has an effect on the cost of imported intermediates. Furthermore,
it depends on the absolute importance of inputs denominated in foreign currency,
measured by the import intensity times the total value of sales. The effect is negative
given that the elasticity of substitution is larger than one and captures the effect of
higher material cost on foreign and domestic sales. Note further that the absolute
size of both effects is increasing in σ, because a higher price elasticity of demand
implies that the decrease in prices caused by the conversion effect and the increase
in prices due to higher marginal cost both result in larger demand and therefore sales
adjustments.22
20 Specifically, εr resembles a firm specific average of changes in the foreign and domestic demand
shifter (Q€Pσ€ and Q$P
σ
$ ). This is going to be the error term in the empirical specification and is
explicitly formulated in section A.1.1 of the appendix. The share of imported intermediates in
value terms is defined as: IS ≡ iw$Ei
(1−i)w€+iw$Ei
.
21 Note that a devaluation of the domestic currency corresponds to an increase in Ex. A more detailed
decomposition of the effects is provided in section A.1.1 of the appendix.
22 Defining equation (II.5), I implicitly assumed σ to be the same across countries for the sake of
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Equation (II.5) requires data on export sales over time. Unfortunately, my dataset
contains information on total sales only. In principle, I could easily construct the
time varying equivalent for exports, assuming that the export share, that relates only
to 2008 in the data, remains valid over the full period. Instead, I propose a small
transformation that, while still depending on the same assumption, allows me to
express the equation directly in terms of the export share. This provides for a better
fit with my data and reduces the dimension of the interaction term on the import
related effect by one:
∆rtot
rtot
= σ · XS · ∆Ex
Ex
− (σ− 1) · IS · dEi
dEx
Ex
Ei
· ∆Ex
Ex
+ ε̂r (II.6)
where XS is the export share.23
Finally, I am going to reformulate equation (II.6) in terms of real exchange rates,
acknowledging that a change in the foreign price index relative to the domestic price
index should have effects that work through the same channels as a change in the
nominal exchange rate. While the derivation for the nominal exchange rate provides
a helpful conceptional starting point, from the firm perspective it should not mat-
ter whether sales deteriorate due to a nominal appreciation or worsening terms of
trade, induced for example by diverging rates of productivity growth across coun-
tries. Note that in difference to most financial hedging devices, operational hedg-
ing delivers a unique opportunity for firms to hedge against movements in real ex-
change rates. Thus, in order to determine the hedging potential of offshoring, it is
worthwhile to consider the full range of macro-economic risks that the typical ex-
porting firm is facing. Adjusting the equation for movements in real exchange rates
is straightforward and leads to the following equation:24
∆rtot
rtot
= σ · XS · ∆Rx
Rx
− (σ− 1) · IS · dRi
dRx
Rx
Ri
· ∆Rx
Rx
+ εr (II.7)
simplicity. It is straightforward to allow different sigmas at home (σ€) and abroad (σ$). In this
case, the sigma of the the first term on the right hand side of equation (II.5) would be the foreign
price elasticity (σ$), while the σ of the second term would be a trade weighted average of the
domestic and the foreign elasticity. The basic intuition would remain the same.
23 The export share is defined as: XS ≡ Exr$rtot .
24 The equation follows from (II.6) by replacing Ei with Ri ∗ (P€/P$), acknowledging that the relative
price P̂ ≡ P€/P$ is itself a function of the real exchange rate and partially differentiating with
respect to Rx.
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The error term ε now contains additional elements capturing the general equilib-
rium adjustments in the sectoral terms of trade. As with the demand shifters, these
effects are firm specific because the exposure to the sectoral terms of trade effects
with respect to exporting or importing countries depends on the export and the im-
port intensity of the firm.25
Equation (II.7) can be directly estimated, assuming that the export and import
decisions are fixed over time. This is a major simplification but necessary due to the
restrictions of my data.
II.4. Data Description, Key Variables and Identification
II.4.1. Data Sources and Construction of Key Variables
Firm-level data stems from two data sources: the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit
(EFIGE) survey and Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database. The EFIGE survey is at
the core of the analysis as it defines the firm sample. Coordinated by the European
think tank Bruegel and supported by the Directorate General Research of the Euro-
pean Commission, the full EFIGE sample encompasses almost 15.000 firms of the
manufacturing sector in seven European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain,
United Kingdom, Austria and Hungary.26 The survey focus lies on the international
activity of firms. Data was collected in 2010 and covers the years from 2007 to 2009.
However, most information is cross-sectional and only available for the year 2008.
From EFIGE I obtain the share of imported intermediates in total intermediates, the
share of turnover exported as well as information on the regional structure of firms’
international activities as of 2008. The EFIGE survey restricts regional information
to the area level.27 The destination area specific information will become important
for the empirical exercise in section II.6.
I match the firms from the EFIGE survey with Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus
database. This allows me to add balance sheet data for the years 2005 to 2013 as
25 See equation (A.2) in the appendix for an explicit formulation.
26 The survey is representative in terms of the firm-size distribution at the country level for firms
with more than 10 employees in the manufacturing industry. See Altomonte and Aquilante (2012)
and Altomonte et al. (2012) for more details.
27 EFIGE splits the world into eight areas: EU15, other EU, other Europe not EU, China & India, other
Asia, USA & Canada, Central & South America and other areas. See Altomonte and Aquilante
(2012) for a full list of countries and table A.1 in the appendix for a list of the countries used in the
empirical analysis.
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well as detailed information on a firm’s industry class. Especially, I obtain total sales
in every year, as well as a range of other balance sheet variables that I use as controls
or alternative dependent variables.28 The sectoral details enable me to add industry
specific exchange rates to the firm panel.
Industry, country and area specific real effective exchange rates for the years 2005
to 2013 are constructed from four additional data sources: Average monthly nomi-
nal exchange rates of the Euro against a range of other currencies are obtained from
Eurostat. From these I derive bilateral exchange rates also with respect to the Forint
and the Pound Sterling. I index all bilateral exchange rates with respect to the rate of
January 2004. I use seasonally adjusted nominal CPI data from World Bank’s Global
Economic Monitor, again indexed with respect to January 2004, in order to trans-
form nominal into real exchange rates. The effective exchange rates are obtained
by geometrically weighting the bilateral exchange rates according to the trade flow
structure in a given industry with respect to a specific region of international ac-
tivity.29 The trade flow data is obtained from the WITS/Comtrade database and
averaged over the years 2005 to 2007. I construct the export weighted and an in-
termediate import weighted real exchange rate at the two digit level (ISIC Rev.3).
Intermediate import trade flows are linked to the firms’ output industry using the
two-digit Input-Output coefficients from the OECD Stan database as weights and
arithmetically averaging over all input industries.30
Equations II.8 and II.9 formalize how the export weighted real effective exchange
rate (Rx) and the intermediate import weighted real effective exchange rate (Ri) are
constructed with respect to some region κ of international activity:31
28 A list of all variables used is provided in table A.2 in the appendix. The appendix also provides
summary statistics for most variables in tables A.3 and A.4.
29 Geometric weighting is the usual approach for the construction of effective exchange rates. Differ-
ent from arithmetic averages, percentage movements in a geometrically averaged index will not
depend on whether the bilateral rates are expressed in price or quantity notation. They are also
more robust to changes in the base period. Compare e.g. Ellis (2001). See table A.1 in the appendix
for details on the final currency basket.
30 I apply the German IO-coefficients for the year 2005 to all countries for simplicity.
31 For the specification that results from the theoretical framework presented in section II.3, I will
define the relevant currency basket with respect to the world. In section II.6 I will use effective
exchange rates that are specific to a certain area of international activity, i.e. that contain only those
currencies used in a specific EFIGE export destination or import sourcing area.
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Rxcsκt = ∏
k∈κ
(
Eckt ·
cpikt
cpict
) EXcks
∑k∈κ EXcks
(II.8)
Ricsκt = ∏
k∈κ
(
Eckt ·
cpikt
cpict
) ∑z∈IO(s) ςzs ·IMckz
∑k∈κ ∑z∈IO(s) ςzs ·IMckz
(II.9)
where k ∈ κ is the set of trading partners of country c in region κ, Eckt is the price
of country k’s currency in terms of country c’s currency at time t (i.e. the nominal
exchange rate in price notation), cpict is the consumer price index in country c, EXcks
are average industry s exports from country c to country k in industry s, IMckz are
average sector z imports from country c to country k, where z ∈ IO(s) is the set of
input industries z related to industry s via IO-coefficients ςzs.
These real effective monthly exchange rates are then used to determine the covari-
ance of exchange rates for a specific region κ and finally (arithmetically) averaged in
order to obtain yearly exchange rates that can be matched to the firm-level data. I
approximate the theoretical elasticity capturing the co-movement of exchange rates
by the following projection coefficient:32
dRicsκt
dRxcsκt
Rxcsκt
Ricsκt
≈ cov(logR
x
csκt, logR
i
csκt)
var(logRxcsκt)
≡ Projdidxcsκ (II.10)
I use this country and sector specific elasticity as a proxy for the unobserved firm
specific elasticity. Looking at the summary statistics for the implied correlation be-
tween export and import weighted exchange rates yields a mean coefficient of 0.90,
with the minimum around 0.59. While this might be reasonable at the sector level, at
the firm level one would expect the correlation to be much lower or even negative for
some firms. I therefore demean the projection coefficient defined in equation (II.10)
and use P̂roj
didx
csκ instead, which is centered around zero.
33 This has the additional ad-
vantage of substantially diminishing the amount of collinearity in the model. Thus,
when regressing the triple interaction with offshoring and the projection coefficient
32 In order to obtain the variance and covariance of the exchange rates, I use variation over 120 dif-
ferent points in time (12 month in each of the 10 years). Note that Projdidxcsκ has no time dimension.
Note also that an alternative time-varying approximation of dR
i
csκt
dRxcsκt
Rxcsκt
Ricsκt
≈ cov(R
x
csκt ,R
i
csκt)
var(Rxcsκt)
Rxcsκt
Ricsκt
delivers
identical results.
33 Note that the proxy variable assumptions actually require a proxy variable to be mean zero in the
population when it is used in an interaction term. Compare Wooldridge (2010), pp. 74-76.
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on all other explanatory variables in the baseline specification, using the demeaned
version of Projdidxcsκt reduces the variance inflation factor (VIF) from 60 to 1.9.
II.4.2. Discussion of the Empirical Strategy
The theoretical structure represented by equation (II.7) can be directly translated into
the following empirical specification:
∆rcsit
rcsit
=
[
α + β1 · XScsi + β2 · (IScsi × P̂roj
didx
cs )
]
∆Rxcst
Rxcst
+ εcsit (II.11)
The main variation in regression equation (II.11) stems from log-changes in the
country, sector and year specific real exchange rate. As Goldberg and Hellerstein
(2008) point out, the advantage of using exchange rate data is that they provide a
source of large and plausibly exogenous price variation. Additionally, note that the
estimation in changes eliminates some of the endogeneity that usually arises in the
context of firm-level survey data. On the downside, identification is restricted to
variation in log-changes which arguably represents only a small fraction of the total
variation. This makes it harder to establish statistically significant results and implies
that the results can only account for a part of the economic significance. Yet, I would
argue that the complexity of the effects involved would render it almost impossible
to derive useful conclusions from a level regression that, though capturing more of
the variation, would impede a structural interpretation.
Note that while the proposed theoretical structure is very simple, the resulting
empirical specification requires higher-dimensional interaction terms, on top of all
the level effects, in order to identify the underlying mechanisms. As much of this
identification depends on the proper translation of the theoretical into the empiri-
cal model, it is important to point out assumptions and simplifications implied by
equation (II.11) and to discuss the potential problems arising from each. Most no-
tably, note that I assume the export and import decisions to be firm specific but fixed
parameters of the model and that I treat the markup that firms set over marginal
costs to be the same for all firms and constant over time.
The assumption of fixed export and import decisions is due to data limitations.
As pointed out before, variables of international activity are time invariant snap-
shots from the 2008 EFIGE survey and thus the assumption is necessary. At least
the assumption of fixed import shares might not be too restrictive, as Amiti et al.
(2014) find the import share to be empirically very persistent over time. Thus, they
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treat the offshoring decision as fixed in most specifications. Yet the assumption is
a critical one and I will address potential endogeneity arising from it through the
inclusion of sector- and country-specific year dummies. Inasmuch as the potential
adjustments of export and import shares over time follow a sector specific trend, the
fixed effects should account for a substantial part of the confounding effects.
The assumption of fixed markups is simplifying the theoretical framework consid-
erably. Because I do not have price-level data, the structural equations are derived
for aggregate variables, implying that the markup and marginal cost channels are
blurred by mixing up price and quantity adjustments as well as domestic and for-
eign demand components.34 Including variable markups into the structural model
would therefore substantially increase the complexity of the empirical model and
render the distinction and identification of the hedging effects of offshoring less vi-
able. As this is the channel least studied in the pass-through literature, I decided to
keep the structure as focused on the import channel as possible. Still, because firm
size, markups and international activity tend to be highly correlated, it is important
to acknowledge the potential endogeneity arising from markup adjustments and to
think about the impact it might have on my estimates.
A good starting point is the paper by Berman et al. (2012). The authors find that
in models of heterogeneous pricing-to-market the high productivity firms usually
adjust their markups more in response to exchange rate movements than low pro-
ductivity firms, because the perceived demand elasticity is higher for the latter. Ac-
cordingly, when faced with a real devaluation, exporters will increase the markup
and this effect will be stronger for more productive firms. For offshoring firms the
opposite should hold. For them, a real devaluation implies higher marginal costs
and therefore higher prices. Because this reduces demand, these firms will lower
their markup in order to sustain sales. Again, the decrease in markups will be larger
for more productive firms, perceiving demand to be less elastic.
In my framework, the positive effect on sales and the negative effect on sales are
captured in separate interactions, including the export share and the import share
respectively. As more productive firms on average tend to be internationally more
active, I expect both the export and the import share to be larger for more productive
firms and thus, to be positively correlated with the size of the unobserved markup
adjustment. Because the export share interaction captures a positive effect on sales, it
34 Note that Amiti et al. (2014) use export price data, which allows them to conceptually split price
variation into markup and marginal cost variation and reliefs them from accounting for export
intensity.
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will induce firms to increase the markup, where the increase is going to be larger for
firms with a larger market share. Not controlling for the markup variation should
therefore bias the coefficient on the export interaction downward, as the increase in
markups would tend to lower the positive effect on sales for large exporters. By
the same token, an increase in material cost would force firms to lower the markup,
effectively diminishing the increase in prices and the decrease in sales. Therefore, I
further expect the coefficient on the offshoring interaction to be downward biased.
Overall, omitting to control for markup adjustments should make it more difficult
for me to find significant effects on the interactions of interest.
I add markup and size controls to control for other potential confounding effects
due to markup heterogeneity. Specifically, I use the log-change in total assets to
control for changes in size and add alternative time-varying measures of the markup
in levels. Additionally, I include firm fixed effects to control for the firm specific
average of the sales reaction.
Because this paper is concerned with hedging potential, one obvious omitted fac-
tor in specification (II.11) is the hedging activity of firms. Effectively insured firms
should be less affected by exchange rate changes and this would tend to diminish
the absolute size of my estimates given that hedging would be relatively more fre-
quent among exporting and offshoring firms. Again, this makes it more difficult to
encounter significant results. Accordingly, the inclusion of firm fixed effects, con-
trolling for the average hedging activity, should result in larger coefficients. Ad-
ditionally, I provide a specification where I interact my measure of exchange rate
movement with a dummy indicating whether a firm was using foreign exchange
rate protection in 2008.
A related potential problem arises because the projection coefficient is derived at
the sectoral level. Effectively, the proxy resembles the average hedging effectiveness
in the firm’s industry. Yet, the fact that it is sector specific implies that there remains
a firm specific residual component of the projection coefficient in the error term. Fol-
lowing the directed hedging argument, one could argue that this unobserved com-
ponent should be positively correlated with the import and the export share, as in-
ternationally more active firms face higher exposure and would thus tend to adjust
sourcing regions in order to increase the co-movement of exchange rates above the
sector average.35 The sector specific projection coefficient would then underestimate
35 Note that one argument against this potential endogeneity issue could be derived from the findings
of Amiti et al. (2014). They explicitly test for a systematic relationship between the import intensity
and the extent to which firms align import and export regions in their data and fail to find any
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the actual projection coefficient for firms with high import and export shares and the
residual component in the error term would be positive. In the error term, this com-
ponent would show up, among others, in a triple interaction analogous to the one
in the model, inflicting a negative impact on the dependent variable. Because the
firm specific component of the projection coefficient is, presumably, positively cor-
related with exporting and offshoring, I would tend to underestimate the coefficient
on the export interaction, but overestimate the effect on the offshoring interaction.
But then the danger of falsely obtaining significant results would only be present
for the offshoring interaction where the problem is minor, because identification ul-
timately tries to assess the whole effect of offshoring, including the part in the error
term. Again, I try to mitigate these effects altogether by including firm fixed effects
that should account for the firm specific projection coefficient, assuming that it is
constant over time. Sector-country-year fixed effects will account for any mismea-
surement of the projection coefficient over time, that is specific to a certain sector.
This leaves the structural error term εr. Note again that this error term resembles
changes in the dependent variables induced by changes in aggregate variables such
as the domestic and foreign price index and the domestic and foreign demand shifter.
It is firm specific because the weighting of domestic and foreign aggregate changes
depends on firms’ specific composition of domestic and foreign activity. Note that
corresponding terms also form part of the error term in Amiti et al. (2014). Yet, these
are residual effects that remain after controlling for the export and import related
interactions that are present in equation (II.11). Amiti et al. (2014) therefore assume
these factors to be idiosyncratic and mean zero.36 I will follow their assumption
but propose that controlling for firm and sector-country-year fixed effects should
eliminate a large part of any remaining endogeneity.
supportive evidence. The error component would therefore be random with respect to the share
of imported intermediates and not interfere with my results.
36 Compare Amiti et al. (2014), Assumption A3.
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II.5. Estimation Results
II.5.1. Baseline Results
Table IV.1 shows the results from different empirical specifications implementing
equation (II.7).37 Column one ignores the additional interaction with the measure of
co-movement and thus estimates the differential impact of offshoring for the sample-
average co-movement. The negative sign indicates that, if anything, an increase in
the rate of devaluation is slowing down sales growth if the firm is importing interme-
diates. This is in line with the theoretical predictions, though statistically the effect is
indistinguishable from zero. The coefficient on the interaction with the export share
on the other hand is positive and statistically highly significant. Thus, as the theory
predicts, devaluation is positively associated with total sales if the firm is exporting,
because domestic goods become cheaper for foreign consumers. Note further that,
different from the theoretical model, there appears to be an effect from changes in the
exchange rate on total sales growth that is working neither through exports nor off-
shoring. The effect is highly significant and probably captures alternative channels
through which exchange rates have an impact on firms. Country-sector fixed effects
are included as I don’t want my results to hinge on certain countries or sectors in
the sample. Thus, if a certain sector faces more volatile demand than another, these
fixed effect would eliminate part of the difference by effectively equalizing average
sales growth across sectors. Additionally, I add year fixed effects in order to control
for shocks in time that equally affected firm sales in all countries and industries.
In specification (2) I add log-changes in total firm assets as a further control. Note
that specification (1) only contains interactions of time-constant firm variables with
the log change in the real effective exchange rate on the right hand side. Any time-
varying firm characteristic that might have an impact on total sales growth is there-
fore captured in the error term. This becomes an issue if such a factor is correlated
with exchange rates or the variables of international activity, because then the coef-
ficients of interest might pick up variation that is not causally related to the import
cost or the export sales channel described by the model. Most notably, total assets
are directly related to what has been called the translation risk of exchange rates.
Following Döhring (2008), this refers to the impact of exchange rate changes on the
valuation of foreign assets. Foreign assets often result from foreign subsidiaries and
37 If not indicated otherwise, the specifications are cluster robust at the firm level and contain the full
set of sub-interaction terms and level effects.
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are therefore, at least potentially, directly related to the exporting and offshoring de-
cisions of firms. A devaluation of foreign assets also reduces the financial collateral
of firms and might therefore reduce their capability to invest in an extension of the
sales network. Potentially then, total assets might be confounding the effects ob-
served in specification (1). Yet, adding log-changes in total assets does not alter the
coefficients of interest substantially. The offshoring coefficient increases somewhat
in size but remains insignificant. Note though that the level effect of log-changes in
exchange rate is significantly reduced, both economically and statistically. This in-
dicates that the asset control is picking up a substantial part of exchange rate effects
other than those related to exports and imports.
Specification (3) introduces the triple interaction with the measure of co-
movement between the export and the intermediate import weighted exchange rate.
While the simple interaction remains insignificant, the coefficient on the triple inter-
action is negative as expected and statistically significant at the 5% level. Because the
measure of co-movement is demeaned in the sample, this implies that offshoring has
a negligible effect on the (export weighted) exchange rate pass-through into sales in
sectors with an average level of exchange rate alignment, but counters the positive
export effect when the co-movement between exchange rates in export and import
regions is sufficiently high. Thus, the joint location of export and import regions
matters for the hedging potential of imported intermediates.38
In specification (4) I add a time varying markup control defined as total sales over
total cost.39 Though the markup control is highly statistically significant (with a
positive sign), the results do not change much, indicating that the markup control
is either not picking up the relevant variation or markup effects are simply not too
important. I therefore include firm fixed effects in specification (5) to see whether
38 While Amiti et al. (2014) also find the marginal cost channel to depend on the correlation of ex-
change rates, their offshoring coefficient is always significant and does not change signs even for
a low correlation. Different from their result, my findings suggest that the offshoring effect might
actually enhance the exchange rate effects caused by exporting. One potential reason for the dis-
crepancy is that they define a low correlation to be everything below 0.7, which is still a relatively
high correlation. I will discuss the heterogeneity of the offshoring effects in more detail below,
together with a discussion of the marginal effects.
39 The markup measure is winsorized at 1% due to some very low (zero) and some very high (above a
billion) values. The winsorized measure varies from from 1 to 3.55. There is no significant change
in the results when I completely drop observations where the original markup measure is below
1 or above 5. Alternative measures for the markup, such as total profits over turnover, the log of
total assets or the constant export market share from 2008 (defined in Marin et al. (2014b)) deliver
similar results. I also tried adding the markup interacted with the log-change in exchange rates
but the interaction is not significant and other results are practically the same.
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controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in time constant firm characteristics alters
my results.40 Controlling for heterogeneity increases both, the coefficient on the ex-
port interaction and the coefficient on the triple interaction, which is now significant
at the 1%-level. As explained earlier, both unobserved market power (not captured
by the markup control) and hedging activities could have biased the previous re-
sults towards zero. Including firm fixed effects eliminates the constant component
of these confounding factors, which would explain the increase of the estimates.
Specification (6) accounts for a slightly more technical problem. Because the ex-
change rate measures are country and industry specific but not firm specific, error
terms are potentially correlated for the firm within a certain country and industry
cluster. I therefore explicitly allow for arbitrary clustering at the country-industry
level in specification (6). Note that this allows error terms to be serially correlated
across years and therefore subsumes the firm clusters used so far. The use of clus-
tered standard errors results in slightly higher standard errors but the coefficients of
interest remain statistically significant.
In specification (7) I retain firm fixed effects and the smaller number of clusters
but replace year fixed effects by country-sector-year fixed effects. Among other
things, these control for any sector specific changes in offshoring, exporting and
market structure and eliminate the level effects of the real effective exchange rate and
the measure of co-movement as well as their interaction. Thus, systematical errors
through aggregation and approximation of exchange rates and their co-movement
are better accounted for. Additionally, the set of fixed effects now controls for the sec-
tor and country specific general equilibrium effects feeding into the structural error
term. Note that the results in specification (7) are now driven exclusively by devia-
tions over time in the differential effect of exchange rates on sales growth resulting
from offshoring and exporting within a certain country and industry cluster while
accounting for the average characteristics of firms. Nevertheless, both the export and
the offshoring interaction remain statistically different from zero, though the size of
the coefficients and their significance is slightly reduced.
II.5.2. Marginal Effects
It is instructive to discuss the meaning of the coefficients in table II.1 in terms of the
marginal effects involved. I will refer to specifications (5) and (7) as my baseline
40 I loose some firms due to singleton observations but the change in the estimates is driven by the
firm fixed effects rather than the change in the number of observations.
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and my fixed effects specification respectively and present marginal effects for these
two specifications only. Specification (5) contains firm fixed effects, controlling effec-
tively for unobserved firm level characteristics such as time-invariant productivity or
financial hedging activity. Variation at the level of exchange rates is retained and can
be used for identification. Specification (7) is much stricter in that it eliminates poten-
tial biases arising from the imperfect approximation of the exchange rate measures.
On the downside, some precision of the estimates is lost. In analogy to the fixed
effects, specification (5) adjusts standard errors for clustering at the firm level only,
while specification (7) allows for arbitrary error co-variation within a certain coun-
try and sector. Again, there is a potential trade-off involved. While the larger size
of clusters in specification (7) accounts much better for error correlation, the reduced
number of clusters potentially leads to biased estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix.41 Taken together, these two regressions provide for a good compromise be-
tween precision and bias and I propose that the true effect is in the neighborhood of
these estimates.
As noted earlier, the structural equations presented here describe log-changes in
total sales as a function of log-changes in the exchange rate interacted with firm
variables. Thus effectively, I can only explain changes in growth rates of sales.42 For
example, looking at the average exporting firm, and evaluating marginal effects for
the average non-offshorer with an average projection coefficient, I find that doubling
the sample average of the annual log-change of devaluation from 0.3% to 0.6% in-
creases the rate of sales growth by 8.8% in the baseline and 10.9% in the fixed effects
specification respectively. For the average offshoring firm, the increase in the rate of
sales growth is 18.5% in the baseline and 25.3% in the fixed effects regression. There-
fore, offshoring actually increases the rate of sales growth given an increase in the
rate of devaluation at the average level of co-movement between export and import
weighted exchange rates. This is not in line with the predictions of the model, be-
cause the mean projection coefficient in the sample is positive. But with a positive
projection coefficient, the offshoring effect should counter the export effect and not
reinforce it. Technically, this is due to the sign of the coefficient on the single in-
teraction between the rate of devaluation and offshoring. The fact that the sign of
41 Some authors have proposed 50 or more as a rule of thumb for a sufficient number of clusters.
According to this rule, 152 cluster groups appear to be more than enough. Nevertheless, the
underlying analysis is based on state-year panel data and the required number of clusters might be
much higher for unbalanced firm-level data. See Colin Cameron and Miller (2015) for a discussion.
42 I would argue that the finding of evidence for hedging effects of offshoring at the level of growth
rates is an important indicator of potentially much larger level effects.
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Figure II.1.: Marginal Effects for Different Levels of the Projection Coefficient
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Notes: The figure depicts marginal effects at different levels of P̂rojdidxcs , i.e. the measure of co-
movement between export and import weighted real effective exchange rates. Marginal effects
are evaluated for the average exporting firm (TS = 0.32), with the average exporters’ share of
imported intermediates (IS = 0.16). All remaining variables are evaluated at the mean. The
confidence level, depicted by vertical bars along the margins-line, is set to 95%. The marginal
effects relate to specification (7) of table II.1.
this effect is positive potentially indicates that the sectoral proxy of the projection co-
efficient might overestimate the true, firm specific co-movement of exchange rates.
If this unobserved true elasticity was negative for the average firm in the sample,
then the coefficient on the interaction between the rate of devaluation and offshoring
should have a positive sign indeed.
The possibility of the true elasticity being negative on average automatically
brings the question of hedging effects to the foreground again. Apparently, the bal-
ancing effect of offshoring on exchange rate pass-through into sales might not be
as obvious as previous findings suggest. The statistical significance of the triple in-
teraction in table II.1 provides evidence for that. It is then easy to see that hedging
through offshoring requires a co-movement between import and export weighted
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exchange rate that is sufficiently high. Figure II.1 shows how the marginal effect
of a change in the rate of devaluation varies with the projection coefficient for the
average offshoring exporter.43 It is based on specification (7). At the mid-point of
the x-axis, the demeaned projection coefficient is zero, indicating that this measure
is at its sample mean. As noted above, the marginal effect at this point (0.34) there-
fore corresponds to an increase in the rate of sales growth of 25.3%, given a 100%
increase in the growth rate of devaluation. The other points on the x-axis represent
different percentiles from the distribution of the projection coefficient. Going from
the midpoint to the right, the marginal effects depicted in the figure imply that the
increase in the rate of sales growth for the average offshoring exporter is reduced
to 23.02% at the 75th. percentile and to 19.9% at the 90th. percentile. Going to the
left, i.e. diminishing the projection coefficient, the increase in the rate of sales growth
becomes 27.1% at the 25th percentile and 31% at the 10th percentile.
Because in these examples offshoring always reinforces the exchange rate risks of
exporting (up from 8.8%), it is instructive to examine whether it is principally possi-
ble for firms to use offshoring as a hedging instrument after all. In figure A.1 I there-
fore depict the marginal effects for various levels of offshoring. I thereby consider
the best and the worst pairing of export and import regions in terms of exchange
rate co-movement in my sample. Specifically, I examine the marginal effects at the
1st and the 99th percentile from the distribution of projection coefficients. This al-
lows me to consider how large hedging effects can become if firms try to avoid the
exchange rate risks attached to exporting by choosing the origin and share of im-
ported intermediates according to hedging objectives. Furthermore, it shows how
offshoring can dramatically increase exchange rate exposure if import regions are
chosen badly in terms of hedging potential.
Panel A of figure A.1 presents the effects from the baseline specification for the
average exporter. The intercept with the y-axis represents the marginal effect for a
non-offshoring exporter. Using the same hypothetical doubling of the rate of de-
valuation, the marginal effect at this point implies that sales growth is increasing
by 7% for a firm with a projection coefficient at the 99th percentile and 10.3% for a
firm at the 1st percentile.44 Increasing the share of imported intermediates shows
43 I evaluate at the average export share (32.4%) and import share (16.4%) among all exporting firms
in the sample.
44 While the effects from the exchange rate interaction with the export share is identical for both firms,
the difference here is explained by the sub-interactions, specifically the level effect of the exchange
rate and the interaction of the exchange rate with the projection coefficient. This difference is
absent from the fixed effects regression (panel B) because the sub-interactions are absorbed by the
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how the level of the projection coefficient determines whether offshoring is work-
ing as a hedging device: for the high-elasticity firm, the exchange rate effect through
exporting is completely offset for an import share of only 7%. Instead, if the low elas-
ticity firm offshores the same amount of intermediates, it increases the effect on sales
growth by more than 73%, with the new effect now representing a 17.9% increase in
total sales growth.
In Panel B, the intercept of both sub-graphs implies that doubling the rate of de-
valuation increases sales growth by 18.5%. The high elasticity firm can completely
offset the devaluation effect through exports with an import share of 29%. But if the
low elasticity firm would source the same share of intermediates from abroad, the
increase in sales growth would substantially increase from 18.5% to 53.5%.
From this I conclude that if firms want to make use of operational hedges, they
seriously need to consider how exporting and importing regions jointly behave in
terms of exchange rate movements. As the analysis so far has shown, offshoring
can significantly reinforce the exchange rate effects of exporting if firms just follow
the average offshoring pattern in the industry. That average offshoring patterns typ-
ically reinforce the exchange rate risks of exporting is easily reconcilable with op-
timizing firm behavior if other criteria (such as lower prices) are relatively more
important determinants for the choice of sourcing regions. But given the anecdotal
evidence cited in the introduction, the potential for operational hedges might still
play a role in the choice of import regions, once other characteristics such as wages
and institutional factors have been accounted for. Section II.6 addresses this question
empirically.
II.5.3. Robustness
In table A.5 I address the robustness of the baseline and the fixed effects regres-
sion from table II.1. Specifications (1) in table A.5 repeats the baseline regression for
better comparability. In specification (2) I replace the projection coefficient with a
dummy variable equal to one if the projection coefficient is positive and thus above
the sample mean. This turns the measure of co-movement into an ordinal variable
which is less dependent on the cardinal properties of the original proxy variable. The
simple offshoring interaction now increases in size and becomes statistically signifi-
cant, confirming that the positive export effect is reinforced through offshoring if the
fixed effects.
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co-movement between export and import weighted exchange rates is below the av-
erage. Plotting the marginal effects (not shown) confirms that offshoring serves as a
hedging device if the dummy is equal to one. An offshoring share of about 20% then
completely offsets the export related effects. In specification (3) I add an additional
interaction between the log change in the real effective exchange rates and a dummy
variable indicating whether a specific firm is using financial hedges. The result re-
main basically unchanged. Specification (4) uses the non-demeaned, raw projection
coefficients. Now again, the positive coefficient on the simple interaction between
exchange rates and offshoring becomes highly significant, indicating that for a pro-
jection coefficient of zero the effect of offshoring reinforces the effect of exporting
on exchange rate pass-through into sales growth. Note though that this time a zero
projection coefficient does not relate to the sample average but to zero co-movement
between export and the import weighted exchange rates. For the sector-level proxy
this never actually occurs in the sample. Taking the model seriously, the fact that
the effect is still positive again implies that the unobserved firm-level co-movement
is probably negative at this point. Specification (5) repeats the fixed effects speci-
fication from table II.1. Specifications (6) to (8) apply the same robustness tests to
the fixed effects specification that I applied to the baseline. Specifications (6) and (7)
are further robust to sector-country-year fixed effects when using 4-digit instead of
2-digit industry codes. In specifications (9) and (10) I use nominal effective exchange
rates instead of real effective exchange rates. These are constructed as in equation
(II.8) and (II.9) but omit the CPI terms. Accordingly, specifications (9) and (10) cor-
respond to a test of the theoretical equation (II.6). The coefficients are robust to the
change but are slightly less significant in statistical terms. The results are also very
similar in terms of marginal effects. Specifically, using the projection coefficient of
nominal exchange rates at the 99th percentile and applying it to specification (9) im-
plies that 9% offshoring is enough to balance out the effects of exporting. For real
exchange rates, the corresponding share of offshored intermediates was 7%.
II.5.4. Extension
One further way to test the robustness of my results is to see whether the framework
presented in section II.3 is flexible enough to lend itself to other dependent variables.
If the empirical results really capture the theoretical channels suggested above, then
this should allow me to consider theoretically related effects and still find the em-
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pirical results to be in line with the predictions. Specifically, if sales are affected by
exchange rates through the exporting and importing channel in the way that the
theoretical structure suggests, than I should find analogous effects for material costs
and profits. Clearly, total material costs should be related to the costs of interme-
diates and and the price of exports analogously to total sales. But if both sales and
costs are affected then also profits should depend on exchange rates via exports and
imports.
Adjusting the theoretical framework in order to obtain estimable equations anal-
ogous to equation (II.7) is straightforward, once I determine the theoretical counter-
parts of total costs and total profits. Abstracting from fixed costs, which should not
depend to much on exchange rates, these are given as:45
ctot = MC · (q€ + q$) = MC ·Q€
[
p€
P€
]−σ
+ MC ·Q$
[
p$
P$
]−σ
(II.12)
πtot = rtot − ctot (II.13)
where qj and Qj resemble firm and total quantities sold in the corresponding coun-
try. As before, I take the partial derivative with respect to the real effective exchange
rate and obtain the following equations, that closely resemble the effects described
in equation (II.7).
∆ctot
ctot
= σ · A · XS · ∆Rx
Rx
− (σ− 1) · IS · dRi
dRx
Rx
Ri
· ∆Rx
Rx
+ εc (II.14)
∆πtot
πtot
= σ · B · XS · ∆Rx
Rx
− (σ− 1) · IS · dRi
dRx
Rx
Ri
· ∆Rx
Rx
+ επ (II.15)
where A ∈ [0, 1] and B ∈ [1, ∞]
The terms A and B are wedge factors indicating that, relative to total sales, the
export related effects are smaller for total costs and larger for total profits. As shown
in the appendix, the export related effects are the same for all three measures, and
thus A = B = 1, if trade costs are zero (τ = 1). Intuitively, positive trade costs create
a wedge between foreign and domestic prices because exporters transfer the pro-
45 Details on the derivations and on the error terms are provided in section A.1.4 of the appendix.
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duction cost for units lost during transportation onto foreign consumers. Given this
wedge, a devaluation that increases foreign sales relative to domestic sales implies
that the average producer currency price charged by the affected firm is increasing.
This increase in prices adds to the increase in revenues but not to the increase in
quantities. Accordingly, the percentage increase in revenues is going to be higher
than the percentage increase in total costs. With revenues increasing more than costs
in percentage terms, the percentage increase in profits is going to be higher than the
increase in revenues and costs.46
In analogy to equation (II.7), equation (II.14) shows that the change in total costs
can be decomposed into a positive effect that results from the increase in quantities
produced for the export market and a negative effect mainly working through the
reduction in quantities produced due to higher costs and prices. Note that different
from the revenue case, the export related effect now only resembles the lower con-
version of domestic prices into foreign currency, as total material costs are already
denominated in domestic currency. On the other hand, the import related effect now
explicitly contains the higher conversion of imported input prices into domestic cur-
rency, given quantities produced. The effect on operating profits resembles the net
of the effects on total revenues and total costs.
Table A.6 in the appendix shows the results from estimating equations (II.14) and
(II.15). Specification (1) repeats the baseline regression for material costs. The ef-
fects are principally in line with the theoretical predictions though I fail to find a
significant effect for offshoring. Note however, that the absolute size of the coeffi-
cient on the triple interaction is relatively close to the coefficients I obtained for total
sales, which is exactly what theory would predict. Furthermore, the coefficient on
the export interaction is smaller than in the sales regression, which is in line with
the wedge factor 0 < A < 1. In specification (2) I replace the continuous projection
coefficient by a dummy variable indicating that the projection coefficient is above
the sample mean. Thus, specification (2) in table A.6 correspond to specification (2)
in the robustness table for total sales. Now the triple interaction becomes significant
at the 5% level. Again, note how close the estimate on the interaction is to the one
obtained in table A.5. Specification (3) and (4) repeat the exercise with the full set of
fixed effects and the more aggregate cluster level. Qualitatively, the results do not
change significantly.
46 Note that B is also decreasing in µ, because the function that relates the percentage change in πtot
to the percentage changes in rtot and ctot puts higher weight on rtot for higher markups.
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Specification (5) to (8) do the same regressions for total profits. Here I do not find
significant effects on the offshoring interactions. Yet, the export interaction is highly
significant and shows the expected sign. More importantly, the coefficient is larger
than both the coefficients for total sales and total material cost, providing further
evidence for the theoretical structure, as the predicted wedge factor B is larger than
1.47
Summing up, the regressions for total material costs in general confirm all of my
findings for total sales. The theoretical prediction of wedge factors A and B is con-
firmed by the data, adding to the credibility of the theoretical framework. While I
find highly significant effects on the export interaction for total profits, the import in-
teractions are not significant. Note however that observed profits, to a much greater
extent than sales and material costs, contain many elements that are not contained
in the theoretical definition of profits. Most notably, the simple structure presented
here does not account for fixed costs and the costs of employees. Additionally, firms
usually shift profits strategically from one period to another in order to save on taxes.
These omitted factors imply that the empirical profit term is measuring the simple
theoretical equivalent with a lot of noise, probably much more than the other depen-
dent variables. It is therefore not surprising that I find the estimates to be less precise
in the profit specification.
II.6. Regional Choice of Importing Regions
The results from section II.5 suggest that operational hedging requires firms to de-
liberately take exchange rate characteristics into account when deciding on sourcing
regions. Specifically, in order to operate as a hedging device, offshoring needs to
offset some of the exchange rate risk that is due to other international activities. As
the previous analysis has shown, for exporters this requires the co-movement be-
tween export and intermediate import weighted exchange rates to be sufficiently
high. Yet, to my knowledge, no empirical study to date has taken the co-movement
of exchange rates into account in explaining exporters’ choice of sourcing regions. In
this section, I will therefore provide first empirical evidence relating firms’ sourcing
47 Note that taking the coefficients from the export interactions seriously actually allows me to deter-
mine the average trade costs and markups implied by the structural model. Using the estimates
from the baseline regressions implies wedge factors A = 0.85 and B = 1.55. Evaluating the theo-
retical terms of factors A and B at the average export share in the sample (19%) implies trade costs
of τ = 1.22 and a markup of µ = 1.23.
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decisions to the co-movement of exchange rates.
I am going to capture sourcing decisions with a dummy variable indicating
whether a firm was sourcing from a specific area in 2008. As noted earlier, EFIGE
provides information on the regional distribution of international firm activities as
of 2008, where the world is split into eight distinct areas. For each of these areas, re-
spondents where asked to indicate whether raw material or intermediate goods were
purchased from or whether products were sold to that specific area. I use this infor-
mation in order to expand my data along the geographic dimension. Again, I match
the data with monthly real effective exchange rates. These are now constructed as a
trade weighted average of all available exchange rates within a certain EFIGE area.48
I use the monthly data to construct time invariant measures of exchange rate
volatility and the projection coefficient, using the full range of years in my data.
Specifically, I determine the standard deviation of all measures of the effective ex-
change rate as well as the covariance between the intermediate import and the export
weighted effective exchange rates, both in logs and in levels. Note that from these
I can easily recover the regional projection coefficients defined in equation (II.10). I
then drop the time dimension for the empirical analysis. Because EFIGE provides
information on regional exports and imports for 2008 only, I am not able to make use
of the time-dimension when analyzing the sourcing decision of firms. Thus, regres-
sion and identification in this section will be based on a firm-area panel, where one
observation represents firm activity in a specific area of the world.
On this data, I run the following regression:
48 I use the same method as detailed in equations (II.8) and (II.9), only that this time region κ cor-
responds to a specific EFIGE area rather than the world as a whole. I will also construct a third
real effective exchange rate that represents total trade, and thus both intermediate imports and
exports. It is going to provide a measure of the overall regional volatility. I am using the overall
trade weighted volatility rather than the export or intermediate import weighted volatility be-
cause those two measures are highly correlated and a separate identification of effects related to
one or the other is therefore empirically not feasible. The trade weighted volatility is constructed
as follows: Rxicsκt = ∏k∈κ
(
Eckt ·
cpikt
cpict
) EXcks+∑z∈IO(s) ςzs ·IMckz
∑k∈κ[EXcks+∑z∈IO(s) ςzs ·IMckz] .
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importercsiκ = γ + δ1 · exportercsiκ
+ δ2 ·
[
exportercsiκ × sd(Rxicsκt)csκ
]
(II.16)
+ δ3 ·
[
exportercsiκ × sd(Rxicsκt)csκ × P̂roj
didx
csκ
]
. . .
where importercsiκ is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i, active in coun-
try c and sector s, was importing intermediates from area κ in 2008 and exportercsiκ is
the corresponding dummy for exports. sd(Rxicsκt)csκ is the standard deviation over all
months in the sample period of the home country c specific trade weighted real ef-
fective exchange rate in region κ. P̂roj
didx
csκ is the area κ specific elasticity of the import
weighted with respect to the export weighted real effective exchange rate. Addi-
tionally, I am going to add all relevant sub-interaction terms as well as a number of
control variables and fixed effects to the model. Because standard errors are poten-
tially clustered across areas for a given firm and because all firms in a given country-
sector-area combination obtain the same measures of exchange rate volatility and
co-movement, I allow for two-way clustering at the firm and the country-sector-area
level.
My expectations with respect to the sign of the coefficients in equation (II.17) are
explained in what follows. I expect the probability of firm i sourcing intermediates
from region k to be higher if the firm is exporting to that very same region. The
reason is that entering a new geographic region usually implies fixed costs, such as
finding a translator, establishing business networks or getting to know the legal sys-
tem. As a firm that already exports to a region will probably be able to save on some
of these expenses, I expect δ1 to be positive.49 I expect δ2 to be negative if the key
assumption of this paper, that firms dislike exchange rate risk, holds in the data.50 If
49 The reason for taking export status into the model in the first place, is that offshoring decisions are
only related to operational hedging activities for firms that are actually exposed to exchange rate
risks. The export status is clearly a good indicator for that.
50 A large literature has shown that firms’ international activities are related to the volatility of ex-
change rates. Thus, Cheung and Sengupta (2013) and Héricourt and Poncet (2015) show that firm-
level exports to a specific destination are decreasing in the volatility of bilateral exchange rates.
Earlier aggregate and sector-level evidence on the effects of exchange rate volatility on exports is
surveyed in McKenzie (1999). Literature focusing on volatility and FDI flows is reviewed in Bloni-
gen (2005). Note that in a recent paper Héricourt and Nedoncelle (2016) regress regional export
performance on volatility measures and explicitly control for operational hedging by adding a re-
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firms are considering hedging activities because they want profits and sales to be less
responsive to exchange rate shocks, then, ceteris paribus, they should be less inclined
to source from highly volatile regions. This is true even if a firm is exporting to that
region because, as has been shown in the previous sections, offshoring might actu-
ally add to the exchange rate risk of exporting for the average firm. Only if importing
helps the firm to offset some of the exchange rate shocks to the export value, I would
expect the probability of offshoring to be rising in exchange rate volatility for ex-
porting firms. This is the case when the shock to the export weighted exchange rate
translates into a corresponding movement in the import weighted exchange rate.
Theoretically, the degree to which the import weighted exchange rate responds to
the export weighted exchange rate is given by the elasticity of the import weighted
with respect to the export weighed exchange rate. Empirically, this elasticity is ap-
proximated by Projdidxcsκ and accordingly I expect δ3 to be positive.
Table II.2 presents the results from estimating a linear probability model of equa-
tion (II.17). Note that all specifications include at least area and firm fixed effects,
which control for the average level of sourcing in certain areas, industries or for spe-
cific firms. Other than that, specification (1) only contains the explanatory variables
detailed in equation (II.17) and the relevant sub-interaction terms. As expected, the
probability of firm i sourcing from area κ is on average higher for firms that exported
to the given area in 2008. But note that the regional exporter status is becoming,
ceteris paribus, a worse predictor of offshoring when the sourcing region is highly
volatile in terms of the real effective exchange rate. As noted earlier, the reason for
that is that the import weighted exchange rate is not trailing the export weighted ex-
change rate close enough for the average firm. Abstracting from other reasons of off-
shoring, foreign sourcing then simply adds to the already higher exchange rate risks
of exporters. Thus, while the model predicts the probability of regional offshoring to
be 15.9 percentage points higher for regional exporters than for non-exporters when
abstracting from exchange rate volatility, the exporter effect is reduced to 4.3 per-
centage points when factoring in the average level of exchange rate volatility. As the
highly significant coefficient on the triple interaction indicates, the effect of volatility
on the sourcing decision of exporters significantly changes with the elasticity of the
gional import dummy interaction. They find imports to diminish the negative effect of exchange
rate volatility on exports. While their approach is closely related to the one presented here, they
focus on the intensive margin of exports rather than the extensive margin of intermediate im-
ports. They also treat the importer status merely as a control variable and do not further discuss
the implications of their results with respect to operational hedging.
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import weighted with respect to the export weighted real effective exchange rate.
Thus, evaluating at the 10th percentile of the elasticity distribution, exporting in-
creases the probability of regional sourcing by merely 2 percentage points, whereas
the effect is 7 percentage points for an elasticity at the 90th percentile.
The contrast becomes more pronounced when considering regions with above av-
erage volatility. Thus, setting the volatility to the 75th percentile of the distribution
implies that the probability of regional sourcing actually decreases by 3.5 percentage
points for a regional exporter that faces a low co-movement of exchange rates, while
it increases by 4.2 percentage points for exporters facing a high co-movement.
The fact that the probability of importing responds not only to area characteristics,
exporter status and the level of exchange rate volatility, but crucially depends on
the co-movement between intermediate import and export weighted exchange rates
is what I count as evidence for operational hedging. Note that the coefficient on
the triple interaction can be read in two ways. On the one hand, it implies that
for a given level of exchange rate volatility, the probability of regional sourcing for
an exporter relative to a non-exporter is increasing in the co-movement of exchange
rates. This is in line with operational hedging, because the co-movement of exchange
rates implies that a shock to the export weighted exchange rate is offset partly by a
change in marginal cost, keeping profits and sales of the exporter relatively stable.
On the other hand, the triple interaction implies that exporters will attribute more
importance to a given level of exchange-rate co-movement when the volatility of
the potential sourcing region increases. Because then shocks to the value of exports
due to exchange rate movements are relatively severe, exporting firms should have a
higher interest in considering offsetting effects through adjustments in the marginal
cost, i.e. operational hedging.
In specifications (2) to (6) I add various controls at the sectoral level that are po-
tentially correlated with the sectoral exchange rate measures and are known to have
an impact on the sourcing decision of firms. In specification (2) I add area κ’s share
in total intermediate imports of country c to the model, as well as the regional share
in final good exports from country c. Both measures are country, industry and area
specific and are indicative of the differential importance of area κ for sector-level
trade. Not surprisingly, the estimates suggest that firms tend to source more fre-
quently from areas that provide inputs to other firms in the sector. Furthermore, the
probability of sourcing from a given region is increasing in the sectoral importance
of that region as an export market. This is in line with an access cost story at the sec-
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Table II.2.: Area Baseline
importercsiκ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
exportercsiκ 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.180*** 0.0691*** 0.0570*** 0.0755*** 0.0528***
(0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0173) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0182) (0.0168) (0.0172)
exportercsiκ × sd(Rxicsκt)csκ -1.147*** -1.124*** -1.084*** -1.249*** -0.939*** -0.880*** -0.890*** -0.655***
(0.119) (0.123) (0.133) (0.128) (0.114) (0.121) (0.110) (0.143)
exportercsiκ × sd(Rxicsκt)csκ × P̂roj
didx
csκ 1.927*** 2.376*** 1.934*** 1.786*** 1.979*** 2.046*** 1.886*** 3.014***
(0.434) (0.455) (0.434) (0.434) (0.459) (0.457) (0.414) (0.588)
exportercsiκ × P̂roj
didx
csκ -0.0629 -0.108* -0.0700 -0.0300 -0.0349 -0.0458 -0.0630 -0.0710
(0.0616) (0.0641) (0.0616) (0.0633) (0.0619) (0.0632) (0.0587) (0.0687)
sd(Rxicsκt)csκ × P̂roj
didx
csκ 0.161 0.131 0.172 0.177 0.299 0.275
(0.242) (0.249) (0.242) (0.243) (0.271) (0.244)
sd(Rxicsκt)csκ -0.0959 -0.135 -0.121 -0.0855 -0.146 -0.236*
(0.128) (0.122) (0.129) (0.128) (0.137) (0.122)
P̂roj
didx
csκ 0.0453 0.0485 0.0455 0.0403 0.0237 0.0218
(0.0397) (0.0441) (0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0434) (0.0427)
reg. io-import sharecsκ 0.515*** 0.501***
(0.0743) (0.0732)
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.0747* 0.0634
(0.0409) (0.0408) (0.0387) (0.0402)
exportercsiκ × rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ 0.00966 0.0410*** 0.0455*** 0.0718***
(0.00898) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0149)
rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ 0.00211 0.00474
(0.00561) (0.00618)
exportercsiκ × rel. io-lab.prod.csκ -0.0111*** -0.0214*** -0.0233*** -0.0208***
(0.00331) (0.00597) (0.00646) (0.00594)
rel. io-lab.prod.csκ 0.000529 0.00258
(0.00193) (0.00257)
exportercsiκ × Grubel-Lloydcsκ 0.129*** 0.121*** 0.0811*** 0.0477***
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0133) (0.0137)
Grubel-Lloydcsκ -0.0122** -0.0180*** -0.0174*** -0.0203**
(0.00613) (0.00582) (0.00632) (0.00793)
Fixed Effects γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γκ + γi γcsκ + γi γcsκ + γi
Area κ κ κ κ κ κ κ κ̂
Cluster (Firm) 12311 11229 12311 12311 11474 11228 11225 11080
Cluster (Sector#Country#Area) 1450 1026 1450 1450 1039 1026 1008 756
Adj. R2 0.303 0.313 0.304 0.304 0.307 0.315 0.335 0.363
Observations 95,490 86,988 95,490 95,490 88,567 86,952 86,934 65,003
Notes: Observations relate to firm i in area κ, where firms are based in country c and active in sector s. The dependent variable importercsiκ
is an indicator equal to one if the firm is sourcing intermediates from region κ. exportercsiκ is an indicator equal to one if the firm is exporting
to region κ. sd(Rxicsκt)csκ is the standard deviation of the monthly export and import weighted, area κ specific real effective exchange rate,
measured over the full sample period. P̂roj
didx
csκ is the demeaned elasticity of the import weighted with respect to the export weighted area κ
specific real effective exchange rate. reg. io-import sharecsκ is share of intermediate imports from area κ in all intermediate imports (2-digit).
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ is the share of final good exports to area κ in all final good exports (4-digit). rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ is the wage per
employee in intermediate input industries in area κ relative to country c (2-digit). rel. io-lab.prod.csκ is the value added per employee in
intermediate input industries in area κ relative to country c (2-digit). Grubel-Lloydcsκ is the Grubel-Lloyed Index of industry s for trade with
area κ (4-digit). γκ are area fixed effects, γi are firm fixed effects and γcsκ are country-sector-area fixed effects. The sector level is defined at
the 2-digit US SIC level. Specification (7) regroups small areas into larger areas. Specifically, Central & South America are grouped together
with USA & Canada, and China & India are grouped together with Other Countries. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and at
the sector-country-area level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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toral level. Controlling for the differential importance of region κ at the sectoral level
does not alter the main results significantly, though the effect on the triple interaction
increases in terms of absolute size.
While specification (2) controls for the overall importance of the different areas in
terms of trade, specifications (3) to (6) consider specific industry characteristics of
those regions. Specification (3) looks at the per-capita wage in region κ for all in-
put industries of sector s and relates it to the corresponding wage in firm i’s home
country c. Note that I add the relative wage in levels and further allow it to interact
with the exporter dummy. While the reason to enter the level control is quite ob-
vious, the reason to add the interacted control is of a more technical nature: as the
effects under examination happen at the interaction level, controls, supposed to dis-
entangle the exchange rate effects from alternative channels, should also enter at the
interaction level.51 From table II.2 it can be seen that the relative wage control is not
affecting my estimates significantly. The coefficients on the controls are statistically
close to zero, which is somewhat surprising, given that offshoring is often attributed
to low foreign wages. Note however that the specification already controls for area
fixed effects and that the relative wage control therefore measures wage effects only
as long as they deviate at the sectoral level from the area average.
Specification (4) controls for the relative labor productivity in region κ’s input in-
dustries. Again the level control is insignificant but now the effect is significant at
the interaction level. Nevertheless, all interactions of interest remain significant at
the 1% level. In specification (5) I add the Grubel-Lloyd index as a measure of intra-
industry trade. This is supposed to control for the type of final good trade between
area κ and home country c in firm i’s output industry. A rise in the measure implies
that comparative advantages are becoming less important in shaping trade patterns.
The fact that the level effect on the control is negative is in line with offshoring being
less relevant for regions that are similar to country c in terms of the trade struc-
ture. Not surprisingly, the control seems to be important for the correlation between
export and import status and therefore reduces the exporter dummy effect substan-
tially. In specification (6) I add all sector-level controls at the same time but the results
51 For the controls of specification (2), the inclusion of an interaction term yields insignificant results
for the main effects under consideration. This is not surprising, given that the sectoral controls of
specification (2) capture the full industry sourcing patterns and thus will also contain the average
effects of operational hedging at the sectoral level. The remaining variation of the sectoral exchange
rate measure is then simply not enough to identify additional firm specific effects. Different from
the controls in specification (2), the controls in specifications (3) to (6) are focused exclusively on
alternative channels, leaving the full variation related to exchange rates for identification.
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remain stable.
In specification (7), I replace area dummies by country-sector-area fixed effects.
Accordingly, all level effects relating to the exchange rate measures and some of the
controls are dropped from the model.52 Specification (7) is my preferred specifica-
tion. Astonishingly, the marginal effects implied by specification (7) are very close
to the effects discussed earlier. Thus, for a high volatility region (75th percentile of
the distribution), specification (7) implies that exporting decreases the probability of
regional sourcing by 3.4 percentage points if the projection coefficient is at the 10th
percentile but increases the probability by 4.2 percentage points for a projection co-
efficient at the 90th percentile of the distribution. The earlier results were -3.5 and
4.2 respectively.
Specification (8) repeats specification (7), but is based on a different area group-
ing. Specifically, I group the smallest regions together, i.e. Central & South America
together with USA & Canada and China & India together with Other Countries. As
shown in table A.1 in the appendix, exchange rate data is available for a limited set
of countries only. Matching the different data sets implies an additional loss of coun-
tries, such that in my data Central & South America consists of Brazil and Mexico
only. Furthermore, the complete set of Other Areas is represented by South Africa
alone. Naturally, if the number of countries in a given region becomes too small,
the co-movement of exchange rates increases. Thus effectively, the correlation coeffi-
cient is equal to one for Other Areas and potentially gets close to one if the number of
countries per area is small.53 This effect was of no consequence in the first part of the
paper, as all effective exchange rates were constructed over the same set of available
countries. For the current specification, the number of countries that feed into the
area-specific effective exchange rates is different across areas. Note though, that this
is partly controlled for by area or country-sector-area fixed effects. Still, because I am
identifying at the interaction level, some of the constructional bias in projection coef-
ficients might still be present in my results. Regrouping countries into broader areas
increases the minimum number of countries in a given area to four.54 As shown in
52 Note that controls determined at the final good industry level remain in the model because they
are constructed at the 4-digit industry level, whereas sectoral dummies relate to the 2-digit level.
See the variable description in the appendix for details.
53 See table A.4 in the appendix.
54 Except for EU15 (14) and Other Asian (8), the groups are now relatively homogenous in size, with
four or five countries in each regional cluster. In the robustness section I will re-run the regression
omitting the two larger areas and show that my results do not exclusively hinge on these two
country clusters.
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table II.2, the results remain qualitatively the same for the new grouping. Quantita-
tively, the effects are slightly smaller, with the probability of regional imports from
a high volatility region increasing in exporter status by 3.5 percentage points for a
high projection coefficient but virtually independent of exporting for firms facing a
low projection coefficient. Note though, that by reducing the number of areas from 8
to 6, a quarter of the observations yields no additional information and accordingly
is lost for the empirical analysis. Because my focus lies on the qualitative results, I
will stick to the full data set in what follows.
In table A.7 I present further robustness results, built upon specification (7) from
the baseline table. Specification (1) to (5) consider real exchange rates and specifica-
tion (6) to (10) nominal exchange rates. I will mention differences between the real
and the nominal exchange rate specifications only if relevant. Specifications (1) and
(6) repeat the baseline. Note that my baseline results are robust to using the nominal
instead of the real exchange rate. The marginal effects are slightly larger, with the
probability of regional sourcing 5 percentage points higher for a firm with projec-
tion coefficient at the 90th percentile and 4.3 percentage points lower for a firm at
the 10th percentile (evaluated for regions with exchange rate volatility at the 75th
percentile). In specifications (2) and (7), I use the non-demeaned projection coeffi-
cient which delivers identical results for the triple interaction. Specifications (3) and
(8) use an indicator equal to one if the demeaned projection coefficient is larger than
zero. The results remain qualitatively the same. The marginal effects implied are +3.6
and -1.6 percentage points for the real exchange rate (+4.3 and +1.6 for the nominal
exchange rate) where these now refer to a firm with above and below average pro-
jection coefficient. Specification (4) and (9) use the demeaned correlation coefficient
rather than the projection coefficient. This renders the coefficient on the triple inter-
action negative and insignificant. While this might be due to high collinearity of the
triple interaction term,55 I would argue that to some extent it also reflects the limited
information content of the correlation coefficient. While the projection coefficient
contains information regarding the actual size of the response in the intermediate
import weighted exchange rate to a change in the export weighted exchange rate,
the correlation just measures their unit-free association. Because hedging requires
the response in the costs of intermediates to be sizable, the projection coefficient is
the preferable measure.
55 The variance inflation factor (VIF) of the triple interaction, for real exchange rates, is 16.9 for the
correlation coefficient - up from 5.5 for the projection coefficient.
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Specification (5) and (10) finally omit EU15 and Other Asian Countries from the
set of regions. As discussed earlier, these areas are especially large in terms of the
number of distinct countries involved and thus the projection coefficient might be
biased due to constructional reasons. Furthermore, EU15 is by far the most impor-
tant area in terms of export and import activity (see table A.4), with about 48% of
the firms exporting to and 35% of the firms sourcing from EU15. Additionally, note
that 12 out of 15 countries in EU15 use the Euro as currency. For many of the firms
in my data, the exchange rate risk for the EU15 activities is therefore relatively small
and relates to changes in the relative price levels. Accordingly, it is important to
check whether my results hinge on the EU15 alone. As shown in specification (5)
and (10), the effect on the triple interaction turns insignificant after dropping EU15
and Other Asian Countries for real exchange rates but remains significant close to
the 5% level for the nominal exchange rate (p-value = 0.051).56 The marginal effects
for the high and low projection coefficient implied by these estimates are +4.5 and
-0.093% respectively.
II.7. Conclusion
This paper confirms earlier results, suggesting that imported intermediates are im-
portant determinants for the pass-through of exchange rates into prices and sales of
an exporter. If marginal costs and export prices are denominated in currencies that
are closely related, then shocks to the exchange rate will trigger offsetting effects on
foreign demand. Specifically, a devaluation will lower foreign prices through a con-
version effect and increase foreign prices due to higher marginal costs. The reverse
effects hold for an appreciation. This is an important finding, given that the appar-
ent disconnect between exchange rates and trade flows has been considered one of
the major puzzles in macroeconomics. Yet, the shift of focus away from the macroe-
conomic country perspective towards decisions taken at the firm level has brought
to light a second question: do internationally active firms synchronize international
activities and purposely produce a disconnect between exchange rates and prices in
order to reduce their exposure to exchange rates?
The findings presented in this paper shed new light on this question that has only
been addressed for large multinationals in the previous literature. They suggest that
a qualified yes might be the answer. Offshoring provides for a means to operational
56 The p-value is 0.029 when only omitting the EU15 and keeping Other Asian Countries in the model.
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hedging if and only if sourcing regions are closely related to the firm’s export market
in terms of exchange rate co-movement. Note that the conditionality of the statement
as well as the focus on small and medium-sized firms are two sides of a medal. Large
multinationals are active in many countries and many dimensions, whereas the di-
versity of international activities decreases rapidly when considering smaller firms.
Thus, while the diversification effect might provide a natural hedge for large multi-
nationals, as earlier studies have confirmed, my findings suggest that smaller firms
will have to actively match international activities in order to benefit from opera-
tional hedges.
Viewed from a different perspective, my results send a clear warning to small and
medium-sized firms considering a mix of different international activities: because
export and sourcing decisions are often taken for reasons other than exchange rate
considerations, such as cheap foreign inputs or promising foreign markets, firms are
potentially underestimating the exchange rate risks involved. The tempting idea of
natural hedges just doesn’t appear to hold for the average firm.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Theoretical Appendix
A.1.1. Decomposition of Effects for Total Sales
∂rtot
∂Ex
=
∂r€
∂Ex
+
∂Exr$
∂Ex
=
∂p€q€
∂Ex
+
∂Ex p$q$
∂Ex
=
∂p€
∂Ex
q€︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
+
∂q€
∂Ex
p€︸ ︷︷ ︸
b+ε1
+
∂Ex
∂Ex
p$q$︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
+
∂p$
∂Ex
Exq$︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
+
∂q$
∂Ex
Ex p$︸ ︷︷ ︸
e+ε2
Where in case of a devaluation total revenues change due to:
• the change in domestic revenues
a) higher prices due to higher import cost (given quantities)
b) lower demand due to higher prices
ε1) sectoral effect that resembles general equilibrium adjustments in the do-
mestic demand shifter
• and the change in foreign revenues
c) higher conversion of foreign revenues into domestic currency (given rev-
enues in foreign currency)
d) change in foreign prices due to d1) higher import cost and d2) lower con-
version of domestic prices into foreign currency (given quantities)
e) change in foreign demand due to the price changes induced by e1) higher
import cost and e2) lower conversion of domestic prices into foreign cur-
rency (given quantities)
ε2) sectoral effect that resembles general equilibrium adjustments in the for-
eign demand shifter
Using Dixit-Stiglitz definitions of prices, quantities and the price elasticity of de-
mand, as well as my definitions of marginal cost and the share imported intermedi-
ates (IS), reordering, multiplying with the absolute change in Ex and keeping track
of the effects we obtain equation (II.5):
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∂rtot
∂Ex
· ∆Ex = σ · Exr$ ·
∆Ex
Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
c+d2+e2
−(σ− 1) · rtot · IS ·
dEi
dEx
Ex
Ei
· ∆Ex
Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
a+b+d1+e1
+ r€ ·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε1
+ Exr$ ·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε2
The effects are now ordered in the following way:57
• A positive effect on foreign revenues due to a higher conversion of foreign
revenues into domestic currency (c)
• A positive effect on foreign revenues due to a lower conversion of domestic
prices into foreign currency (d2 + e2)
• A negative effect on domestic revenues due to higher material cost (a + b),
• A negative effect on foreign revenues due to higher material cost (d1 + e1)
• Sectoral effects that resemble general equilibrium adjustments in the domes-
tic and foreign demand shifter, weighted by firm activity at home and abroad
(ε1 + ε2)
A.1.2. The Structural Error for Nominal Exchange Rates
ε̂r = (1− XS) ·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€
+ XS ·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$
(A.1)
A.1.3. The Structural Error for Real Exchange Rates
εr = (1− XS) ·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€
+ XS ·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$
(A.2)
+σ · 1 · XS · ∆P̂
P̂
− (σ− 1) · IS · ∆P̂
P̂
where P̂ ≡ P€/P$ resembles the relative price levels abroad and at home.
57 Note that the quantity effect always dominates the price effect for σ > 1
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A.1.4. Extension for Costs and Profits
Costs
∂ctot
∂Ex
=
∂qtot
∂Ex
·MC︸ ︷︷ ︸
A: change in demand
+ qtot ·
∂MC
∂Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
B: change in marginal cost
Where the change in quantities produced (A) is determined by:
∂(q€ + q$)
∂Ex
= Q€Pσ€ ·
∂p−σ€
∂Ex
+ Q$Pσ$ ·
∂p−σ$
∂Ex
+ p−σ€ ·
∂Q€Pσ€
∂Ex
+ p−σ$ ·
∂Q$Pσ$
∂Ex
= −σ · q€
p€
· ∂p€
∂Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
a1
+ (−σ) · q$
p$
· ∂p$
∂Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
a2+a3
+ p−σ€ ·
∂Q€Pσ€
∂Ex
+ p−σ$ ·
∂Q$Pσ$
∂Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε′c
Thus, a devaluation:
a1) decreases domestic demand due to higher domestic prices (higher input costs)
a2) decreases foreign demand due to higher foreign prices (higher input costs)
a3) increases foreign demand due to lower conversion of domestic prices into for-
eign prices
B) increases total cost due to higher conversion of imported input prices into do-
mestic currency (given quantities)
ε′c) Sectoral effects that resemble general equilibrium adjustments in the domestic
and foreign demand shifter, weighted by firm activity at home and abroad
Multiplying with the absolute change in exchange rates, using Dixit-Stiglitz defini-
tions of prices, quantities and the price elasticity of demand, as well as my definitions
of marginal cost and the share imported intermediates (IS), reordering and keeping
track of the effects we obtain:
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∂ctot
∂Ex
· ∆Ex = σ · Exc$ ·
∆Ex
Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
a3
−(σ− 1) · IS · ctot ·
dEi
dEx
Ex
Ei
· ∆Ex
Ex︸ ︷︷ ︸
a1+a2+B
+ c€ ·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€
+ Exc$ ·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$︸ ︷︷ ︸
εc
Profits The equivalent of equation (II.15) in nominal terms results by using equa-
tions (II.6) and (A.3) and noting that:
∂π
∂Ex
· ∆Ex =
∂rtot
∂Ex
· ∆Ex −
∂ctot
∂Ex
· ∆Ex
Wedge Factor for Costs
∆ctot
ctot
= σ · Exc$
ctot
· ∆Ex
Ex
− (σ− 1) · IS · dEi
dEx
Ex
Ei
· ∆Ex
Ex
+
c€
ctot
·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€
+
Exc$
ctot
·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε̂c
Using:
Exc$ = [(1− i)w€ + iw$Ei] · q$ = Exr$ ·
1
µτ
ctot = [(1− i)w€ + iw$Ei] · (q€ + q$) = r€ ·
1
µ
+ Exr$ ·
1
µτ
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⇒ Exc$
ctot
=
Exr$ · 1τ
r€ + Exr$ · 1τ
=
Exr$
rtot
· rtot
r€τ + Exr$
=
Exr$
rtot
·
−1[
r€
rtot
· τ + Exr$
rtot
· 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A∈[0,1]
= XS · A
where: A→ 1 if τ → 1 and A→ 0 if τ → ∞
Wedge Factor for Profits
∆π
π
= σ · Exπ$
πtot
· ∆Ex
Ex
− (σ− 1) · IS · dEi
dEx
Ex
Ei
· ∆Ex
Ex
+
π€
πtot
·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€
+
Exπ$
πtot
·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε̂π
Using:
Exc$ = Exr$ ·
1
µτ
ctot = r€ ·
1
µ
+ Exr$ ·
1
µτ
⇒ Exπ$
πtot
=
Exr$ − Exc$
rtot − ctot
=
Exr$
(
1− 1µτ
)
rtot −
(
Exr$ 1µτ + r€
1
µ
)
=
Exr$
rtot
· µτ − 1
µτ −
(
Exr$
rtot · 1 +
r€
rtot · τ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B∈[1,∞]
= XS · B
where: B→ 1 if τ → 1 and B→
[
1− r€
rtot
1
µ
]−1
> 1 if τ → ∞
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The Structural Error for Real Exchange Rates - Costs
εc = (1− XS · A) ·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€
+ XS · A ·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$
(A.3)
+σ · A · XS · ∆P̂
P̂
− (σ− 1) · IS · ∆P̂
P̂
The Structural Error for Real Exchange Rates - Profits
επ = (1− XS · B) ·
∆Q€Pσ€
Q€Pσ€
+ XS · B ·
∆Q$Pσ$
Q$Pσ$
(A.4)
+σ · B · XS · ∆P̂
P̂
− (σ− 1) · IS · ∆P̂
P̂
A.2. Data Appendix
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Table A.1.: The Currency Basket
EFIGE Area Partner Country Currency
EU15 Austria Euro
EU15 Belgium Euro
EU15 Denmark Danish krone
EU15 Finland Euro
EU15 France Euro
EU15 Germany Euro
EU15 Greece Euro
EU15 Ireland Euro
EU15 Italy Euro
EU15 Luxembourg Euro
EU15 Netherlands Euro
EU15 Portugal Euro
EU15 Spain Euro
EU15 Sweden Swedish krona
EU15 United Kingdom Pound sterling
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Bulgaria Bulgarian lev
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Czech Republic Czech koruna
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Hungary Hungarian forint
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Poland Polish zloty
OTHER EU COUNTRIES Romania Romanian leu
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Croatia Croatian kuna
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Norway Norwegian krone
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Russian Federation Russian rouble
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Switzerland Swiss franc
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES NOT EU Turkey Turkish lira
CHINA AND INDIA China Renminbi-yuan
CHINA AND INDIA Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar
CHINA AND INDIA India Indian rupee
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Indonesia Indonesian rupiah
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Israel Israeli shekel
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Japan Japanese yen
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Korea, Rep. South Korean won
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Malaysia Malaysian ringgit
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Philippines Philippine peso
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Singapore Singapore dollar
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES Thailand Thai baht
USA AND CANADA Canada Canadian dollar
USA AND CANADA United States US dollar
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Brazil Brazilian real
CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Mexico Mexican peso
OTHER AREAS South Africa South African rand
dropped due to missing price data Australia Australian dollar
dropped due to missing price data New Zealand New Zealand dollar
dropped due to missing price data Serbia Serbian dinar
dropped due to missing price data Argentina Argentine peso
dropped due to missing trade data Iceland Icelandic krona
dropped due to missing trade data Macedonia Denar (of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
dropped due to missing trade data Taiwan New Taiwan dollar
Notes: I use bilateral nominal exchange rates with respect to the Euro from Eurostat [ert_bil_eur_m]. These are matched
with seasonally adjusted CPI price data from World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor [CPTOTSAXN] in order to construct
real exchange rates with respect to the Euro, the Pound Sterling and the Hungarian Forint. Eurostat provides bilateral
exchange rates with respect to the EURO for 36 currencies. I can match 32 of these currencies with the CPI data, loosing
the Australian Dollar, the New Zealand Dollar, the Serbian Dinar and the Argentine Peso due to missing price data for the
base month January 2004. Matching the combined exchange rate and price data with trade data leads to the loss of three
additional currencies, the Icelandic Krona, the Macedonian Denar and the New Taiwan Dollar. The reason is that I want
to keep the set of countries feeding into the weighting of exchange rates to be relatively constant across all industries and
I want them to be the same for both export and import flows. As trade flows are a crucial determinant in the effective
exchange rate construction, they also determine the co-movement of effective exchange rates. I therefore need to make sure
that it is not missing data that is driving my results. Thus, I drop industries when too many countries are missing for those
industries and I drop countries with two many missing industries. This results in a set of 29 currencies other than the Euro,
plus 12 distinct real Euro exchange rates.
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Table A.2.: Description of Variables
variable description
XScsi Percentage of annual turnover represented by exports (2008, EFIGE).
IScsi Percentage of intermediate goods purchased from abroad (2008, EFIGE).
importercsiκ Indicator equal to 1 if percentage of intermediate goods purchased from area κ larger
than zero (2008, EFIGE).
exportercsiκ Indicator equal to 1 if percentage of exports sold to area κ larger than zero (2008,
EFIGE).
FHcsi Indicator equal to 1 if firm uses foreign exchange risk protection (2008, EFIGE).
Salescsit turnover in th. EUR (Amadeus), if missing: costs of goods sold - costs of employees in
th. EUR (Amadeus).
Materialcostcsit material cost in th. EUR (Amadeus)
Pro f itscsit gross profit in th. EUR (Amadeus), if missing: turnover - costs of goods sold in th. EUR
(Amadeus).
Assetscsit total assets in th. EUR (Amadeus).
µcsit turnover / (cost of employees + material cost) in th. EUR (Amadeus). Alternative
measures used: (turnover - cost of employees - material cost) /turnover in th. EUR
(Amadeus) , EMS2008csκ : XScsκ ∗ Sales2008csκ / (total sectoral imports of the outside world
(WITS/Comtrade), see Marin et al. (2014b) for detailed information).
R fcsκt with f ∈ x, i, xi Export weighted (x), intermediate input weighted (i) or export and import weighted
(xi) real effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ. If the κ is
omitted, the weighting is done with respect to the whole world. See section II.4 for
detailed information.
E fcsκt with f ∈ x, i, xi Export weighted (x), intermediate input weighted (i) or export and import weighted
(xi) nominal effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ. If the κ is
omitted, the weighting is done with respect to the whole world. See section II.4 for
detailed information.
Projdidxcsκ Elasticity of the monthly intermediate import weighted with respect to the export
weighted exchange rate, measured over the full sample period. Real or nominal in
accordance with the exchange rate measure used and specific to country c, sector s
and area κ. If the κ is omitted, the weighting is done with respect to the whole world.
P̂roj
didx
csκ is the corresponding measure demeaned for the sample. See section II.4 for
detailed information.
ĉorrcsκ Simple correlation coefficient between the monthly intermediate import weighted and
the export weighted exchange rate, demeaned for the regression sample and
measured over the full sample period. Real or nominal in accordance with the
exchange rate measure used and specific to country c, sector s and area κ.
sd(Rxicsκt)csκ Standard deviation of the monthly intermediate import and export weighted real
effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ and measured over
the full sample period.
sd(Exicsκt)csκ Standard deviation of the monthly intermediate import and export weighted nominal
effective exchange rate specific to country c, sector s and area κ and measured over
the full sample period.
reg. io-import sharecsκ Share of region κ in all industry s intermediate imports into country c. Import data at
the 2-digit level (ISIC Rev. 3) from WITS/Comtrade, linked to output industries via the
IO-table from OECD Stan.
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ Share of region κ in all industry s final good exports from country c. Export data at the
4-digit level (ISIC Rev. 3) from WITS/Comtrade.
rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ Wage per Employee (INDSTAT, ISIC Rev. 3, 2-digit) in region κ relative to Wage per
Employee in country c. Relative wage is input-industry specific, where input
industries have been linked to output industries via the IO-table from OECD Stan.
rel. io-lab.prod.csκ Value Added per Employee (INDSTAT, ISIC Rev. 3, 2-digit) in region κ relative to
Value Added per Employee in country c. Relative labor productivity is input-industry
specific, where input industries have been linked to output industries via the IO-table
from OECD Stan.
Grubel-Lloydcsκ 1− |EXcsκ−IMcsκ |EXcsκ+IMcsκ , where EXcsκ are final good export flows from country c to area κ in
industry s (WITS/Comtrade) at the 4-digit level (ISIC Rev. 3) and IMcsκ are
corresponding final good import flows from region κ into country c.
Table A.3.: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Summary Statistics for Section II.5
∆log(Salescsit) 60174 0.00 0.22 -0.75 0.66
∆log(Materialcostscsit) 60174 0.00 0.34 -1.15 1.04
∆log(Pro f itscsit) 60174 -0.01 0.38 -1.51 1.20
real
∆logRxcst 60174 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.14
P̂roj
didx
cs 60174 0.00 0.16 -0.51 0.67
P̂roj
didx
cs > 0 60174 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Projdidxcs 60174 0.86 0.16 0.35 1.53
nominal
∆logExcst 60174 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.14
P̂roj
didx
cs 60174 0.00 0.14 -0.37 0.61
P̂roj
didx
cs > 0 60174 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Projdidxcs 60174 0.65 0.14 0.28 1.25
IScsi 60174 0.13 0.23 0.00 1.00
XScsi 60174 0.19 0.27 0.00 1.00
µcsit 60174 1.53 0.38 1.00 3.55
∆log(Assetscsit) 60174 0.03 0.18 -0.51 0.61
FHcsi 60174 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Summary Statistics for Section II.6
importercsiκ 86934 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
exportercsiκ 86934 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
real
sd(Xxicsκt)csκ 86934 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.35
P̂roj
didx
csκ 86934 0.00 0.16 -0.82 0.79
Projdidxcsκ 86934 0.98 0.16 0.16 1.77
P̂roj
didx
csκ > 0 86934 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
ĉorrcsκ 86934 0.00 0.08 -0.86 0.05
nominal
sd(Xxicsκt)csκ 86934 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.25
P̂roj
didx
csκ 86934 0.00 0.20 -1.18 0.87
Projdidxcsκ 86934 0.93 0.20 -0.25 1.81
P̂roj
didx
csκ > 0 86934 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
ĉorrcsκ 86934 0.00 0.16 -1.08 0.11
reg. io-import sharecsκ 86934 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.75
reg. f inal-export sharecsκ 86934 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.94
rel. io-wage (p.C.)csκ 86934 0.59 0.56 0.04 5.86
rel. io-lab.prod.csκ 86934 0.88 0.95 0.12 12.54
Grubel-Lloydcsκ 86934 0.52 0.29 0.00 1.00
Notes: Table provides selected summary statistics for the vari-
ables used in sections II.5 and II.6. For a definition of vari-
ables, see table A.2. ∆log(Salescsit), ∆log(Materialcostscsit),
∆log(Pro f itscsit), ∆log(Assetscsit) and µcsit are winsorized at the
1%-level in order to normalize the error distribution. The results
presented are robust to using the non-winsorized variables.
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III. Organizations as Competitive
Advantage
III.1. Introduction
Little is known about the effect of organizational choices on the international com-
petitiveness of firms within their market. This paper links the organization of firms
to their export activity using representative firm-level data for the European manu-
facturing sector. Two important margins of organizational adjustment are offshoring
and decentralization of decision making. Firms that reorganize production interna-
tionally and offshore part of the production to other countries can reduce their costs
and compete on prices. Firms with a more decentralized hierarchy can empower
their knowledge workers to suggest new ideas and compete on product quality.
During the last decade, much of the literature on international trade has centered
around the heterogeneity of firm export activities.1 More productive firms are more
likely to enter export markets, obtain more sales from exports, export more products
and sell higher quality goods.2
Furthermore, the increasing availability of firm-level data during recent years has
pushed research in organizational economics to new empirical grounds. This al-
lowed for a linkage between differences in organizational choices and firm produc-
tivity.3
This chapter is joint work with Dalia Marin and Jan Schymik. We have benefited from the access
to the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit database, managed by Bruegel and funded by the EU 7th
Framework Programme ([FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement no. 225551), as well as by Uni-
Credit.
1See Bernard et al. (2012b) for a literature review.
2Melitz (2003); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that firms with lower production costs are more
likely to become exporters and sell more on international markets. Bernard et al. (2011), Eckel and
Neary (2010) and Nocke and Yeaple (2008) show that lower production costs increase the scope of
exported products. Hottman et al. (2014) provide evidence on the quality channel in export sales.
3See Bloom et al. (2010) for a literature review.
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This paper aims at the largely untapped overlap between these two strands of the
literature, linking the organization of firms to their export activity. This allows us
to shift the focus away from exogenously given productivity distributions towards
actual firm-level decisions that determine the competitive position of firms within
international markets. Naturally, it is important for policy makers to understand the
specific channels linking firm decisions to international competitiveness.
We provide firm-level evidence on the role of firm organization on international
competitiveness based on representative data of nearly 15,000 European manufac-
turing plants with detailed information about their exporting and organizational
behavior.4 We show that both, offshoring and decentralized management, are im-
portant determinants of firm competitiveness and thus relevant for European policy
makers.
We motivate our empirical analysis with a stylized theoretical framework that
links organizational decisions to market shares and the product quality that firms of-
fer. Firm success in foreign markets is based on two determinants: production costs
and product quality. We propose two channels of adjustment for these determinants
that have been widely discussed in the literature. First, firms in our model can im-
port intermediate inputs which reduces their production costs. Second, firms may
switch towards a more decentralized hierarchy where strategic decisions are made at
lower levels of the hierarchy. Decentralizing decision rights empowers knowledge
workers and raises their creative efforts. Flatter chains of command thus promote
creativity and incentivize the creation and implementation of new ideas, which ulti-
mately translates into higher quality competitiveness.
Based on the model, we test the following predictions: First, offshoring and better
product quality increase the competitive position of a firm within its specific mar-
ket. Second, decentralization of decision authority leads to improvements in prod-
uct quality. And third, the effect of decentralization on quality is particularly strong
if the conflict of interest within firms is large.
In order to measure competitiveness, we link our data to balance sheet informa-
tion and trade flows at the industry level to construct the actual market share of
each individual firm in its specific world market. Our data reveal that firms which
import a larger share of their intermediates also capture a larger market share on
export markets. We exploit variation in wages paid by intermediate good produc-
4Our data span information from manufacturing plants in 7 European countries (Austria, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, UK) and are representative for the manufacturing sectors in each
of those countries.
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ers in typical sourcing regions and variation in the skill intensity of input production
across different output industries in Europe to identify how offshoring affects export
competitiveness. After controlling for firm size, labor productivity, product quality,
sector and regional fix effects, we find that an exporter importing 30% of its inputs
(the average import intensity in our sample) has a market share in global markets
about three times as high as an exporter that sources purely domestically.
We then analyze how more decentralized chains of command can help firms to
become more competitive. Our results suggest that the probability of outperforming
the national competition in terms of quality is on average about 70 percentage points
higher for non-family firms with a decentralized organization than for their central-
ized competitors. Similar results hold for the probability of product innovations.
In order to identify the effects of decentralized management on product quality, we
exploit regional variation in religious beliefs and trust across Europe.
This paper relates to several literatures. First, we establish an empirical relation-
ship between the international sourcing of intermediates and the competitive posi-
tion of European firms in world markets. This relates our paper to the literature on
offshoring, plant productivity and exporting. The changing nature of world trade
flows from trade in final goods towards vertical specialization and trade in inter-
mediate goods has been documented by Hummels et al. (2001) and Hanson et al.
(2005).
Previous empirical studies by Halpern et al. (2015) and Amiti and Konings (2007)
have identified a link between intermediate imports and firm-level productivity.
Our theoretical framework borrows from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) who
show theoretically that offshoring can increase firm productivity as it gives firms
the opportunity to exploit differences in factor costs across borders. Antràs et al.
(2006) show theoretically that offshoring increases firm productivity as globaliza-
tion improves the matching opportunities for knowledge workers in industrialized
countries.
Additionally, various theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the link
between offshoring and exporting. Kleinert and Zorell (2012) analyze the export-
magnification effect of offshoring in an extended Melitz (2003) framework. Empir-
ically, Bas (2012) finds that reductions in input tariffs also increase the probability
of exporting for Argentinean firms. Kasahara and Lapham (2013) structurally es-
timate the relationship between importing and exporting using Chilean plant-level
data and find that importing intermediates increases the probability of exporting.
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We add to this literature with a link between intermediate imports and an actual
measure of firm export competitiveness. Our empirical findings suggest that better
importing opportunities lead to a reallocation of market shares towards offshoring
firms.
Second, we show that decentralized management improves product quality. Thus,
we relate to the literature that analyzes the productivity effects of firm organization.
Several empirical papers on management practices have established a connection be-
tween the quality of management and total factor productivity differences between
firms (see e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); Bloom et al. (2012) and Bloom et al.
(2014) for a survey). Furthermore, Marin and Verdier (2008) show theoretically that
heterogeneity in the organization of decision making gives rise to firm heterogeneity.
Marin et al. (2014a) show that offshoring affects the organization of firms and their
productivity. Acemoglu et al. (2007) find that firms who compete in innovations are
more likely to decentralize.
Third, we argue that product quality and innovativeness are important determi-
nants for firm competitiveness. Related papers are Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) and
Antoniades (2015) who develop models of international trade with firm heterogene-
ity in product quality and find that exporters sell higher quality products. Hottman
et al. (2014) estimate a structural model of heterogeneous multiproduct firms and
find that variation in quality and product scope explain the majority of variation
in firm sales. Eckel et al. (2015) construct a model of endogenous quality choices
in multiproduct firms and find that firms in differentiated sectors compete more on
quality. Our paper builds on their insights but we argue that firms can compete on
quality by choosing a decentralized organization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section III.2 introduces the
theoretical framework. Section III.3 describes our data sources. The empirical mod-
eling strategy and estimation results are presented in section III.4. Section III.5 con-
cludes.
III.2. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple theoretical framework that links the organiza-
tion of the firm to its export competitiveness. Firms have two options to adjust their
organization to meet competitive pressures. First, firms can offshore part of their
production to low cost countries and reduce costs which increases their price com-
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petitiveness. Second, firms can reorganize towards more decentralized hierarchies
and empower knowledge workers.5 The empowerment of knowledge workers stim-
ulates new ideas which increases the quality competitiveness of firms. We use this
framework to formulate testable predictions about the competitive advantages of
offshoring and decentralized organizations. Since our analysis is focused on the rela-
tionship between offshoring, headquarter organization and export competitiveness,
we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we condition our theoretical
analysis on exporting firms in a partial equilibrium and do not explicitly model entry
and exit into markets. Furthermore, our model treats export destinations as a single
market and all firms are considered single-product.
III.2.1. Demand
Consider a firm i in sector s that supplies its product to destination market k. Con-
sumers in each market have a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility function that nests
CES sub utility functions for different sectors s. The elasticity of substitution across
different varieties within each sector is σ > 1.6 Firm i faces the following demand
for its product in market k:
xksi =
(
qi
pi
)σ
IksPσ−1ks , (III.1)
where xksi is the quantity demanded in market k, qi is a firm specific quality pa-
rameter and pi is the firm’s price. The parameter Pks is a quality weighted sectoral
price index and Iks the income share spent on sector s in destination k. The quality
weighted price index is given by Pks ≡
[´
ω q
σ
ω p
1−σ
kω
]1/(1−σ)
and is an inverse measure
of the degree of competition in market k and sector s.
Each firm’s competitive position in the market is its market share that can be ex-
pressed as follows:
Mksi ≡
xksi pksi
Iks
∈ [0, 1]. (III.2)
5 In our data, firms are decentralized when managers can take autonomous decisions and are central-
ized when the CEO/owner takes most decisions. In line with the theoretical mechanisms we have
in mind, we will sometimes refer to the manager as the knowledge worker or the agent, and to the
CEO/owner as the principal.
6 The sub utility functions in destination k are of the form uks =
[´
Ωks
qix
σ−1
σ
i di
] σ
σ−1
, where Ωks is the
set of varieties in sector s and market k.
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We directly observe Mksi for different markets in our data and will now link it to
organizational decisions to formulate testable predictions. In the light of the cost
and quality channel that we propose, we can rewrite the market share as a function
of marginal costs and quality alone:
Mksi =
qσi c
1−σ
i
Kks
, (III.3)
where Kks measures the total amount of cost weighted quality in the market, and is
defined by:
Kks ≡
ˆ
Ωks
qσi c
1−σ
i di. (III.4)
It is easy to see from equation (III.3) that the market share is strictly increasing in
quality and decreasing in marginal costs. In the following two sections we are going
demonstrate how marginal costs and quality at the firm level are determined.
III.2.2. Production and Trade in Tasks
We follow Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) in modeling the firm’s decision to
offshore production tasks to low cost countries. The production of one unit of out-
put requires a continuum of intermediate tasks of measure 1 that we index by the
difficulty to conduct them abroad γ ∈ [0, 1]. The firm can perform each task in the
production process either at home or import it from abroad (i.e. offshore the task).
Tasks with a relatively high index value γ have higher cost requirements when they
are offshored relative to tasks with a lower index γ. This is captured by the function
t (γ) that is assumed to be increasing and continuously differentiable.
The cost level in sector s of firm i’s home country is given by Cs. This determines
the marginal cost of a non-importing firm in sector s. Additionally, we suppose that
there is an offshoring destination where the cost index is C∗s < Cs. The offshoring
potential of firm i is determined by its offshoring technology θi > 0. The lower θi,
the easier a firm can offshore production tasks abroad. When the task with index
value γ is offshored abroad, it increases production costs by a factor θit (γ), where
t′(γ) > 0. This implies that it is more costly to offshore difficult tasks. The unit
production costs of firm i are then given by:
ci = Cs (1−Oi) + C∗s
ˆ Oi
0
θit (γ) dγ. (III.5)
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It is profitable to offshore task γ if and only if there is a cost advantage when the
task is conducted offshore, i.e. if Cs > θit (γ)C∗s . Tasks with an index γ ∈ [0, Oi]
are offshored while the other tasks are conducted at home. Here, Oi is the marginal
task where the firm is indifferent between offshoring the task or not, hence it solves
Cs = θit (Oi)C∗s . We can rewrite the unit production cost of firm i as:
ci =
Cs
Bi
, (III.6)
where the use of imported intermediates leads to a cost-reduction factor that cap-
tures the firm-specific productivity gains from offshoring tasks abroad:7
Bi ≡ Bi(Oi) = 1−Oi +
´ Oi
0 t (γ) dγ
t (Oi)
≥ 1. (III.7)
This cost-reduction factor increases in the share of tasks offshored Oi and because
the market share is decreasing in marginal costs, firm competitiveness is strictly in-
creasing in offshoring.
III.2.3. Decentralization, Ideas and Product Quality
We now endogenize the firm-specific product quality and link it to the organiza-
tion of decision rights within the firm’s headquarter. Firms innovate to improve
their quality and the process of innovation is modeled in two stages. In the first
stage knowledge workers invest into the creation of quality enhancing innovations.
In the second stage promising ideas are implemented. We assume that the princi-
pal/CEO decides who implements the innovation before the agent starts looking for
new ideas.8 We call firms decentralized when the knowledge workers are responsible
for the implementation of ideas. Similarly, centralized firms are the ones where the
CEO decides about the implementation of ideas.
Because the principal chooses ex-ante who will be responsible for the implemen-
tation if an idea is found, we implicitly assume that the authority over the imple-
mentation choice is ex-ante contractible. Furthermore, in order to abstract from any
aspect regarding performance payment, we assume that knowledge workers are in-
finitely risk averse with respect to income and receive a fix wage r to satisfy their
7We borrow the expression of the cost-reduction factor from Marin et al. (2014a).
8Inderst (2009) considers a similar stylized model of the firm to analyze how incentive contracts
affect the organization.
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participation constraint.
Before the principal makes his choice of organization, he observes a firm specific
signal φi > 1 about the value of potential ideas.9 If an idea is found in the first stage
and successfully implemented in the second stage, it increases the quality of the firm
by the factor φi. If no innovation occurs, product quality remains at its basic level
which is denoted by Ei.
Knowledge workers search for ideas with effort e and face a personal cost of effort
g (e) = g2 e
2 with a sufficiently large g such that there is an interior solution for e ∈
(0, 1), the probability of finding an idea.
The principal faces a trade-off between higher agent initiative and the cost-efficient
production. We assume that knowledge workers only care about how an idea is im-
plemented and whenever an idea is implemented in their preferred manner, they ob-
tain private benefits b. We model the conflict of interest between principal and agent
by simply assuming that, with probability 1− δi, the knowledge worker prefers to
implement the idea in a way that leads to an increase of production costs by the fac-
tor ϕi > 1. With probability δi there is no conflict of interest. The optimal allocation
of decision authority can easily be found by solving the model backwards.
Decentralization
Suppose that knowledge workers have found an idea such that the firm’s product
quality is qi = φiEi. Since the implementation choice was delegated to the knowl-
edge workers, they will choose to implement the idea in their preferred way and
receive the private benefits b. The CEO thus expects the following payoff after an
idea is found: δiπ (ci, φiEi) + (1− δi)π (ϕici, φiEi)− r.
Next, consider the knowledge workers’ incentives to search for an idea during the
previous period. They find an idea with probability ed and then always receive the
private benefits b on top of the fix wage r. If knowledge workers do not find an
idea they only receive the fixed wage. Optimizing expected outcomes leads to the
optimal search effort ed = b/g for decentralized firms.
Given the search effort ed, the principal of a decentralized firm expects the follow-
ing ex-ante payoff:
ed [δiπ (ci, φiEi) + (1− δi)π (ϕici, φiEi)] + (1− ed)π (ci, Ei)− r. (III.8)
9e.g. by market research.
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Centralization
Next, consider the case when the CEO decides to control the implementation of the
idea himself. Suppose the knowledge workers have found an idea. Since the prin-
cipal may now choose how the idea is implemented, he will always choose the low
cost implementation and payoffs are given by π (ci, φiEi)− r.
Note that the agents now have less incentives to search for an idea since the prin-
cipal may ex-post choose to implement the idea in a way that is not in the agents’
interest. Their optimal effort choice is now given by ec = (δib) /g = δied.
Given the search efforts ec, the CEO of a centralized firm expects the following
ex-ante payoff:
δiedπ (ci, φiEi) + (1− δied)π (ci, Ei)− r. (III.9)
Choice of Decision Authority
We can now state a condition under which the CEO prefers a decentralized organi-
zation in order to foster the initiative of knowledge workers. We simply compare
the payoffs under both forms of organization, i.e. (III.8) and (III.9). After plugging
in the effort levels ed = b/g and ec = (δib) /g and rearranging terms, the condi-
tion for decentralization simplifies to a direct comparison of profit levels. Firms are
decentralized if
π (ϕici, φiEi) > π (ci, Ei) . (III.10)
Given the residual demand function (III.1) and the constant markup pricing rule,
a firm chooses to decentralize if φσi > ϕ
σ−1
i .
III.2.4. Firm Organization and Competitiveness
We are now in a position where we can relate the firm’s organizational choices to the
market share. The expression for the market share (III.3) can be rewritten as:
Mksi =
Eσi c
1−σ
i
Kks
ηi(Di), (III.11)
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where the function ηi (Di) captures the cost and quality effect of the chosen level of
hierarchy on the market share:
ηi =

[
1 + ed
(
δiφ
σ
i + (1− δi) φσi ϕ
1−σ
i − 1
)]
i f Di = decentralized[
1 + δied
(
φσi − 1
)]
i f Di = centralized.
Equation (III.11) shows that the market share resembles the competitive position of
firm i as a function of cost, quality and the decentralization decision. Here, ci resem-
bles the marginal cost level after offshoring, but before taking account of the cost-
increasing potential of a decentralized management. Ei is the firm specific quality
level before taking account of the quality-enhancing effect of a decentralized man-
agement. We summarize the model description with the following results:
Prediction 1: The effect of offshoring on market shares is strictly positive.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that ηi(d) > ηi(c) ⇐⇒ φσi > ϕ
σ−1
i .
Thus, whether a reorganization of the internal hierarchy leads to an increase or a
decrease of the market share depends on the optimality of the organizational deci-
sion. If the value of innovations φi outweighs potential cost inefficiencies ϕi, then
decentralization leads to higher competitiveness, but only then.
Prediction 2: The effect of decentralization or centralization on the market share is a
priori ambiguous.
Comparing the optimal effort level under centralization and decentralization, we
obtain ed = bg > ec =
δib
g for the probability of innovation. Note that the actual
impact of decentralization on innovativeness depends on δi. Remember that δi is
the probability of agent and principal preferring the same implementation strategy.
The incentivizing effect of decentralization is zero if there is no conflict of interest
to begin with, because then the knowledge worker will always obtain his private
benefit, irrespective of decision authority.
Prediction 3a: The effect of decentralization on quality and innovation is positive.
Prediction 3b: The effect of decentralization on quality and innovation is diminishing in
the congruence of interests between CEO and knowledge workers.
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In the empirical section, we will analyze how the discussed organizational choices
affect the observed market shares Mksi and observed product quality using infor-
mation from our firm sample. Furthermore, we analyze whether decentralization is
associated with innovativeness and quality qi at the firm level. We also check if the
size of the effect depends on the conflict of interest within firms.
III.3. Data Description and Key Variables
In the following section we describe our data sources and the construction of key
variables. We refer to the Appendix for a more detailed description of the vari-
able construction. Our firm-level data stem from two main sources: the EU-
EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit (EFIGE) survey and Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database.
III.3.1. Data Sources
The EFIGE survey dataset is at the core of our analysis. Coordinated by the Eu-
ropean think tank Bruegel and supported by the Directorate General Research of
the European Commission it is the first pan-European firm-level data that combines
information on firms’ international activities with detailed information on organiza-
tional characteristics. The data consist of a representative sample of almost 15,000
surveyed firms with more than 10 employees in seven European economies: Ger-
many, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria and Hungary.10 Consequently,
the representative nature of the survey sample allows us to make statements that are
representative for the manufacturing sector in major European economies. The data
were collected in 2010 and cover the years from 2007 to 2009. However, most infor-
mation is collected as a cross-section for the year 2008. The collection of information
has been performed through a survey carried out by a professional contractor that is
the fourth largest market research company in the world. See Altomonte et al. (2012)
for more details on the survey method.
We match the firms in the EFIGE dataset with Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus
database. The match with Amadeus gives us two important types of information.
First, we obtain detailed balance sheet data and second, we use information on the
set of relevant industries at the 4-digit US SIC level where the firms are active in.
10The data are representative in terms of the firm-size distribution at the country level for the manu-
facturing industry.
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Finally, we use the UN Comtrade data. Comtrade measures trade flows at the in-
dustry level which we can use to construct the firm specific export world market
size within the industries where each firm is active in. Given the export informa-
tion from the EFIGE survey, turnover data from Amadeus and the size of the world
export market from Comtrade, we can construct firm specific export world market
shares for each firm in the sample. We use these market shares to measure the com-
petitive position of each firm within its respective market. We relate it to the firms’
intensities of global sourcing to test how importing cheap intermediates can improve
the international competitiveness of a firm.
Furthermore, EFIGE provides information on the innovation activity and product
quality that firms offer. We link this information to the internal organization of deci-
sion making in firm headquarters to estimate if decentralized management improves
the firms’ product quality.
III.3.2. Construction of Key Variables
Export Market Share
We propose the export market share as a natural measure of export competitiveness.
If firms want to stay ahead of their competitors in global markets, it is not sufficient
to look at their export sales alone. What matters is how much they export relative
to their peers. When constructing the market share, the difficulty is to get the peers
right. Specifically, we want to account for the fact that many firms are active in
more than one industry. Thus, we define the export market share as the ratio of total
firm exports relative to all exports available to the world in the firm specific set of
industries.
We use detailed industry information from Amadeus in order to assess the spe-
cific industry mix of each individual firm. While the average firm in our sample is
active in about three distinct 4-digit US SIC industries, some firms provide up to
44 different industry codes. Because supposedly not all industries are equally im-
portant to the firm, we need to make assumptions about the relative importance of
each industry. Here we use information from Amadeus and EFIGE for guidance.
Amadeus divides the set of industries into primary and secondary industries. In the
EFIGE survey, firms were asked about the percentage of turnover that their core busi-
ness/product represented in the year 2008. Relating primary industries to the core
area of business, we use this percentage share in order to weight primary industries
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and secondary industries differently. Thus, primary industries are weighted with
the share of turnover attributed to the core business, while secondary industries are
weighted with the remainder. Within the primary and secondary category, indus-
tries are equally weighted.
The peer exports to the world are constructed by applying this firm specific
weighting scheme to total industry exports for an individual firm’s set of industries.
Total exports by industry are obtained from UN Comtrade WITS by summing up
industry imports of all countries, excluding the firm’s home country. For the numer-
ator, we use survey information on the percentage of annual turnover exported in
2008 and multiply that by turnover information obtained from Amadeus.11
Offshoring
The theoretical mechanism we presented in section III.2 is very simple. Firms be-
come more productive by sourcing cheaper inputs from abroad. We stick to these
simplicity in the empirical section by assuming that offshoring is simply the share of
intermediates purchased from abroad. This also implies that we do not care whether
imported inputs origin from within or outside the boundaries of the firm. To be
specific, our measure of offshoring is the response of firms to the following ques-
tion in the EFIGE survey: What percentage of the total purchased intermediate goods (from
anywhere) did the intermediate goods purchased from abroad represent?
Decentralization
With respect to the organization of internal hierarchies, we use the following survey
question in order to determine whether a firm is decentralized or not: With refer-
ence to strategic decisions which of the following statements better describe your firm situa-
tion? Firms are considered centralized when they choose centralized: the CEO/owner
takes most decisions in every area. Firms that choose decentralized: managers can take
autonomous decisions in some business areas are considered to be decentralized. In our
stylized model the CEO/owner was represented by the principal while managers
were represented by the agents/knowledge workers. As we believe that the impli-
cations of our model easily transcend into more general settings, we are not worried
with the slightly imperfect matching between managers and knowledge workers.
11 In the appendix we present the construction of the export market share in more detail.
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Product Quality and Innovations
Our theoretical model proposes a one to one matching between innovation and qual-
ity. Whenever decentralization leads to innovation, product quality increases. In the
empirical section we discard with this simplification and try to assess the effect of
decentralization on both characteristics separately. For quality, we use a subjective
measure from the EFIGE survey. Firms were asked to think of the product category your
main product belongs to. If we rank the maximum quality available in the market for this
product equal to 100, how would you rate the quality of your own product?. Because this
measure is prone to cultural noise, we normalize the survey measure at the country
level. For innovation, we use a dummy equal to one when firms carried out any prod-
uct innovation in years 2007- 2009. Alternatively, we use the same dummy for process
innovations.
III.4. Estimation Results
Our theoretical model predicts that the export market share of firms is a function of
the firm specific cost and quality level, relative to the average costs and quality in the
market. In the theoretical framework, we mapped quality and costs to specific orga-
nizational decisions to see how organizations determine firm competitiveness. The
empirical setup is thereby guided by two insights from our theoretical framework.
First, offshoring reduces costs and thereby unambiguously increases market shares.
Second, decentralization triggers a trade-off between higher costs and higher qual-
ity. Thus, the relationship between market shares and decentralization is ambigu-
ous. Quality itself is the factor that we expect to have an unambiguously positive
effect on competitiveness and we expect that decentralized management improves
product quality. This gives rise to two empirical models that we will subsequently
introduce in more detail.
III.4.1. Offshoring and Market Shares
In this part of the empirical analysis we provide evidence supporting a link between
offshoring and export market shares. The core empirical specification looks as fol-
lows:
mKsi = α + β1off i + β2quali + β3deci + β4Fi + β5XKs + εKsi. (III.12)
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Our empirical specification closely resembles the theoretical determinants of the
market share. The dependent variable mKsi is our empirical measure of firm i’s ex-
port market share in industry s and destination K. The key variable of interest in the
empirical model (III.12) is the offshoring intensity off i at the firm level. We proxy
off i by the ratio of intermediates purchased from abroad relative to all intermedi-
ates purchased within each firm i. The theoretical model also predicts export market
shares to increase with the degree of product quality quali that a firm offers. Our
measure of product quality is a subjective survey question that ranks the product
quality of each firm i relative to its competitors. As cultural influences usually play
an important role in these subjective evaluations, we normalize the measure of prod-
uct quality at the country level and only employ the variation in quality within the
firms’ home countries (i.e. within each country the mean is 0 and the standard devi-
ation is 1). Furthermore, we replace our quality measure with product innovation in
the robustness section. The evaluation of product quality from the firm perspective
might introduce measurement error since we are originally interested in the quality
perceived by consumers. Due to the lack of a proper instrument, we will treat quality
as a control variable rather than a variable of interest. deci is a dummy that indicates
if managers can autonomously take strategic decisions in some business areas. This
dummy is supposed to capture the potential costs and benefits of a decentralized or-
ganization as described in our theoretical framework by the term ηi(Di). The vector
Fi contains additional firm-level controls such as firm size and productivity in order
to account for remaining firm heterogeneity. Finally, XKs includes a set of fixed ef-
fects at the country, region or sector level to capture different market conditions. We
will consider destination K to be simply the world market.12 The variable εKsi is the
error term.
We will first show our baseline results from ordinary least squares estimates. Then
we proceed by addressing potential biases from endogeneity. Our identification
strategy is based on measures of comparative advantage and cost saving potentials
of offshoring at the industry level that we will use to instrument for offshoring at the
firm level.
12Given that we consider the world market as destination, the only way to control for destination
fixed effects is by accounting for the fact that the world market is different for German firms than
it is for French firms. We therefore include shipping country fixed effects rather than destination
effects in most specifications. Note that this also controls for all other unobserved differences
between the countries in our sample. We use the 11 NACE Clio sectors provided in EFIGE to
control for sector conditions because our instrumental strategy does not allow for finer sectoral
controls. The results in table III.1 are robust to the inclusion of 3digit-industry controls (US SIC).
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III.4.1.1. Baseline Results
Table III.1 shows the ordinary least squares estimates of the empirical model (III.12).
Column (1) gives a first impression of the link between offshoring and the export
market share of a firm: we ignore the set of firm controls and regress the market share
on offshoring, normalized quality and fixed effects only. Both, offshoring and quality
appear to be positively correlated with the market share and are highly significant.
The empirical literature on firm heterogeneity in trade has established strong
connections between various firm characteristics: importing firms export more fre-
quently, but also tend to be larger and more productive on average (see Bernard et al.
(2012b) for an empirical overview or Melitz (2003) for a theoretical framework that
shows how in principal all those factors might be driven by a single factor). In prin-
ciple then, it might be size or productivity rather than imports driving the export
competitiveness of firms. In specification (2), we therefore control for size and pro-
ductivity, using log employment and log labor productivity, in order to account for
the most obvious factors that might confound our results.13 Our coefficient of inter-
est remains statistically significant at the 5% level but diminishes to less than half of
its original size. This indicates that the size of the measured effect in specification (1)
was driven to a considerable extent by the failure to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity across firms. As expected, controlling for productivity and size increases the
explanatory power of the model considerably, raising the adjusted R2 from 0.011 to
0.073.
Column (3) includes decentralized management as a further control. As suggested
by our simple theory and the literature on firm organization, the type of decision
making within a firm can have a big impact on firm performance (see Acemoglu
et al. (2007) and Bloom et al. (2012)). However, according to our theory, the opti-
mal organization of firms depends on the relative importance of quality and costs
such that a priori we would not expect a specific sign for the coefficient on decen-
tralization. Still, we should expect the dummy variable to control for firm specific
cost and quality opportunities that are not captured by the measures of offshoring
or the subjective quality, respectively. Effectively though, the inclusion of decentral-
ization does not alter our results by much and the coefficient remains statistically
insignificant.
Column (4) replaces the country dummies with finer regional controls at the
13Our estimation results are robust to using total factor productivity in most specifications, though
the number of Observations is significantly higher for labor productivity.
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NUTS-1 level.14 Regional controls can be important as they help to absorb omit-
ted factors at the regional level that are related to market access costs. For example,
regions at the border might be especially prone to offshoring as well as exporting.
Other differences between regions, such as the degree of industrialization, income or
local institutions could also be important determinants of export performance at the
firm level and should be controlled for. Table III.1 shows that our results are robust
to these regional controls.
Note though, that regional fixed effects do not control for unobservable regional
effects when the effects are specific to certain industries. In order to control for this
type of unobserved covariance, we interact region and industry controls in column
(5). The offshoring coefficient increases slightly.
Column (6) tries to address potential bad control problems.15 In our case, off-
shoring is itself a candidate variable to explain labor productivity (the value added
per employee). As we measure value added as turnover net of the value of interme-
diates purchased, the ratio of intermediates obtained as cheap imports clearly will
have a direct impact on labor productivity. Once we control for labor productivity,
our coefficient of interest supposedly measures the effect of offshoring on market
shares conditional on a specific level of labor productivity. But as the level of labor
productivity itself changes with offshoring, this potentially introduces a sort of se-
lection bias into the model. Therefore we reestimate the model without the inclusion
of labor productivity. The qualitative results remain robust and the coefficient on
offshoring changes only little. Nevertheless, we prefer to keep labor productivity
as a control in our model as we assume that endogeneity from omitted variables
outweighs endogeneity from bad controls.
Including both exporters and non-exporters in our sample raises one further con-
cern, namely that the correlation we measure is driven solely by the export status.
Thus, given entry into exporting, offshoring might not have an impact on export per-
formance at all. To rule that out, columns (7) and (8) repeat specifications (3) and (5)
respectively, but only include exporters. This reduces the sample size considerably
and much of the precision of our estimates is lost. Note though, that the coefficient
on offshoring is still positive and significantly different from zero at the 10 and 5
percent level respectively. The magnitude of the effect slightly increases.
14The specification is also robust to region fix effects at the even more disaggregated NUTS-2 level.
We obtain the NUTS-region for each firm by combining the regional information provided in
EFIGE together with zip codes from Amadeus.
15See Angrist and Pischke (2009), p.64 ff for a detailed presentation of the problem.
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III.4.1.2. Instrumenting for Offshoring
The specifications of our empirical model are subject to different potential endogene-
ity problems. One problem could be omitted variable bias from unobservable firm
characteristics that are correlated with both international activities, offshoring and
exporting. Presumably, the inclusion of size and productivity as control variables
does not fully account for all dimensions of firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, re-
versed causality arises if exporting itself has a positive impact on the firm’s propen-
sity to engage in offshoring leading to an upward bias of the offshoring coefficient.
While empirical evidence for this channel is rare, the broader body of literature on
international trade delivers reasons to be aware of the possibility. One argument that
raises concerns about reversed causality is the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.16 If
exporting has a positive effect on the productivity of firms, this might very well help
exporters to overcome possible fix costs of importing. A related argument could also
be derived from the literature of network economics in trade. Exporters may have
an advantage to find suppliers in a foreign market simply because they already pos-
sess valuable contacts to local business networks.17 Finally, some of our explanatory
variables could be measured with error. Classical measurement error would bias our
coefficients towards zero.18
We try to respond to these concerns by employing different instrumental variables.
The underlying estimation strategy is to use variation in the comparative advantage
or the cost saving potential at the input industry level in order to instrument for off-
shoring at the firm level in the output industry. In our main specifications, we use
two different instruments for offshoring: The low-skilled labor intensity at the input
industry and input industry specific wages in Eastern Europe.
The low-skill intensity of intermediate production is the share of low-skilled labor
that is used at the input industry level (low-skilled labor compensation in total la-
bor compensation). The measure is obtained from the WIOD database and measures
the skill intensity in input industries.19 On the one hand, the low-skilled labor in-
16See De Loecker (2007, 2013) for empirical evidence.
17See Chaney (2014) on the effects of international social networks on exports.
18Note that measurement error in the market share is less of a problem in terms of consistency, as
long as the error is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables. Since our construction of
the dependent variable allows for multiple sources of measurement error, we will show results for
alternative measures of openness in the robustness section of this chapter.
19We make use of the February 2012 release of the WIOD database. For each industry, we use the
midpoint between the German and the Austrian value. Our instrumental strategy is robust to
using the country specific values as well as values for Eastern European countries instead of the
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tensity resembles an endowment-type comparative advantage argument. Assuming
that the endowment with skills is relatively high for the countries in our data, tra-
ditional Heckscher-Ohlin type arguments would suggest low-skilled labor intensive
intermediates to be imported more frequently. On the other hand, the instrument
might also proxy the complexity of intermediates. This notion of complexity relates
the skill intensity at the task level to the offshoring costs t (γ) and θi in our theoret-
ical model and we would expect less complex intermediates to be offshored more
frequently.
Our second instrument are the input industry specific wages in Eastern Europe.
These input wages are supposed to capture the cost saving potential from offshoring.
The instrument relates to the cost index C∗s in the offshoring regions in our model.
We expect a positive correlation between the offshoring intensity at the firm level
and the low-skill intensity of the input industries and a negative correlation between
the input industry wages in Eastern Europe and offshoring.
We weight input industries according to input coefficients from the OECD STAN
data to determine the relevant input industries for each industry where the firm
is active in.20 Again, we use information from Amadeus to determine the firms’
relevant primary and secondary industries. Weighting of the industries of activity
applies as for the market shares. For each of those industries, we then determine the
share of inputs provided by any other industry from the input-output table. Finally,
we use these shares in order to construct our instruments as a weighted average of
input industry level information.
In order for our instruments to be valid, they need to satisfy the exclusion re-
striction. For this purpose, they need to be conditionally uncorrelated with the ex-
port market shares of firms and other unobserved firm characteristics that determine
both, offshoring and export performance.
One concern could arise if low-skill intensive input industries supply inputs with
lower quality that translate to lower output quality and thus directly affect firm mar-
ket shares. We account for this by including our proxy quali that absorbs variation
in the output quality of a firm. Another problem could arise if the wages in specific
input industries in Eastern Europe determine world demand. However, as our de-
German Austrian midpoint (unreported).
20We use input coefficients for Germany in 2005 and apply them to all countries for simplicity. The
STAN database provides input-output coefficients at the 2-digit ISIC Rev.3 level only. Both, the
industries of activity for each firm as well as the information for the input industries, will therefore
be restricted to the 2-digit level for the construction of our instruments.
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pendent variable is the export market share rather than the export value, this does
not necessarily violate the exclusion restriction. Additionally, we use wages in input
industries in India and China relative to domestic wages as an alternative instrument
in the robustness section. Then, the exclusion restriction of our second instrument
could be violated. An alternative concern is that firms with large market shares are
also monopsonists in factor markets and can enforce low wages in input industries.
As we focus on wages in relatively aggregated input industries (2-digit ISIC), the
bargaining power of an individual firm on the Eastern European labor market seems
rather negligible. Furthermore, we also use input wages in China and India in the
robustness section which should be even less determined by individual firms.
The specifications presented in table III.2 are the IV analogs of table III.1. Results
from the first stage are shown at the bottom of the table. Both instruments are highly
significant and the coefficients have the expected signs. The first stage F-test of ex-
cluded instruments are above any of the Stock-Yogo critical values of weak identifi-
cation in all specifications. As we use both instruments simultaneously, we are able
to test for overidentification of our model (the Sargan-Hansen test). Reassuringly,
the Hansen J-statistics do not reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments
in any of the specifications except for the first one where we do not control for firm
heterogeneity.21
Comparing the outcome of the instrumental variable regression with the results
from table III.1 shows that our coefficient of interest has increased significantly in
size across all specifications. This indicates that attenuation bias might have been a
serious issue in our previous ordinary least squares estimates. Offshoring remains
highly significant in explaining the export market share in the full sample. The cor-
relation is weaker for the restricted sample of exporters but still remains significant
at the 10% level. The coefficient does not vary too much between the individual
specifications. As a benchmark, specifications (3) and (5) both yield a coefficient of
around 0.5. Taking that coefficient at face value would imply that the average non-
offshoring exporter could increase its market share by almost 230% when the firm
purchased the same share of intermediates from abroad as the average offshoring ex-
port firm does (about 30%).22 While tripling the market share appears to be a huge
21The specification (1) is very weakly controlled. Adding firm controls already raises the p value of
the test to 0.57. Note that the Hansen J-statistic only tests the validity of one instrument against
the other. Thus, it will not indicate problems if both instruments turn out to be flawed. On the
other hand, if the exclusion restrictions is met for at least one of the instruments, our identification
strategy should deliver causal effects.
22The less precise estimate for exporters in specification (7) yields an increase in the market share
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effect indeed, the underlying increase in the offshoring variable from 0% to 30% is
very substantial. In terms of the market share, we are talking about an absolute
increase in a range between 0.67 to 2.2 per mille.
III.4.1.3. Robustness
Tables B.4 (OLS), B.5 (IV) and B.6 (IV) present results to evaluate the robustness of
our estimations. We choose specification (4), from table III.1 and table III.2 respec-
tively, as our baseline specification. In tables B.4 and B.5 we provide the following
robustness checks: we control for more disaggregated industry fix effects, exchange
the control variables, use alternative measures of offshoring and alternative depen-
dent variables. In table B.6 we deal with the robustness of instruments and consider
how auto-correlation within standard errors affect the significance of our estimates.
The robustness checks in tables B.4 and B.5 are symmetric unless otherwise noted.
In specification (2) we begin by adding industry dummies at a finer level of detail.
As our instruments varies at the industry level our IV results are not robust to the
inclusion of industry dummies at the 2-digit US SIC level. As it can be seen from the
first stage F-statistic this is due to the loosened grip of our instruments after absorb-
ing industry variation across very narrow industries. The OLS estimates however
are robust to the inclusion of industry fix effects up to the 3-digit US SIC level.
Specifications (3) to (6) successively replace the main control variables of our
model with alternative measures. Thus, we use average total factor productivity
for the years 2001 to 2007 in order substitute for our constructed measure of labor
productivity in specification (3).23 We then replace log employment by log turnover
in specification (4). Subjective quality is replaced by an indicator of product innova-
tion in specification (5). Specification (6) interchanges the full set of control variables.
Using turnover as a size control in the OLS regression leads to a coefficient that is in-
distinguishable from zero. We believe that this might be due to measurement error
and the strong connection between turnover and the market share. Other than that,
our results hold well and the absolute size and significance of the measured effect
does not vary substantially across specifications.
In specifications (7) to (10) we replace our explanatory variable and see whether
our results are robust to alternative measures of offshoring. The underlying hypoth-
of slightly more than 200%, while the smallest coefficient, specification (1), implies an increase of
almost 170%.
23We are thankful to Bruegel for providing us with this measure.
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III. Organizations as Competitive Advantage
esis is that the effect we measure should not depend too strongly on the specific type
of offshoring. As long as costs can be reduced by sourcing inputs from abroad, we
expect a significant effect on our measure of competitiveness. While we use interme-
diates purchased from abroad as a share of all intermediates as our core measure of
offshoring, specification (7) shows the results from using intermediates from abroad
as a share of turnover instead. Specifications (8) to (10) proceed by replacing interme-
diate purchases in terms of turnover by FDI, service offshoring and outsourcing in
terms of turnover, respectively. The OLS coefficients remain positive but only partly
significant. Using our instruments yields positive and significant estimates across
all measures of global sourcing. Naturally, the actual size of the coefficients changes.
Nevertheless, the implied effect remains very close to the original effect in the case
of intermediates relative to turnover. An analogous thought experiment to the one
we invoked earlier implies a 223% increase in market shares. The effects are much
larger for FDI, service offshoring and outsourcing, but we will not elaborate on these
differences as our instruments are relatively weak for these alternative measures of
offshoring.
Specifications (11) and (12) replace the dependent variable by the share of exports
in turnover and the export volume, respectively. This reduces the risk of potential
measurement error in the dependent variable and loosens the constructional bond
between dependent variable and instrument by taking the firm specific industry-mix
out of the left-hand side variable. The estimates show that our results are robust to
using these alternative measures of export performance. The IV results are less clear
cut, with a rejected Hansen test for the export share and huge standard errors for the
export volume. Note though, that substituting the East European wage instrument,
which is measured in absolute terms, by wages relative to the firm’s home country
increases the Hansen p-value for both specifications and renders the coefficient of
interest significant even for the export volume (not reported).
In table B.6 we elaborate more on the robustness of our instruments and check
whether our results hinge on standard errors being robust to heteroskedasticity only.
Specification (1) again repeats the baseline regression. In specification (2) we want to
check whether our results are still robust when using the mean over Chinese and
Indian input industry wages rather than wages in Eastern Europe. As the Chi-
nese and Indian markets are less tied to the countries in our sample, the risk of
reversed causality from firm’s export performance to labor market conditions in the
offshoring region should be reduced by using wages from these regions. The off-
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shoring coefficient reduces in size but remains robust apart from that. In specifica-
tion (3) we use wages in China and India relative to the firm’s country of origin, as
this might be the relevant characteristic from the firm’s point of view.
Specifications (4), (5) and (6) introduce an alternative instrument based on an idea
by Hummels et al. (2014). The alternative instrument relates to worldwide export
supply in firm i’s input industries and is measured as the weighted sum of all in-
termediate exports from any country in the world to all other countries, excluding
the firm’s home country on both sides. The first stage has the expected sign and the
new instrument works in combination with either of the original instruments. As the
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is not rejected for any of the combinations
of instruments, we conclude that all instruments are valid as long at least one of the
instruments we propose is valid.
Specifications (7), (8) and (9) finally experiment with the auto-correlation structure
of standard errors. Up to now, we showed results for heteroskedasticity robust stan-
dard errors, because to us it is not obvious what type of clustering to expect. As our
variable of interest is measured at the firm level and we exploit cross-sectional varia-
tion between firms, auto-correlation of standard errors is not obvious. Nevertheless,
standard errors could be auto-correlated between firms within one geographical re-
gion as firms with high levels of intermediate imports might cluster within border
regions. Alternatively, standard errors could also be clustered within industries or
at the industry-region level. We allowed for clustered standard errors at the regional
level (NUTS-2), at the industry level (3-digit US SIC) and at the industry-region level.
Our results are robust to all three types of clusters but standard errors tend to in-
crease whenever we cluster at the industry level.
Overall, the coefficients remain relatively stable across all specifications and our
results are robust to most of the alterations we proposed.
III.4.2. Decentralization and Product Quality
Let us now turn to the second prediction of the model. We want to analyze if there
is a positive association between firms with a decentralized management and the
quality of the products that these firms produce. Theoretically, we consider anything
the firm can do in order to increase demand for a given price to be a realization of
quality. In the empirical section we will focus on two broad measures of desirability:
the quality of products relative to the market average as perceived by the firm and
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an indicator whether firm i has carried out a product innovation in the years 2007 to
2009.
We will use both, product and process innovations in the regressions. Note
though, that the notion of non-price desirability applies mainly to product innova-
tions, while process innovations, though still related to the incentive creating effects
of decentralization, are probably more relevant for the reduction of costs.
The measure of perceived quality is an indicator, directly taken from the survey,
that varies from 0 (the worst product in the market) to 100 (the best). We will use a
transformation of this indicator, which is centered around 0 for each country, with
the standard deviation set to 1. This normalization helps us to prevent cultural dif-
ferences in perception from driving our results.
The core empirical specification looks as follows:
qcsi = λ + µ1deci + µ2(deci × coii) + µ3Fi + µ4Xcs + ωcsi, (III.13)
where qcsi is one of our three measures of firm specific product quality or inno-
vation. The variable deci is our dummy indicating decentralized organizations and
coii is a measure of the conflict of interest within firms. The vector Fi contains firm
controls, Xcs includes industry and country or regional controls and ωcsi is the error
term.
Two considerations determine the set of controls in equation (III.13). First, our
theoretical model predicts the probability of a quality innovation to be higher for
decentralized firms because knowledge workers show more initiative in those orga-
nizations (as ed = b/g > δ(b/g) = ec). This fact resembles the higher search effort
of managers once they know they can choose their preferred implementation after
an idea is found and lets us expect a positive coefficient µ1 > 0 for the regressor
deci. Note though, that the size of this positive effect depends on δ. In our the-
oretical model, δ measures the probability of manager and principal choosing the
same implementation strategy. From the manager’s point of view, a high δ implies
that he has good chances of obtaining the private benefit from his preferred imple-
mentation, even if the principal chooses the strategy in a centralized organization.
Therefore, the advantage of a decentralized organization in terms of higher search
effort should be relatively low for high values of δ as knowledge workers expand
similar efforts under both types of organizations. We try to capture this with the in-
teraction term deci × coii, where coii is an inverse measure of the conflict of interest.
We expect the coefficient µ2 to be negative.
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The choice of a good proxy for the congruence of interests δ is crucial to measure
the interaction effect deci × coii. As the majority of firms in our data are private
limited liability corporations who are to a substantial part family owned firms, we
exploit the ownership structure of the firms to proxy for coii. We proxy coii by the
share of managers (including top and middle management) that is related to the
family who owns the company. The underlying assumption is that the probability of
congruent interests between owner and manager should be higher when both share
the same family ties. In accordance with our theory, we expect µ1 to be positive and
µ2 to be negative.
Second, as organizational choices are not assigned randomly, we need to control
for relevant factors determining whether firm i is prone to being decentralized or
not. At the firm level, we add the share of high and medium skilled workers among
all workers in order to proxy for the firm specific level of human capital and thus the
value of empowerment due to decentralization. The underlying assumption is that
innovative activities are more frequent among skilled workers and that the gains
from higher effort should therefore be more important to firms with a skilled labor
force. We further add a dummy indicating whether the firm is young (less than 6
years old), assuming that younger firms might be more dependent on innovations.24
Because we do not want our proxy coii to pick up other specifics of family firms,
we further add a dummy indicating whether the CEO himself is part of the family.
As larger firms naturally tend to be more decentralized, we will also control for the
number of employees. Finally, we include our measure of labor productivity in order
to control for other dimensions of firm heterogeneity that affect product quality.
In order to control for the sectoral fix effects, Xcs contains 11 NACE Clio sector
dummies.25 Xsc also contains a set of country or regional fix effects. In some specifi-
cations we will use interacted sector and region fixed effects as in the regressions for
the export market share. Note though, that we will instrument decentralization by
regional characteristics below, preventing us from using regional fix effects. We will
use regional control variables instead when it comes to instrumentation.
24See Acemoglu et al. (2007) for empirical evidence on the relation between firm age and decentral-
ized management.
25 The specifications are robust to using 3-digit US SIC industry controls.
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III.4.2.1. Baseline Results
Table III.3 shows the results from running ordinary least square variants of equation
(III.13). Specifications (1) to (3) use the normalized measure of perceived quality,
specifications (4) to (6) show the results for product innovation and specifications (7)
to (9) use process innovations as the dependent variable.
Specification (1) shows the results when we omit to control for regional effects.
As expected, the coefficient on decentralization is positive and significantly different
from zero at the 5% level. We fail to establish significant results for the interaction
term but the point estimate delivers the right sign. Firm size appears to be an impor-
tant covariate in this specification.
Specifications (2) and (3) show whether regional effects are decisive drivers of our
results. The estimates in table III.3 indicate that our coefficients are relatively robust
when controlling for unobservable characteristics at the regional or sector-regional
level. This is an important finding as we will not be able to control for regional
unobservables once instrumenting at the regional level. Additionally, it might be
counted as a good sign for the exclusion restriction we propose.
The results are very similar but more robust when using product innovation in-
stead of perceived quality as our dependent variable.26 Product innovations are very
close in spirit to the theory we proposed. Product innovations are usually thought
to be improving the objective characteristics of the product, potentially leaving pro-
duction costs unaltered. The utility of costumers then rises without the necessity of a
decrease in prices. This is exactly the notion of quality we proposed in the theoretical
section.
Note that while their absolute size has not changed by much, the coefficients on
the interaction are now significant up to the 1% level, suggesting that an increase in
the share of family executives renders the impact of decentralized management less
important. Finally, the existence of a family CEO as well as the share of high- and
medium skilled employees do now appear to be significant covariates of the model.
In specifications (7) to (9) we replace product by process innovations. Innovations
in the production process are often related to the cost of the product rather than to
its qualitative characteristics. While this is less in line with the theoretical model we
proposed, the effort argument remains valid for any type of innovation and therefore
26 Here we are showing results for the linear probability model. Running Probit estimations does not
alter the results significantly but makes the interpretation of the coefficients much harder, given
that we are dealing with an interaction term.
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we should in general expect to find similar effects in line with our model.
Nevertheless, the results are slightly different for process innovations. The coef-
ficient on the interaction turns out indifferent from zero in a statistical sense. Fur-
thermore, family firms are not as different from other firms when it comes to process
innovation. The coefficient on the share of high and medium skilled workers is now
negative. Instead, labor productivity shows up to be an important covariate of inno-
vation for the first time.
It is not quite clear what explains these deviations, especially the missing effect
on the interaction. As you will note in the next section, some of the differences in
the results for product and process innovations will disappear as soon as we try to
identify effects with our instrumentation strategy. The interaction effect for example
will show up again significantly and with a negative sign. Others, like the coefficient
on the share of high-skilled workers, remain significantly different for process inno-
vations. One explanation would be that process innovations are more important for
production intensive firms, where the share of low-skilled rather than high-skilled
employees is supportive of innovation.
We will briefly return to the differences for varying dependent variables when we
have seen results from the instrumental variable estimations.
III.4.2.2. Instrumenting for Decentralization
Again, the set of control variables we added to equation (III.13) might not suffice
to prevent omitted variable bias. Additionally, measurement error appears to be
important given the survey nature of our data. Finally, innovation itself potentially
has a substantial impact on the organization of firms, leading to reverse causality
issues.27
The literature on firm organization proposes different determinants for decentral-
ization in firms. For example, Bloom et al. (2012) propose the rule of law, product
market competition, hierarchical religion and the level of trust in a region as poten-
tial determinants for decentralized management within firms.
Rule of law or the degree of product market competition are probably important
determinants of innovation and quality in their own right and thus not exogenous
in our empirical model. We focus on the other two determinants: regional variation
of religious faith and trust levels across Europe and argue that this variation is better
27The survey specifically asks firms to indicate whether product or process innovation implied orga-
nizational innovation. Almost a third of the firms gave an affirmative answer.
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suited for instrumentation given that a direct impact on product quality is less likely.
If the notion of trust and religion were relevant determinants of product quality or
innovation, than the effect would rather work via trust levels within firms. However
we try to account for that by controlling for the conflict of interest within firms.
In our main specifications we use measures of religion rather than trust because we
assume that religious beliefs are less likely to be shaped by the professional setting
which again could have a direct impact on product quality. We will add trust as an
instrument in the robustness section.28
Our instruments are constructed at the regional level (NUTS-1) where regional
averages are obtained from the 2008 European Values Study (EVS).29 We will use in-
struments from the EVS for both endogenous variables, the level of decentralization
and its interaction with family managers. As you will see in the robustness section,
using religion, our instrument for decentralization, interacted with the share of fam-
ily members as an instrument for the interaction term has two disadvantages. First,
the covariation between the instruments and decentralization is very weak when
both instruments contain the same variable from the value survey. And second,
testing overidentifying restrictions with a larger set of instruments shows that the
simple interaction between religion and the share of family members is not exoge-
nous. Results appear to be less problematic when using two distinct instruments
based on religion for both endogenous variables, acknowledging that the relevance
of the instruments is then based on decentralization alone.
Our first measure of religion is the share of people that mentioned “religious faith”
when asked about especially important qualities which children can be encouraged
to learn at home. La Porta et al. (1997) and Bloom et al. (2012) also propose the
regional influence of “hierarchical religions” as a determinant for decentralization
which we will use as our second instrument.30 We argue that both instruments are
relevant by arguing that religious believes might be negatively correlated with a taste
for autonomy and positively with the submission to authority.
Figures B.2a, B.2b and B.2c in the appendix show the regional variation in the av-
28Our measure of trust in a region is the share of people responding “most people can be trusted”
when asked whether generally speaking, most people can be trusted or alternatively, “one can’t
be to careful in dealing with people”.
29 The EVS is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal value survey, covering 47 European coun-
tries or regions with a number of roughly 70, 000 interviewees. We use Version 3.0.0 of the Inte-
grated Dataset (Study No. ZA4800). Note that our results are robust to using instruments at the
NUTS-2 level, though the instruments become weaker.
30 We refer to Roman Catholic, Muslim or Orthodox believes when talking about hierarchical reli-
gions.
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erage values of decentralization and our instruments. Three facts are noteworthy:
First, much of the variation can be found between countries. This explains why the
inclusion of country fixed effects renders our instruments weak. Second, there is
indeed a correlation between decentralization and our instruments. For example,
Italy is clearly a country where religion is highly important and the level of decen-
tralization is relatively low. Also the levels of decentralization are much higher for
Germany and the UK where hierarchical religions play less of a role. Third, religious
faith and hierarchical religions are clearly not the same thing. This is important be-
cause we need distinct variation in order to employ both instruments at the same
time.
Our exclusion restriction requires that religious beliefs have no direct impact on
the product quality that firms offer, other than through their influence on firm or-
ganization. Again, our claim is that the exclusion restrictions holds after controlling
for the relevant covariates. One concern is that religious beliefs could be associated
with economic activity and income. This association was proposed by the sociolo-
gist Max Weber who claimed that there is a positive link between protestant ethic and
economic activity.31 However, Cantoni (2015) does not find evidence for this effect
in German-speaking regions. Furthermore, empirical findings by Becker and Woess-
mann (2009) suggest that the effect of protestantism on economic growth vanishes
once they control for human capital accumulation. This effect should be absorbed by
our control for human capital at the firm level. We also control for per capita income
to absorb variation in demand that stems from variation in income. A problem with
the exclusion restriction would persist if religious beliefs affect the preferences for
quality besides through differences in income.
Table III.4 shows the results from the instrumental variable regression. Results
from the first stage are shown at the bottom. As expected, the coefficients on both
measures of religion are negatively correlated with decentralization and are highly
significant. This is true for decentralization in the level as well as in the interaction
with the conflict of interest proxy. The Angrist-Pischke F-statistic indicates strong
instruments in both first stages and the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic shows that the
instruments are overall not weak.
Specification (1) shows results for the normalized measure of product quality. Nei-
ther the level effect nor the interaction effect appear to be significantly different from
zero. This is due to the normalization of perceived quality, which virtually forces the
31See “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”.
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cross country variation of our measure to zero. Given that our instrumental strat-
egy then can work through within-country variation only, the explanatory power of
our variable of interest is largely reduced. Specification (2), where we use the non-
normalized version of perceived quality, confirms this interpretation. Now the level
effect is positive and highly significant, though the interaction is still insignificant.
The problem with using non-normalized quality as perceived by the firm is that
our coefficient might pick up cultural differences in perception between countries
rather than differences in actual quality. Country fixed effects would help here, but
are not viable given that we use regional variation for identification. In specification
(3) we add regional controls to account for at least some of the unobserved hetero-
geneity across countries and regions. Following Bloom et al. (2012) we control for
GDP per capita, population and an index of the rule of law.32
In principal, we could include all three measures at the regional level. Unfortu-
nately, too much controls at the regional level restrict the amount of variation left for
identification. Consequentially, our instruments are rendered weak when we include
all three measures at the regional level. We therefore tried to use either the Eurostat
variables or the governance index at the regional (NUTS-2) level and included the
remaining control(s) at the country level. When both variants turned out to deliver
similar results, we decided to stick with quality of governance at the regional level.
Assuming that rule of law is potentially easier to causally connect to the organiza-
tion of firms, we preferred to rule out the alternative channel that firms are more
decentralized and produce higher quality because contracts are better enforceable.
As column (3) shows, adding regional controls reduces the size of the coefficient on
decentralization slightly but in turn renders the interaction significant at the 10%
level.
Though our regional controls might pick up some of the cultural differences be-
tween countries it is clear that none of the controls is predestined for that task. We
therefore transformed the normalized measure of perceived quality into a dummy
that indicates whether the perceived product quality of a firm is above the coun-
try mean in specification (4) and (5). The advantage of this transformation is that
it amplifies the response of the dependent variable with respect to a given regional
variation in instrumented decentralization. As table III.4 shows, both coefficients
are now highly significant and have the expected signs. Again, including regional
32GDP per capita and population are taken from Eurostat while we take the European Quality of
Governance Index (EQI) from 2010 as our measure of the rule of law. See Charron et al. (2014).
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controls slightly diminishes the coefficients but does not alter the general finding.
In specifications (6) to (9), we show results for product and process innovations
with and without country controls respectively. The expected results are valid for
both types of innovation. The coefficients are very similar for product and process
innovations but smaller than for product quality. Still, the size of the coefficients
increases a lot when compared to the ordinary least squares estimates, indicating
that our previous results might have been attenuated by measurement error in the
explanatory variable.
To provide an idea about the magnitude of the coefficients, we calculate the effect
of decentralization on quality and innovation if our results were to be interpreted
literally. This exercise is to be taken with caution because we have included an inter-
action term and the estimated effects depend a lot on the point of evaluation. Using
specification (5) and evaluating the effect at the average number of family members
(13.7%) for firms where the CEO is not a family member, decentralized management
increases the probability of producing quality above the country mean by 70.1 per-
centage points.
III.4.2.3. Robustness
In tables B.7 and B.8 of the appendix, we test the robustness of our results for quality
and production innovation respectively. We evaluate the robustness of our estimates
with respect to different instrumentation, industry fix effects and clustering of stan-
dard errors. The point of departure is specification (5) of table III.4 for quality and
specification (7) for product innovations. As the results are similar for both depen-
dent variables, the following discussion applies to both dependent variables.
In specifications (2) to (6) in both tables, we try different combinations of instru-
ments. Specification (2) replaces religious faith by trust. The results remain qualita-
tively similar but now the first stage results indicate that our instruments are slightly
weak, predominantly due to the interaction. Using the three instruments jointly in
specification (3) improves the strength again and allows us to test overidentifying
restrictions. The Hansen J-statistic implies that all three instruments are exogenous,
given that at least two of them are valid instruments.
In specification (4) we try to instrument the interaction deci × coii with IVdec × coii.
Remember that we used two instruments for decentralization in order to instru-
ment for both, decentralization and the interaction with the share of family mem-
bers among executives. Often researchers would interact the exogenous part of the
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interaction (family members) with the instrument for the endogenous part in order
to obtain an instrument for the interaction. But as the results in tables B.7 and B.8
show, applying this to religious faith renders our instruments weak and the coeffi-
cients of interest insignificant.
We therefore add the other instruments in specification (5) and do now obtain
satisfying F-statistics and significant coefficients with the right sign. However, the
Hansen overidentification test indicates a strong endogeneity problem with this set
of instruments. Fortunately, the number of instruments allows us to run statistical
tests on subsets of instruments. Doing this indicates that the instrument causing
problems is precisely the interaction with the share of family members.
In specification (6) we go one final step further and add the share of family mem-
bers to the list of endogenous regressors. An additional instrument is obtained
by interacting our main instruments, religious faith and hierarchical religion. The
results persist in terms of significant coefficients although the instrumentation be-
comes weak.
Overall, our results are relatively robust with respect to different instrumental ap-
proaches. The standard approach for the instrumentation of interactions is prob-
lematic in our case, as both components appear to be endogenous. The size of the
coefficients varies for different specifications but the qualitative predictions are al-
ways met.
Finally, in specifications (7) to (9) we include industry dummies at a finer level
of detail, exchange covariates and see whether two-way clustering at the region-
industry level has any effect on our results. As it seems, neither of these changes has
a big impact on the measured effects, neither in size nor in significance.
III.5. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze how firm organization affects the international competi-
tiveness of firms with representative data on 15,000 European manufacturing plants.
We motivate our empirical analyses with a stylized model where firms can source
inputs internationally to lower their costs and decentralize decision making to fos-
ter ideas and produce higher quality products. In order to identify the effects of
offshoring, we exploit variation in foreign input wages and input skill intensity to
instrument for offshoring at the firm level. We identify the effects of decentralized
management by instrumenting the decentralization choice with regional variation in
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religious beliefs and trust. We find that the average offshoring firm obtains a world
market share that is about three times larger than the average market share of non-
offshoring firms. Furthermore, we find that decentralized management increases the
probability of producing quality above the country mean by 70.1 percentage points
in firms where the CEO is not a family member. However, this effect becomes smaller
as firms are managed by a larger fraction of managers with family ties.
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B. Appendix
Construction of Export Market Shares
We define the export market share of firm i in country c as the ratio of firm exports
to export competition in destination region K:
mKic =
exportsKic
compKic
,
where exportsKic are firm exports from country c to region K and compKic is the export
competition of firm i in region K. We measure export competition as a weighted
average of industry imports into region K, where the set of industries considered is
firm specific. Note that we only look at competition by other exporters and do not
consider domestic supply in destination K. One effect of this simplification is that
destination specific effects, such as a strong preference for domestic goods, are partly
muted. The ranking we obtain then resembles a ranking within exporters and not
within firms in general.
Export competition is constructed as follows:
compKic = wi
1
N1i
∑
s∈S1i
∑
k∈K\{c}
importsks + (1− wi)
1
N2i
∑
s∈S2i
∑
k∈K\{c}
importsks,
where wi is the proportion of turnover related to firm i’s core business obtained from
EFIGE, serving us as a weight for primary industries. N1i and S1i are the number
and set of distinct primary industries respectively and are obtained from Amadeus.
k are the individual countries in region K and importsks are all industry s imports
into country k which we obtain from the UN Comtrade WITS database. Secondary
industry characteristics are defined analogically.33
When summing up the industry imports in destination region K, we have to ac-
33Besides the four digit primary and secondary codes, Amadeus provides a three digit core code
for each firm. If no information on primary and secondary industries was provided, we use the
core code information in order to construct the export competition. To avoid scaling issues, we
construct the core code trade flow as an average over all lower-level four digit trade flows. If firms
did not provide information on the share of turnover they relate to the core business, we use the
sample average (90%) for weighting. Note that about two thirds of the firms in our sample assign
all their activity to the core business line. Of those, many still provide information on distinct
primary and secondary industries. As this might cast doubt on our weighting scheme, we also
tried using only the core code industry or only primary industries for calculations. Our results
were robust to such alterations.
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count for the fact that the home country c of firm i might be part of that region.
Thus, when we define the world to be the region of interest, we subtract imports
into country c from the sum of imports over all countries in order to obtain the rele-
vant export market. Naturally, the world export market is different for France than
it is for Germany.
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Table B.1.: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Min Max Std. Dev.
world export market share 9807 0.0590 0 33.450 0.548
EXPvol 10255 10698.02 0 4827955 105146.4
EXPshare 13988 0.179 0 1 0.263
offshoring (relative to all intermediates
purchased)
14031 0.107 0 1 0.214
offshoring (relative to turnover) 13856 0.0397 0 1 0.102
FDI (relative to turnover) 14146 0.014 0 1 0.085
service offshoring (relative to turnover) 14631 0.003 0 1 0.0231
decentralized management 14138 0.291 0 1 0.454
product quality (relative to highest quality in
the market 100)
14653 87.38 0 100 15.34
product quality (normalized) 14653 0.00 -8.40 1.37 1.00
product innovation 14654 0.491 0 1 0.50
process innovation 14654 0.441 0 1 0.497
employment 14654 92.80838 10 30000 502.1967
turnover 10781 32012.23 0.0266 2.06×107 295586.1
labor productivity 10622 192.9212 0 14524.92 374.312
tfp (avg: 2001 - 2007) 10158 -0.0934 -6.616 2.632 0.454
share of family board members 12522 0.435 0 1 0.418
family CEO 14654 0.623 0 1 0.485
young firm 14654 0.070 0 1 0.256
share of high- and medium skilled employees 12813 0.741 0 1 0.295
EQI 2010 (NUTS-2 level) 13060 0.467 -2.284 1.456 0.654
GDP per capita 14654 27695.83 10500 34000 3890.071
population 14654 59779.06 8322 82120 16964.83
foreign wage per employee (Eastern Europe,
abs.)
13761 6244.87 2158.28 7174.23 383.72
foreign wage per employee (China & India,
abs.)
13761 2585.32 897.58 3105.86 157.69
foreign wage per employee (China & India, rel.) 13761 0.0668 0.0180 0.251 0.0287
low skilled labor share in total compensation 13761 0.116 0.0350 0.145 0.00722
world export supply of intermediates 13190 412723 136306.6 1311349 165574
hierarchical religion 14556 0.729 0 0.997 0.298
religious faith 14556 0.163 0 0.468 0.102
trust 14556 0.346 0.165 1 0.0871
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Table B.2.: Description of Variables
Variable Description
world export market
share
share of firm exports to export market competition in the world in %. See B for
detailed information
EXPvol percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by exports (EFIGE) × operating
revenue in 2008 in th. USD (Amadeus)
EXPshare percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by exports (EFIGE)
offshoring share of 2008 total purchased intermediate goods (from anywhere) represented by
intermediate goods purchased from abroad (EFIGE)
offshoring /
intermediates
share of 2008 annual turnover represented by purchased intermediates goods (from
anywhere)× offshoring (relative to all intermediates purchased) (EFIGE)
FDI percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by production activities through
direct investment (EFIGE)
service offshoring percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by purchased services (from
anywhere)× percentage of 2008 total purchased services (from anywhere) represented
by services purchased from abroad (EFIGE)
decentralized
management
dummy indicating that with reference to strategic decisions the firm is decentralized,
i.e. managers can take autonomous decisions in some business areas (EFIGE)
product quality index indicating how firms would rank their main product in terms of quality, when
the maximum quality available in the market equals 100 (EFIGE)
product quality
(normalized)
index indicating how firms would rank their main product in terms of quality, when
the country average in the market is set equal to 0 and the standard deviation of
individual firms is set to 1 (based on EFIGE)
product innovation dummy for firms that carried out any product innovation in years 2007-2009 (EFIGE)
process innovation dummy for firms that carried out any process innovation in years 2007-2009 (EFIGE)
employment total number of employees in the firm’s home country (EFIGE)
turnover operating revenue in 2008 in th. USD (Amadeus)
labor productivity value added per employee: operating revenue in 2008 in th. USD× (1 - offshoring
(relative to turnover) ) / employment
tfp total factor productivity (EFIGE)
share of family board
members
ratio of entrepreneurs/executives (included middle management) who are related to
the family who owns the company to total number of entrepreneurs/executives
(EFIGE)
family CEO dummy for firms where the chief executive officer (CEO)/company head is the
individual who owns or controls the firm or is a member of the family that
owns/controls it (EFIGE)
young firm dummy indicating young innovative companies (year of establishment less than 6
years before survey was taken) (EFIGE)
share of high- and
medium skilled
employees
ratio of white and skilled blue collars to white, skilled blue, unskilled blue collars and
apprentices (EFIGE)
EQI 2010 European Quality of Government Index 2010, see Charron et al. (2014). Due to data
limitations we use the NUTS-2 level for Austria, Spain, France and Italy and the
NUTS-1 level for Germany, UK and Hungary
GDP per capita gross domestic product per capita (in Euro) at the country level 2008, (Eurostat,
nama_r_e2gdp)
population population in thousand at the country level (Eurostat, nama_r_e3popgdp)
102
III. Organizations as Competitive Advantage
Table B.3.: Description of Variables - Instrumental Variables
Variable Description
foreign wage per
employee (Eastern
Europe, absolute)
ratio of wage (in USD) to employment from INDSTAT4 2013 at the industry-country
level (average 2005 to 2007). The region East consists of Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary
(this resembles the group "other UE countries" in EFIGE). We use the value at the 10th
percentile of these countries in order to guarantee a low wage value for each industry.
We then connect these values at the ISIC input industry level to output industries via
input coefficients from the IO table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This results in IO
weighted average values at the output industry level. Using industry correspondence
tables from Eurostat, we can link these isic output industry values to the primary,
secondary and core code industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the weighting
applies as for the market share.
foreign wage per
employee (China &
India, absolute)
ratio of wage (in USD) to employment from INDSTAT4 2013 at the industry-country
level (average 2005 to 2007). We use the average of the Chinese and the Indian value
(China and India also define a country group in EFIGE). We then connect these values
at the ISIC input industry level to output industries via input coefficients from the IO
table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This results in IO weighted average values at the
output industry level. Using industry correspondence tables from Eurostat, we can
link these ISIC output industry values to the primary, secondary and core code
industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the weighting applies as for the market share.
foreign wage per
employee (China &
India, relative)
ratio of wage (in USD) to employment from INDSTAT4 2013 at the industry-country
level (average 2005 to 2007). We use the ratio of the average Chinese and Indian value
(China and India also define a country group in EFIGE) to the value of firm’s home
country. We then connect these values at the ISIC input industry level to output
industries via input coefficients from the IO table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This
results in IO weighted average values at the output industry level. Using industry
correspondence tables from Eurostat, we can link these ISIC output industry values to
the primary, secondary and core code industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the
weighting applies as for the market share.
low skilled labor share
in total compensation
low-skilled labor compensation (share in total labour compensation) from WIOD
database, February 2012 release at the industry-country level (average 2004-2007). We
use the median of the Austrian and the German value. We then connect these values
at the ISIC input industry level to output industries via input coefficients from the IO
table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This results in IO weighted average values at the
output industry level. Using industry correspondence tables from Eurostat, we can
link these ISIC output industry values to the primary, secondary and core code
industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the weighting applies as for the market share.
world export supply of
intermediates
intermediate exports by country pair (in million USD) from WIOD, see Timmer
(2012). For each country in our sample, we add up exports from any country in the
world to all other countries, excluding the firm’s home country on both sides. This
gives us the world export supply of intermediates in a specific industry for each of the
countries in our sample. Weight industry export supply of intermediates with IO
coefficients in order to obtain weighted intermediate export supply for a given output
industry. Concordance from NACE to US SIC (by hand). Link these output industry
values to the primary, secondary and core code industries from Amadeus. Then the
weighting applies as for the market share. Compare Hummels et al. (2014).
hierarchical religion share of people belonging to a hierarchical religion (Roman Catholic, Muslim or
Orthodox) in a specific NUTS-1 region (European Value Survey 2008)
religious faith share of people who think that generally speaking most people can be trusted in a
specific NUTS-1 region (European Value Survey 2008)
trust share of people who consider it to be especially important that children are
encouraged to learn religious faith at home in a specific NUTS-1 region (European
Value Survey 2008)
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Figure B.1.: Decentralized Organizations and Religious Beliefs Across European Re-
gions
Decentralized
(a) Decentralized Organizations
Religious Faith
(b) Religious Faith
Hierarchical Religions
(c) Hierarchical Religions
IV. Import Competition and the
Composition of Firm Investments
IV.1. Introduction
Firms invest in expectation of some future benefits. A vigorous policy debate is in
progress over the origins and consequences of short-term corporate behavior: when
firms in the economy face short-term incentives and do not invest sufficiently long-
term, into assets that pay off in distant future, this can be impedimental for economic
growth. The literature has identified that credit crunches, uncertainty, investor pres-
sures or agency problems can be causal for short-term investment behavior (see
Aghion et al. (2010), Garicano and Steinwender (2016), Terry (2015), Garicano and
Rayo (2016) and Bénabou and Tirole (2016)). In this paper, we put forward another
reason for corporate short-termism: we argue that foreign competition can induce
firms to distort investments away from assets that payoff in distant future towards
short-term assets.
Falling trade barriers leading to a dramatic rise in international trade flows is a
defining feature of the past century. The associated increase in competitive pressure
from abroad can threaten domestic firms. When competition lowers future price-
cost margins and thereby reduces the quasi-rents from durable investments, import
competition might discourage long-term firm investments.
In this paper, we study how trade shocks affect the composition of firm invest-
ments with respect to durable and nondurable assets. We think that this investment
composition matters due to three reasons. First, when firms do not sufficiently con-
sider the long-term perspective when facing investment decisions but strongly react
to short-term pressures, they might not fully exploit their growth potential in the
This chapter is joint work with Philippe Fromenteau and Jan Schymik.
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long-run.1 Second, when the amount of investment into nondurable assets increases,
firms need to refinance more frequently as their assets deplete earlier. As a result, fi-
nancing costs of firms increase. Third, changes in the investment composition due to
trade shocks potentially affects the firm-size distribution when investment responses
are heterogeneous.
To guide our empirical analysis, we provide a simple model. We consider a firm
in a two-period economy which engages in two types of investment: a short-term
one and a long-term one. While short-term investments reduce production costs to-
day and yield an immediate payoff, investments into more durable assets reduce
future production costs and therefore pay off at a later point in time. When tougher
competition from abroad reduces future price-cost margins, firms are incentivized
to shift their investment expenditures towards nondurable investments. Further-
more, we show that firm heterogeneity matters for the relative size of this effect. Al-
though tougher foreign competition shifts the composition of investments towards
nondurable assets on average, larger firms are expected to respond less to competi-
tion shocks since they have more market power.
To estimate the effect of foreign competition on the investment composition inside
firms, we use our model to derive a within-firm difference-in-differences estimator.
Our model predicts that within a firm in a given year, tougher foreign competition
should lead to a relatively larger reduction in long-term investments vis-à-vis short-
term investments. We use data for the population of stock listed manufacturing
firms in the US between 1995 and 2009 to test this prediction. Using data on listed
firms has two major advantages for our empirical analysis. First, listed firms dis-
close investment expenditures across different asset categories which differ in their
durability. Similar to Garicano and Steinwender (2016), we exploit variation in dura-
bility across asset groups to distinguish between short- and long-term investments.2
1Hillary Clinton’s US presidential election campaign is a prominent example for this policy debate
about short-term corporate behavior. Creating stronger incentives for firms to plan for the long-
run is part of the program of the Democratic Party for the upcoming legislative period: “We need
an economy where companies plan for the long run [. . . ] - leading to higher productivity, better service,
and larger profits.”, Hillary Clinton, 2016. Part of this debate also comes from business experts
themselves. For example, Larry Fink, the CEO of the investment firm BlackRock stated: “Over the
past several years, I have written to the CEOs of leading companies urging resistance to the powerful forces
of short-termism afflicting corporate behavior. Reducing these pressures and working instead to invest in
long-term growth remains an issue of paramount importance for BlackRock’s clients, most of whom are
saving for retirement and other long-term goals, as well as for the entire global economy.”
2Specifically, we consider seven investment categories which we group according to their durability
by means of depreciation rates derived from accounting rules: Advertising expenditures, Com-
puter expenditures, expenditures on R&D, expenditures on Transportation Equipment, expendi-
111
IV. The Composition of Firm Investments
Second, we can use the volatility of each firms’ stock returns within a given year to
control for variation in the level of uncertainty that firms face.
With the data at hand, we estimate how changes in the sectoral degree of foreign
competition lead to a shift of firms’ investment composition. We find that between
1995 and 2009, firms became on average more short-term oriented when the level
of sectoral import competition increased. Specifically, our estimates suggest that
the average increase in import competition by 60% during our sample period has
reduced the lifespan of firm assets by 72 days on average, which corresponds to
4.6% of the average asset lifespan. Presuming a refinancing rate of 3%, this would
impose an additional cost of 6$ for each 1000$ invested.
We find this result to be robust to controlling for several alternative channels that
could counteract our results. First, trade liberalization could be associated with a
rise in perceived uncertainty. For firms that face a higher level of uncertainty, the
real option value of future investment opportunities increases, leading to a post-
ponement of long-term investments (see Bloom (2009), Handley and Limão (2015)
and Novy and Taylor (2014)). We find that a higher level of trade-induced uncer-
tainty cannot fully explain our effects, exploring variation in firm-level stock return
volatility across time to control for changes in the level of uncertainty that firms face.
Second, the level of import competition could be correlated with developments in
the domestic industry. For example, if US industries become more productive over
time, this might lead to relatively more long-term investments and a lower level of
import competition. When we control for changes in total factor productivity, value
added, capital- and skill-intensity of the US manufacturing industries our estimated
effect is indeed smaller yet remains significant, both statistically and economically.
Third, we find our results to be robust to controlling for financial frictions like credit
constraints or the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Fourth, as our estimation is based on the
within-firm responses across investment categories, we are able to take account for
potential alternative firm-specific demand or technology shocks.
Additionally, we investigate the role of firm heterogeneity on investment re-
sponses. Our model suggests that a competition shock has a larger impact on profits
of smaller, less productive firms since their residual demand is relatively more elas-
tic than residual demand for larger firms. We find support for that prediction in
our data. When comparing investment responses across the size distribution, we
find that shifts in investments towards less durable assets as a response to foreign
tures on Machinery, expenditures on Buildings and expenditures on Land.
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competition are more vigorous among smaller firms. Comparing a firm at the 10th
percentile with a firm at the 90th percentile of the firm-size distribution (in terms of
assets), we find that the lifespan of assets decreases by about 15 days more in the
small firm.
Lastly, we exploit the WTO accession of China in 2001 as a quasi-natural experi-
ment to study how firms’ investment composition changes in response to an exoge-
nous increase in foreign competition. The increase in US imports from China was
mainly due to changes in China’s internal conditions rather than rising demand in
the US. Furthermore, Autor et al. (2016) argue that China’s comparative advantage
in industrial goods resulted primarily in a large supply shock for manufacturing
goods and a large demand shock for raw materials in the US. Since US imports from
China vastly exceeded US exports to China, our identification strategy is likely cap-
turing manufacturing import competition rather than export potential. We use the
average effectively applied tariffs on imports from China over the years 1995 to 1999
as our treatment variable. Although tariff rates have already been reduced during
the 1990s, the change in China’s WTO membership status in 2001 led to a reduction
in expected US imports tariffs on Chinese goods (see Pierce and Schott (2016)). In line
with our model, we find that firms in industries with high pre-WTO tariffs shifted
their investments towards less durable assets as a response to the rise in import com-
petition from China. Our estimates suggest that between 1999 and 2003, firms with
pre-WTO tariffs at the 25th percentile reduced the life span of investments by about
143 days more than a firm with pre-WTO tariffs at the 75th percentile.
This paper relates to studies that analyze how firms adjust their investment ex-
penditures to international trade. Bloom et al. (2016) examine the impact of Chinese
import competition on within firm productivity changes and find that the absolute
volume of innovation increases within the firms most affected by Chinese imports.
Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) study how access to foreign markets can
induce investments in technology upgrading. Both studies find that firms respond
to better exporting opportunities with investments in productivity improvements.
While these papers study the absolute level of firm investments in response to trade
liberalization, our focus is on changes in the composition of investments within firms
with respect to more or less durable assets.
Furthermore, the paper is also related to a nascent literature that studies the impact
of international trade on corporate finance. Fresard (2010) finds that large corporate
cash holdings lead to systematic future market share gains at the expense of industry
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rivals when an industry is hit by an import competition shock. Valta (2012) studies
how the costs of bank credit respond to foreign competition and finds that firms
face higher loan spreads when import competition toughens. Xu (2012) studies the
financing response during periods of higher competition and finds that firms reduce
their leverage by issuing equity and selling assets to repay debt when experiencing
increases in import competition. While previous studies show that credit constraints
determine firms’ opportunities to participate in exporting (see e.g. Manova (2013),
Foley and Manova (2015)), our paper studies the impact of foreign competition on
the composition of firm investments which affects demand for credit itself.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section IV.2 presents the the-
oretical framework, section IV.3 describes the data, identification and the empirical
results. Finally, section IV.4 concludes.
IV.2. Theoretical Framework
To understand the impact of competition on firms’ investment behavior, we lay out a
framework which incorporates the inter-temporal investment decision of a firm with
respect to short- and long-term investments. The main goal of the section is to guide
our empirical work.
IV.2.1. Demand and Industry Structure
We consider an economy that exists for two time periods t ∈ {0, 1}. During each
period t the economy is composed of Lt consumers which derive their demand from
a linear-quadratic utility function following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). As a result,
firms face a linear demand
qit = At −
Lt
γ
pit, (IV.1)
where the intercept is given by At ≡ αLtηNt+γ +
ηNt
ηNt+γ
Lt
γ p̄t. The degree of product
differentiation is described by γ, Nt reflects the number of consumed varieties and
p̄it = (1/Nt)
´
i∈Ωt pitdi characterizes the average price level in the economy. Linear
demand implies an upper price bound pmaxt =
αγ
ηNt+γ +
ηNt
ηNt+γ p̄t at which demand
for a variety is driven to zero. This upper price bound pmaxt is an inverse measure
of the toughness of competition. A larger degree of differentiation γ, a larger mass
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of competing varieties Nt or a lower average price level p̄t all trigger a decline in
the price bound pmaxt such that firms are forced to charge lower prices in order to
generate positive demand for their product.3 Firms face a larger price elasticity of
demand if they set higher prices or if the intensity of competition in the economy
increases.4
IV.2.2. Production and Investment Decision
Production in the differentiated goods sector occurs at constant returns to scale with
marginal costs c∗ representing the corresponding unit labor requirement. Most im-
portantly, we assume that profit maximizing firms can opt for two types of invest-
ment in order to reduce their marginal costs of production c∗. Short-term invest-
ments k reduce the unit costs of production instantaneously to c0 = c∗ − (c∗)θ k0.5 in
period 0. Long-term investments z yield larger productivity gains which however
only materialize during the subsequent period 1 and reduce the firm’s unit produc-
tion costs to c1 = c∗ − ϕ (c∗)θ z0.5 with ϕ > 1.5 Higher levels of investment relate
to lower unit costs with decreasing returns to scale.6 The magnitude of cost reduc-
tions however depends on firm productivity c∗ and the parameter θ. With θ > 0
a unit of investment reduces marginal costs to a larger extent for less productive
firms whereas θ < 0 implies that low cost firms are more efficient in cutting costs.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a unit of short-term investment k and long-
term investment z are both equally costly and require r units of labor to finance the
investment.
In both periods firms compete on a monopolistically competitive market and take
the average price level p̄t as well as the number of firms Nt as given. This yields
3The parameters α and η are both positive and determine the pattern of substitution between a
numéraire good and the differentiated varieties. An increase in α and a decrease in η induce an
upward shift in the consumption levels of the differentiated varieties relative to the numéraire.
If γ = 0, the varieties are perfect substitutes and consumers only focus on the total level of con-
sumption. A rise in γ however implies that the degree of differentiation augments and consumers
care about the distribution of consumption levels across varieties.
4The price elasticity of demand is given by εit ≡ |(∂qit/∂pit) (pit/qit)| = [(pmaxt /pit)− 1]
−1. This
stands in contrast to a CES demand where price elasticity is uniquely determined by the level of
product differentiation γ.
5The basic set-up of the investment function is akin to Dhingra (2013).
6In order for the effective marginal costs c not to become negative, investments k and z are restricted
by firm productivity c∗. This however is no critical assumption since our primary interest is in the
composition and not in the absolute level of short- and long-term investments.
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profits given by
π (ct) =
Lt
4γ
(
cDt − ct
)2
. (IV.2)
If a firm’s unit costs are just as high such that it earns zero profits, it is indifferent
about remaining in the industry. This firm is characterized by marginal costs of
production cDt such that p
(
cDt
)
= cDt = p
max
t . Thus, c
D
t reflects the intensity of
competition in the economy as the threshold incorporates the impact of both, the
average price level and the number of firms. A reduction in cDt implies a rise in
the toughness of competition, as firms need to exhibit lower costs of production in
order to produce profitably. Moreover, cDt integrates the impact of competition on
firms’ prices, demand and profits. Intuitively, firms with lower marginal costs charge
lower prices for which reason they generate larger demand and earn higher profits.
Beyond that, they face a lower price elasticity of demand which allows them to set
higher markups of price over marginal costs. An increase in market size Lt raises
profits whereas more intense competition, reflected by a reduction in cDt , decreases
demand and squeezes markups implying that firms loose earnings.
Having explained the basic organization of production, we now turn towards firm
investments and the choice between short- and long-term investments. Taking the
size of the market Lt and the level of competition cDt as given, the firm optimizes
profits discounted with a factor δ ∈ (0, 1) over time
max
k,z
π (c0) + (1− δ)π (c1)− rk− rz. (IV.3)
Determining the first order conditions with respect to short- and long-term invest-
ments and solving for the optimal level of k and z yields
k0.5 =
[
4γr
L0
− (c∗)2θ
]−1 (
cD0 − c∗
)
(c∗)θ (IV.4)
z0.5 =
[
4γr
L1 (1− δ) ϕ
− ϕ (c∗)2θ
]−1 (
cD1 − c∗
)
(c∗)θ (IV.5)
From equations (IV.4) and (IV.5) it becomes clear that stronger competition
(smaller cD) reduces the marginal return of investment and thus diminishes invest-
ment volumes. However, we are not interested in the effects on the investment vol-
ume of firms but want to study the composition of investments inside firms. Building
ratios of equations (IV.4) and (IV.5) and taking logs finally leaves us with the follow-
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ing expression for the relative composition of short-term and long-term investments
k and z:
ln (k)− ln (z) = 2
{[
ln
(
cD0 − c∗
)
− ln
(
cD1 − c∗
)]
(IV.6)
−
[
ln
(
4γr
L0
− (c∗)2θ
)
− ln
(
4γr
L1 (1− δ) ϕ
− ϕ (c∗)2θ
)]}
IV.2.3. The Impact of Import Competition on Investment
Composition
We now analyze the effect of import competition on the relative composition of
short-term and long-term investments. An increase in competition cD1 < c
D
0 reduces
firms’ profits in period 1 which in turn diminishes the value of long-term invest-
ments relative to short-term investments. As such, tougher competition in period
1 incentivizes firms to adjust their investment composition towards short-lived in-
vestments. Figure C.1 illustrates the effect. Firms choose the investment composition
that equalizes the marginal return of short- and long-term investments.7 The opti-
mal composition of investments (k∗, z∗) is therefore given by the intersection of the
marginal return of short- (MRk) and long-term investments (MRz). According to our
model, an increase in the intensity of competition reduces the return of long-term in-
vestments for any level of z thereby shifting the MRz-curve downwards (the red,
dashed curve). A new intersection of both marginal return curves emerges giving
rise to a larger fraction of short-term investments and a smaller fraction of long-term
investments.
In order to identify the investment distortion created by international competition,
we compare the investment composition of a firm affected by an increase in import
competition (open economy) with the investment composition of a firm facing no
increase in import competition (closed economy). If import competition increases
between period 0 and period 1, relative investments [ln (k)− ln (z)]open are given by
7If a firm expected a larger return in one type of investment than in the other, the firm would invest
more into that investment type. Since we assumed decreasing marginal returns, the firm would
increase investments until marginal returns are equalized.
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equation (IV.6). If the economy however remains closed and cD1 = c
D
0 it follows that
[ln (k)− ln (z)]closed = −2
{
ln
(
4γr
L0
− (c∗)2θ
)
(IV.7)
− ln
(
4γr
L1 (1− δ) ϕ
− ϕ (c∗)2θ
)}
Hence, in the closed economy relative investments are exclusively determined by
market size in both time periods. Subtracting the investment composition in the
closed economy case (IV.7) from the investment composition in the open economy
case (IV.6) provides us with the following difference-in-differences equation, identi-
fying the shift in the relative composition of investments induced by import compe-
tition
[ln (k)− ln (z)]open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed = ln
(
cD0 − c∗
)
− ln
(
cD1 − c∗
)
(IV.8)
Summing up, international competition from abroad entails tougher competition
in period 1. This shrinks the effective market size and lowers firms’ market power
and profits such that the value of long-term investments relative to short-term invest-
ments is reduced. Thus, import competition incentivizes firms to shift their invest-
ment expenditure towards investments characterized by a shorter lifespan. Based
on these theoretical considerations we derive the following testable result.
Prediction 1 Import competition increases the amount of short-term relative to long-term
investments.
IV.2.4. Heterogeneous Investment Responses across Firms
From our difference-in-differences equation (IV.8) it becomes obvious that the size of
the investment shift depends on a firm’s productivity c∗. For less productive firms,
the relative loss in profits in period 1 compared to period 0 is more pronounced
than for firms with lower unit costs. Hence, while all firms loose profits and market
power, the relative change in profits across time decreases with firm productivity.
Accordingly, this leads to a smaller reduction in the marginal return of long-term
investments MRz relative to the marginal return of short-term investments MRk for
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more productive firms. Thus, high-cost firms shift their composition of investments
to a larger extent towards more short-lived investments. In our theoretical frame-
work, more productive firms are characterized by larger sales and employment.
Therefore, we employ different measures of firm size as empirical counterpart to
firm productivity.8
Prediction 2 Import competition increases the amount of short-term relative to long-term
investments less for larger firms.
IV.2.5. The Impact of Market Size on Investment Composition
Given that trade liberalization is typically associated with both, higher import com-
petition and larger export markets, we also study what an increase in market size
would imply for our difference-in-differences estimator. From equations (IV.4) and
(IV.5) it becomes clear that a larger market size Lt generates additional demand such
that the marginal return of short- and long-term investments increases resulting in
a higher level of firm investments for a given level of cDt (for both types of invest-
ments).9
An increase in market size L1 > L0 in period 1 raises demand and profits and thus
the relative value of long-term investments, such that firms become less short-term
oriented. Hence, the market size effect works in the opposite direction to the com-
petition effect. In Figure C.2, this is depicted by an upward shift of the MRz-curve
as the marginal return of long-term investments increases for any level of z. As a re-
sult, the new intersection of the marginal return of short- and long-term investments
shifts to the left implying a reduction in the fraction of short-term investments while
the fraction of long-term investments increases.10 In the empirical analysis, we there-
8Based on survey data, Atkin et al. (2015) provide recent evidence for a positive relationship of the
level of markups and firm size. They therefore consider firm size to be the best proxy for the
productivity parameter in heterogeneous firm models based on Melitz (2003).
9These effects of trade liberalization on the investment volume of firms have been studied empirically
by Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Bustos (2011).
10The magnitude of the effect depends again on firm productivity c∗. However, the role of productiv-
ity is ambiguous and depends on the sign of the parameter θ which determines the impact of firm
productivity on the efficiency of investments. If θ > 0, less productive firms are more efficient in
cutting costs and thus they face relatively larger incentives to engage in long-term investments.
If θ < 0, high productive firms are more effective in lowering unit costs such that an increase
in market size in period 1 creates larger incentives for high productive firms to shift investment
expenditures towards long-term investments. As long as θ = 0, firm productivity has no impact
on the magnitude of cost reductions.
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fore also take account of this market size effect to control confounding effects.
IV.3. Empirical Analysis
IV.3.1. Identification
Equation (IV.8) serves as our theoretical guideline to set up the econometric estima-
tion strategy in order to identify the effect of import competition on the composition
of firm investments. Based on equation (IV.8) we derive the following difference-
in-differences specification where Iisct denotes investments by firm i in investment
category c at time t
ln (Iisct) = β0 + β1 × ln (ImpCompst)× Short-Termc + X′isctζ + λc + λit + ε isct (IV.9)
where ImpCompst is our measure of import competition varying across industries
s and years t and Short-Termc reflects the duration of an investment category c. In
order to distinguish between long- and short-term investments, we rank each firm’s
investments into different assets according to their time to payoff. We follow here the
approach suggested by Garicano and Steinwender (2016) and exploit expenditures
on Advertising, Computer Equipment, R&D, Transportation Equipment, Machin-
ery Equipment as well as on Buildings and Land. In our specification, the rate of
duration follows an ordering where a higher ranking implies a more short-lived in-
vestment category. Alternatively, we also use depreciation rates. X′isct is a vector of
control variables. λc and λit are fixed effects for different investment types as well
as for firm-year combinations in order to sweep out unobserved firm-specific factors
that vary across time and affect the investment decisions of firms. Notably, this in-
cludes demand shocks, credit shocks or technology shocks as long as they do not
affect short- and long-term investments differently. Identification is therefore based
on variation across investment categories within a firm for a given year. Most im-
portantly, in this specification β1 identifies the distortion in the relative composition
of firm investments created by import competition and reflected in our theoretical
model in equation (IV.8).11 Altogether, following Prediction 1, if import competition
leads firms to adjust their composition of investments towards short-term invest-
ment categories, the coefficient of interest is supposed to be positive β1 > 0.
11β1 = [ln (k)− ln (z)]open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed
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Transferring this approach to firm size and its impact on the effect of import com-
petition on firm investments, we obtain a triple difference specification of the follow-
ing form
ln (Iisct) = β0 + β2× ln (ImpCompst)× Short-Termc× Sizei +X′isctζ + λc + λit + ε isct (IV.10)
The coefficient β2 measures the distortion created by competition and its differen-
tial impact across the firm-size distribution.12 Again, the specification makes use of
investment category as well as firm-year fixed effects such that identification rests
upon variation across investment types within firm-year combinations. According
to Prediction 2 we expect import competition to have a more negative influence on
short-term relative to long-term investments for larger firms. Thus, our coefficient of
interest is expected to be negative (β2 < 0) in order to be in line with the theoretical
prediction.
As an additional step, we use China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 in order to
identify the effect of foreign competition on the investment composition of firms
based on a similar difference-in-differences strategy. China’s WTO accession marked
an inflection point in the evolution of Chinese exports and gave rise to a dramatic
increase in exports to the US. The econometric specification is given by
ln (Iisct) = β0 + β3 × Post2000t × Pre-WTO-Tari f fs × Short-Termc + X′isctζ + λc + λit + ε isct
(IV.11)
Post2000t is a dummy variable equal to one for years within the panel which suc-
ceed China’s WTO entry. Pre-WTO-Tari f fs represents the average US tariff level
on Chinese imports by industry during the period preceding the accession. We ex-
pect firms in industries with larger average tariffs prior to China’s WTO entry to be
subject bigger increases in import competition thereafter. Again, we expect the co-
efficient of interest to be positive. By exploiting the competition effect triggered by
China’s WTO accession as a quasi-natural experiment, we aim to provide corrobora-
tive evidence of capturing a causal and economically significant effect.
In all estimation equations the within-firm identification strategy allows for a clean
identification of the effect of competition on investments as potential firm-specific
demand and supply shocks that symmetrically affect investment categories are cap-
tured by the firm-year fixed effects. Therefore, the specification mainly requires to
control for investment determinants that vary at the firm or sector level and differ-
12β2 =
{
[ln (k)− ln (z)]open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed
}
c∗′
−
{
[ln (k)− ln (z)]open − [ln (k)− ln (z)]closed
}
c∗
, c∗′ < c∗
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entially affect a firm’s composition of short- and long-term investments.
IV.3.2. Data Description and Key Variables
We employ data on the population of listed manufacturing firms in the US for the
years 1995 - 2009. The firms in our sample are obtained from the CRSP database. We
match all CUSIP identifiers in the CRSP database for firms with a primary US SIC
industry code between 2000 and 3999 with firm-level information from the Compus-
tat and the Worldscope databases. Overall, we end up with 4,428 stock market listed
manufacturing firms in our sample.
Measuring Firm Investment and Size
We follow the approach suggested by Garicano and Steinwender (2016) and exploit
expenditures on Advertising, Computer Equipment, R&D, Transportation Equip-
ment, Machinery Equipment as well as on Buildings and Land. Garicano and Stein-
wender (2016) assign the following depreciation rates to these investments based
on a survey of the accounting literature to proxy for Short-Termc:13 60% for Adver-
tising, 30% for Computer Equipment, 20% for R&D, 16% for Transportation Equip-
ment, 12% for Machinery, 3% for Buildings and 0% for Land. Besides using these
explicit depreciation rates, we also employ a simple ranking that orders the invest-
ments from the most long-term one (Land with a durability rank of 1) to the most
short-term one (Advertising with a durability rank of 7). Tables C.1 and C.5 in the
Data Appendix provide detailed information on the investment data.
To explore the second empirical prediction, we use three different measures of firm
size (Sizei): a firm’s total assets, employment and sales. Since firm size responds
endogenously to the level of investments, we hold firm size constant throughout
all our estimations and construct firm-specific averages over the years 1995 - 1999,
winsorized at the top 1%.
13Note that an investment’s depreciation rate is the inverse of its time to payoff in years.
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Measuring Foreign Competition and Trade Exposure
We measure import competition at the sector level s for a given year t following
Bernard et al. (2006) by
ImpCompst =
Impst
Prodst + Impst − Expst
, (IV.12)
where Impst and Expst represent the value of total US imports and exports at the
3-digit US SIC level derived from UN Comtrade data. Prodst reflects the value of
US domestic shipments at the 3-digit US SIC level taken from the NBER CES man-
ufacturing database. Along the same lines we compute a sector’s share of export in
domestic consumption
ExpMarketst =
Expst
Prodst + Impst − Expst
. (IV.13)
Finally, the sectoral degree of openness is given by the ratio of the sum of total US
imports and exports over domestic shipments:
Opennessst =
Impst + Expst
Prodst
. (IV.14)
We implicitly assume that all firms within an industry are subject to the same level
of foreign competition as well as export market exposure and openness. In order
to measure the level of tariff protection prior to China’s WTO entry, we average the
effectively applied US tariff on Chinese imports at the 3-digit US SIC level over the
years 1995− 2000. Data on tariffs are again taken from UN Comtrade.
Firm and Sector Level Controls
Two alternative channels that can have an impact on the investment composition
at the firm-level are changes in financial constraints and changes in the degree of
uncertainty faced by firms. To control for changes in financial constraints, we use
firms’ current ratio, external financial dependence as well as capital cost. Table C.1
provides a detailed definition of these variables. Since trade liberalization can also
be associated with an increase in the degree of uncertainty perceived by firms, we
use the annual standard deviation of daily stock returns to proxy for variation in
uncertainty.
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Moreover, firms’ investment composition as well as the level of foreign competi-
tion might be affected by sector specific attributes. If import competition is primarily
traced back to low-wage countries such as China, the factor proportions framework
predicts firms in capital or skill intensive sectors to be relatively less affected than
their counterparts in labor or low-skill intensive industries. Furthermore, trade ex-
posure might be related to trends in technology adoption which alter the demand
for skill and capital and determine sector specific productivity. We therefore use
the capital stock per worker and the share of non-production worker wages in total
compensation in order to control for capital and skill intensity at the sector level.
Ultimately, we control for sector specific productivity and size by measures of to-
tal factor productivity and value added. The entire set of industry level controls is
obtained from the NBER CES manufacturing database.
IV.3.3. Baseline Results
Table IV.1 presents our main results from estimating equation (IV.9). In panel A we
use the simple ordering as our measure of duration. The ordering of categories fol-
lows the ordering of depreciation rates and ranges from 1 (Land) to 7 (Advertising).
Panel B repeats all specifications using absolute depreciation rates from the litera-
ture as a measure of duration. By offering two distinct measures we aim to ensure
that our results do not hinge on specific assumptions regarding the duration of in-
vestments, except for a broad ordering. We will show that our story goes through
irrespective of the measure chosen.
In discussing our results, we will focus on the sign of the interaction between
import competition and duration in a log-log specification, allowing us to compare
how long-term investments react relative to short-term investments (both measured
in percentage terms), when sector-level import competition is increasing by one per-
cent. According to Prediction 1, if import competition induces firms to shift their
investments towards less durable categories, we expect our coefficient of interest β1
to be positive. This implies that higher import competition is associated on average
with a relative shift of investments towards more short-term categories, i.e. categories
with a higher rate of depreciation.
All specifications include our measure of interest, category fixed effects and firm-
year fixed effects. We correct for two-way clustered standard errors. We cluster at
the firm-level and additionally, we cluster at the industry-year level, as our measure
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of import competition is the same for all firms in a given industry and in a given
year. The level of import competition is sector-year specific and thus absorbed by
the fixed effects. Thus, we do not identify the average effect of import competition
on investments. Similarly, due to the inclusion of category fixed effects, we do not
identify the between-category difference in average investments. We include these
fixed effects because they allow us to effectively control for alternative channels that
otherwise would potentially be confounding our results.
For example, sectors and firms will be exposed to temporary shocks that, on aver-
age, will have an impact on investments. Think about a domestic demand shock that
reduces the demand for durable consumer goods. Potentially, this demand shock
will be correlated with our sectoral measure of import competition. In response to
the shock, firms in the durable goods sector might reduce average investments. Be-
cause this decision is due to the demand shock and independent of investment dura-
tions, the relative composition of short and long-term investments within firms and
industries would remain constant. Nevertheless, our coefficient of interest might
falsely pick up the variation if the investment composition in the durable goods sec-
tor happens to be on average more long-term than in other sectors. The uniform
investment reduction in the durable goods sector would then shift the economy-wide
investment composition towards more short run investments. Consequently, we
would find a positive coefficient on the durability interaction and wrongly conclude
that import competition was causing firms to invest more short-term. The inclusion
of firm-year fixed effects will account for these confounding effects at the firm or sec-
toral level, as long as the change in investments is uniform across the different types
of investment.
The fixed effect specification implies that identification, as well as potential con-
founding effects, all hinge on factors that vary across firms, years and investment
categories. In specification (1), only the interaction of import competition with du-
ration fulfills this requirement. No other controls are included. The coefficient is
positive as predicted for both measures of depreciation but significant only for the
ordered measure.
The problem with specification (1) is that a lot of systematic variation across the
three dimensions is now potentially projected on the import channel. Thus, other
sectoral developments with a direct impact on investment composition might in-
terfere with our results provided that they are correlated with import competition.
We therefore add interactions of the depreciation measure with various sector-level
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Table IV.1.: Baseline Regressions
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0455*** 0.0347*** 0.0330*** 0.0333***
(0.00813) (0.00886) (0.00906) (0.00903)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.143 0.252*** 0.237** 0.248**
(0.0901) (0.0968) (0.0994) (0.0998)
Industry Controls * Depreciation no yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation no no yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 89,735 89,436 81,912 72,064
Firm Clusters 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308
Industry-Year Clusters 2,163 2,163 2,163 2,163
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%),
Buildings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer
(30%), Advertising (60%). The ordering of categories resembles the ordering
of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance
sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Com-
puter) or taken from the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import
competition (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic
production plus imports minus exports. Industry controls contain controls for
capital-intensity, skill-intensity, tfp and value added. Sd(stock return) is the
standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are
twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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controls in specification (2). Specifically, we interact depreciation with time-varying
measures of capital intensity, skill intensity, tfp and value added. The import com-
petition coefficient remains positive and now turns significant for both measures of
depreciation.
In specification (3), we add an interaction with firm-level volatility of stock re-
turns. This is supposed to disentangle the import competition effect proposed in the
theoretical framework from other effects due to trade induced uncertainty. As our
coefficient of interest remains significant, we conclude that import competition must
have an impact on investment composition other than through market insecurity.
Specification (3) is our baseline regression. Consider the following example in
order to understand the meaning of our coefficients: a higher level of import com-
petition creates a wedge between investments into different investment categories.
Suppose for example that the level of import competition increases by 10%. Then
our coefficient in panel A implies that this wedge is equal to 0.33%. Thus, if an ex-
emplary firm reduces its land investments (the most long-term category) by 10%, we
would expect that firm to reduce its investments in buildings by 9.67%, its machinery
investments by 9.34%, its transportation investments by 9.01%, its R&D investments
by 8.68%, its computer investments by 8.35% and its advertising investments (the
most short-term category) by 8.02%.
To evaluate the economic significance of our estimates, we invoke a simple
thought experiment. We consider the average increase in import competition over
the sample period 1995-2009, i.e. 60% over the 15-year period. Additionally, we as-
sume that Land investments respond inelastically to an import competition shock.14
Using the results from Table IV.1, panel B, specification (3), we can then calculate the
change in the average depreciation rate that results from the increase in import com-
petition.15 Our estimates suggest that the average increase in import competition by
60% during our sample period has reduced the lifespan of firm assets by 72 days
on average, which corresponds to 4.6% of the average asset lifespan. Presuming a
refinancing rate of 3%, this would impose an additional cost of 6$ for each 1000$
invested. Thus, import competition is associated with a significant shift towards
relatively short-term investments.
In specification (4), we exclude the years 2008 and 2009 from our sample in order
to assure that our effect is not picking up specifics of the financial crisis. Garicano
14When regressing import competition on Land investments and adding firm and year fixed effects,
we find Land investments to be inelastic with respect to import competition.
15See the Data Appendix for details on this calculation.
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and Steinwender (2016) show for Spanish manufacturing firms that the credit crisis
in 2008 effectively worked like an additional tax rate on long-term investments. If
import competition was increasing during the crisis, we would not be able to dis-
tinguish the two effects. Dropping the crisis years however does not alter our re-
sults significantly. If anything, the estimated effects become stronger, indicating that
omitting to control for the crisis actually led us to slightly underestimate the effect of
import competition.
IV.3.4. Firm Heterogeneity
In our theoretical framework we show that the import competition effect on invest-
ment composition should be less pronounced for larger firms.
In Table IV.2, we confront this prediction (Prediction 2) with the data, using a triple
interaction with measures of firm size in order to see whether the effect of import
competition on investment composition varies along the firm-size distribution. We
use total employment, net firm sales and total assets as measures of size. Adding the
size interactions increases the coefficient on the original interaction (β1) compared to
the baseline. The interaction remains significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
The triple interaction with size has the expected negative sign in all specifications,
implying that the shift towards short-term investments is less pronounced for larger
firms. Statistically, the effect is significant at the 1% level for total assets, independent
of the depreciation measure chosen. The effects are less significant for sales and em-
ployment and on average stronger when we use the depreciation rate as our measure
of duration. Using assets as a measure of size, the coefficients for the depreciation
rank imply that for any two neighboring investment categories, a 10% higher import
competition is associated with a 0.4% higher decrease in the long-term investment
compared to the neighboring shorter-term investment for the median firm. Using an
analogous back-of-the-envelope calculation as in the baseline with respect to the es-
timates from panel B, we compare a firm at the 10th percentile with a firm at the 90th
percentile of the firm-size distribution (in terms of assets). We find that the lifespan
of assets decreases by about 15 days more in the small firm.
IV.3.5. Reordering and Omitting Investment Categories
In order to determine whether our results hinge on the assumed ordering of invest-
ment categories in terms of depreciation rates, we omit and regroup various cate-
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Table IV.2.: Heterogeneous Investment Responses Across Firms
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
Measure of Size
Employment Sales Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0330*** 0.0396*** 0.0403*** 0.0401***
(0.00906) (0.0101) (0.00985) (0.00966)
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation * Size -0.000599 -3.42e-06* -3.32e-06***
(0.000385) (1.74e-06) (1.22e-06)
Depreciation * Size -0.000736 -3.00e-06 -4.83e-06
(0.000950) (3.97e-06) (3.36e-06)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.237** 0.321*** 0.335*** 0.326***
(0.0994) (0.109) (0.106) (0.105)
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation * Size -0.00647* -3.86e-05** -3.58e-05***
(0.00371) (1.85e-05) (1.23e-05)
Depreciation * Sales 0.00421 2.51e-05 -2.82e-06
(0.0102) (4.54e-05) (3.62e-05)
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,912 73,136 75,578 75,660
Firm Clusters 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866
Industry-Year Clusters 2,381 2,381 2,381 2,381
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%),
Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The
ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Investment expenses are
either derived from balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation
and Computer) or taken from the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competi-
tion (ImpComp) are imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports
minus exports. Measures of size are from Compustat and represent firm averages over the
years 1995 to 1999. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-intensity, tfp
and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given
year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
129
IV. The Composition of Firm Investments
gories for the ordered measure of depreciation in Table C.2.16 Specification (1) re-
peats our baseline regression. In specification (2) we omit investments into R&D in
order to see whether R&D expenses are driving our result. For example, a rise in
import competition might lead firms to foster innovation by investing more heavily
in research activities.17 This decision is independent of the duration of R&D invest-
ments, but would still render our coefficient positive because R&D expenditures just
happen to be classified as relatively short-term. The inclusion of category fixed ef-
fects does not help us against this type of disturbances, as the unobservable effect
varies over time. Omitting R&D investments reduces the number of observations by
more than a quarter and diminishes the size of our coefficient. But our results remain
robust at the 5% level of significance, indicating that R&D is an important, but not
the only driver of our results.
In specification (3) we further omit investments in Advertising. Because different
from the other categories, both R&D and Advertising expenses are taken from the
income statements rather than being derived from asset data, one concern is that
our results are due to these constructional differences. The results in specification (3)
show that our results go through when restricting the sample to asset data. Specifica-
tion (4) omits Transportation and Computer investments. Computer investments are
reported only for the years 1999 and onwards and Transportation is reported very
little over the full range of years. Accordingly, these two categories might not be
very representative and specifically prone to be affected by outliers. But again, our
results remain robust when estimating the equation for the remaining categories.
Because estimates of depreciation rates vary in the literature, we regroup assets
that are close to each other into single categories in specifications (5) to (7). In spec-
ification (5), we assign the same rank to Land, Buildings and Machinery. R&D and
Computer investments are grouped into another category. The coefficient almost
doubles in size and remains highly significant. Adding Transportation to the group
of long-term investments in specification (6) further increases the coefficient, con-
firming that switching from one rank to another now has a higher impact on invest-
ment duration. Because the depreciation rate of Transportation is relatively close
also to R&D and Computer, specification (7) assigns it into one group with these
categories. Again, our results are not significantly altered.
Finally, it could be that firms increase research expenditures in order to remain
16 Specifications (1) to (4) are robust to using the depreciation rate instead.
17Bloom et al. (2016) show that Chinese import competition increases technical change within firms,
among other things, by increasing the amount of R&D.
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competitive in the future, rendering R&D effectively a long-term investment. Then
our ranking of investment categories would be flawed. Specification (8) therefore
ranks R&D as the most long-term investment. The effect vanishes and we conclude
that our original ordering is more coherent, given that R&D investments are not the
sole driver of our results.
IV.3.6. Alternative Financial Channels
In Table C.3 we try to rule out some alternative stories that might affect our results.
Garicano and Steinwender (2016) argue that credit shocks reduce the relative value
of long-term investments because firms might have to liquidate before the payoff
materializes. Since we want to identify a competition shock, we need to make sure
that time varying financial characteristics are properly controlled for. In specifica-
tions (2) to (5) we therefore add interactions of the depreciation measure with mea-
sures of the current ratio, external dependence, capital cost and a financial crisis
dummy. While some of these controls appear to have an effect on the investment
composition, the results for our measure of import competition are not significantly
altered. We therefore conclude that import competition is not just working through
changes in firms’ financial characteristics and probably better explained by changes
in demand.
IV.3.7. Differentiating between Import Competition and Market
Access
In subsection IV.2.5 in the theory, we argue that higher market access should have
effects exactly opposed to the effects of import competition. Table C.4 addresses
this point. Because better market access implies higher demand in the future, we
would expect firms to shift investments towards this future market. Accordingly, the
results for import competition documented so far are probably biased in the opposite
direction.
Specification (2) shows that our assumptions regarding the market access effects
are confirmed in the data. When regressing investments on the interaction of depre-
ciation with export market size, our estimates suggest that firms are shifting invest-
ments towards long-term categories when faced with better export opportunities.
The effects for exports are slightly larger than for imports and highly significant. In
specification (3) we add the export market interaction to the baseline specification to
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see how our original results are affected. Stable signs indicate that the impact of both
imports and exports remain as the theory would predict. The increase in size of our
coefficient of interest shows that failing to control for export opportunities biases our
coefficient on import competition in the opposite direction.18 Given these findings,
we consider our previous results to represent a conservative estimate of the actual
effect. Finally, in specification (4) we use an openness measure that incorporates
both import competition and export opportunities and find that mixing up the two
effects conceals much of the impact trade has on investment composition. Because
the coefficient remains positive and marginally significant for the ordering measure,
we conclude that import competition might have slightly outweighed the effect of
export opportunities for the firms in our sample.
IV.3.8. The Impact of China’s WTO Accession on the Composition
of Firm Investments in the US
In order to substantiate our claim that it is the surge in imports that induces a reallo-
cation of investments towards long-term investments, we will exploit a quasi-natural
experiment based on the large competition effect caused by China’s accession to the
WTO in 2001. China’s WTO accession is a useful experiment for mainly two reasons.
First, China’s accession to the WTO, and the dramatic increase of exports to the
world that followed thereafter,19 was driven mostly by the change in China’s inter-
nal conditions and not by the rising import demand of receiving countries. As Autor
et al. (2013) point out, this interpretation is corroborated by the fact that China had
an average annual TFP growth in manufacturing of 8% during that time, compared
to only 3.9% for the US. Autor et al. (2016) cite several studies indicating that the
prospect of formal WTO accession was a major force stimulating the underlying re-
structuring of the manufacturing industry. The increasing privatization of public
enterprises, the extension of trading rights for private firms, greater access to im-
ported intermediates and a solidification of the MFN status, providing security to
Chinese exporters, all helped to foster a new level of productivity growth after 2001.
Thus, although China had already been granted most-favored nation status (MFN)
18 The same holds vice versa for export opportunities.
19Between 2000 and 2007, the low-income country share of US imports almost doubled from 15 to
28%, with China accounting for 89% of this growth. Compare Autor et al. (2013). Additionally,
see Figure C.6 in the Data Appendix for the average share of imports from China in total US
imports for the industries in our sample.
132
IV. The Composition of Firm Investments
Table IV.3.: The Impact of China’s WTO Accession
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Duration rank
Post2000 * Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.00636** 0.00550* 0.00539* 0.00430
(0.00290) (0.00301) (0.00300) (0.00313)
Post2000 * Depreciation -0.0359*** -0.0241* -0.0219 -0.0123
(0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0148)
Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.00489 0.00541 0.0181*** 0.0184***
(0.00344) (0.00352) (0.00371) (0.00378)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
Post2000 * Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.0642** 0.0548* 0.0549** 0.0447
(0.0272) (0.0282) (0.0270) (0.0282)
Post2000 * Depreciation -0.642*** -0.577*** -0.500*** -0.376**
(0.146) (0.154) (0.147) (0.157)
Pre-WTO-Tariff * Depreciation 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.134*** 0.155***
(0.0327) (0.0337) (0.0351) (0.0364)
Industry Controls * Depreciation no no yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation no yes no yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 30,949 27,804 30,517 27,428
Firm Clusters 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings
(3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising
(60%). The ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depreciation rates. Invest-
ment expenses are either derived from balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings,
Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from the income statement (R&D and
Advertising). Sample period 1999-2003. Post2000 is an indicator that takes the value 1 if
the year is 2001 or later. Pre-WTO-Tariff is the simple industry average (over the years
1995-2000) of the effectively applied tariff on US imports from China as reported in the
WITS/Comtrade data base. Industry controls contain controls for capital-intensity, skill-
intensity, tfp and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard deviation of daily stock
returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the firm and at the
industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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during the 80s, the surge in exports significantly accelerated after 2001. This surge
can be treated as mostly exogenous to dynamics in the US market which is crucial
for identification.20
Second, Autor et al. (2016) argue that China’s comparative advantage in indus-
trial goods implies that China’s growth resulted primarily in a large supply shock
for manufacturing goods and a large demand shock for raw materials. Given that
US imports from China vastly exceeded US exports to China, this suggests that our
identification strategy is likely going to capture manufacturing import competition
rather than export potential.21
While we argue that the results we are going to present in this section represent a
causal effect of imports on the investment composition, we are aware that we cannot
precisely determine the channel through which imports are affecting the investment
choices of firms. Thus, while we claim that import competition is the driving force
behind our results, part of the variation we are using might be due to a rise in im-
ported intermediates rather than final goods. Yet, note that cheaper intermediates
should have a positive effect on the future market potential of US firms. Thus, if
the surge in US imports to China was driven by a surge in intermediate imports, if
anything, it would make it more difficult for us to detect a shift towards short-term
investments.
Technically, the approach we use is related to Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), as we
also use the average pre-trade-agreement level of tariffs to identify the firms most
affected by trade liberalization. Specifically, we use the US effectively applied import
tariff vis-à-vis China, averaged over the years 1995 to 1999 and specific to firms within
US SIC three digit industries.22 As noted by Pierce and Schott (2016), the change in
China’s WTO membership status in 2001 had two effects: it ended the uncertainty
associated with annual renewals of China’s MFN status and it led to a substantial
reduction in expected US imports tariffs on Chinese goods. It is the latter aspect
that we will use for identification.23 Accordingly, we look at the differential change
in investment behavior before and after the Chinese WTO accession in 2001, where
20 See Iacovone et al. (2013) for a similar argument.
21 Bloom et al. (2016), Iacovone et al. (2013) and Utar (2014) also use the WTO accession of China as
a natural experiment for an increase in import competition.
22 The effectively applied tariff is defined as the lowest available tariff, given by preferential tariffs if
existent and MFN tariffs otherwise.
23 In fact, the average tariffs remained relatively stable after 2000. Nevertheless, for the years 1999 to
2003, we find that industries with pre-WTO accession tariff levels above the median experienced a
66% larger increase in Chinese import competition than industries with pre-WTO accession tariffs
below the median.
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we make use of the fact that the threat of tariff reductions is larger in high-tariff
industries. The coefficient of interest is the interaction of a post-2000 dummy with
the pre-trade-agreement level of tariffs. In all specifications, we focus our sample on
a sample period between 1999 and 2003, around China’s WTO entry in 2001.
Table IV.3 shows the results for the two measures of depreciation. Again, we al-
low errors to be clustered at the firm level and include category and firm-year fixed
effects in all specifications. In specifications (1) to (4), we subsequently add the
time varying sector-level and uncertainty controls interacted with our measure of
duration. Adding all controls simultaneously leads to insignificant results, but the
triple-interaction of interest is significant at the 5% or 10% level when restricting the
controls to one set or the other. The coefficient of interest is positive in all specifica-
tions, implying that the WTO accession of China led to a higher decrease (or lower
increase) in long-term investments, compared to short-term investments, and that
this effect was more pronounced in sectors that had higher average tariffs during
the second half of the 1990s.24 Specifically, using the results from specification (3)
in panel B, we find that for a firm at the 25th percentile of our tariff measure, the
average investment duration increased in the years after 2001 by roughly 106 days
more than for firms at the 75th percentile of the pre-2000 tariff distribution.
IV.4. Conclusion
This paper examines how the exposure to foreign competition affects the composi-
tion of short-term relative to long-term investments within firms. In order to guide
our empirical strategy, we develop a stylized framework which illustrates the in-
vestment decision of a representative firm with respect to short- and long-term in-
vestments. An increase in the toughness of competition reduces the relative value
of long-term investments and induces firms to shift their investment composition
towards short-term investments. The magnitude of this effect varies with firm size.
We test these predictions based on the population of listed US manufacturing firms
by using data on seven asset classes which we order according to their deprecia-
tion rates. Based on our framework, the empirical strategy employs a difference-
in-differences estimator. This approach allows using firm-year fixed effects as well
24 Note that the negative coefficient on the interaction of our measure of depreciation with the post-
2000 dummy implies that on average firms with a zero tariff-level invested relatively more long-
term after 2000. This is a materialization of the general trend towards more long-term investments
over time which can be seen in Figures C.3 and C.5.
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as investment category fixed effects in order to identify the effect of trade induced
competition on the composition of investments within firms. The empirical results
are in line with our predictions. Import competition shifts the composition of invest-
ments towards more short-lived categories and the effect depends on firm size. Our
results are robust to the inclusion of controls that account for alternative channels at
the firm and sector level such as various measures of financial constraints and factor
intensities. In order to provide further supportive evidence of a causal effect, we
exploit the rise in Chinese imports to the US due to China’s accession to the WTO
as quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we also explore the impact of exporting on
the composition of investments. Our results suggest that exposure to export mar-
kets works in the opposite direction, and induces a reallocation towards long-term
investments.
We believe that adjustments in the composition of investment have important eco-
nomic implications. If trade induced competition incentivizes firms to disregard the
long-term perspective this implies a loss in sustainability, higher financing costs as
well as changes in the firm-size distribution. This suggests new research directions.
Future research might for example study how changes in the composition of invest-
ment relate to the welfare effects of globalization.
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C. Appendix
Figure C.1.: Impact of Tougher Competition on Investment Composition
𝑀𝑅𝑧𝑀𝑅𝑘
𝑧 𝑘
∆𝑐𝐷 < 0
𝑘∗ 𝑧∗
𝑘∗ 𝑧∗
Figure C.2.: Impact of an Increase in Market Size on Investment Composition
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Table C.1.: Description of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Description Source
Firm Investments
advertisingit advertising represents the cost of advertising media (i.e., radio, television, and
periodicals) and promotional expenses in millions USD; Compustat variable
name: XAD
Compustat
computerit computer software & equipment (period t) - 0.95 × computer software & equipment
(period t− 1); computer software & equipment (gross property plant and
equipment) represents computer equipment and the information a computer
uses to perform tasks in millions USD
Worldscope
R&Dit research & development expenses (period t) represent all direct and indirect costs
related to the creation and development of new processes, techniques,
applications and products with commercial possibilities in millions USD
Worldscope
transportation
equipmentit
transportation equipment (period t) - 0.95 × transportation equipment (period t− 1);
transportation equipment (gross property plant and equipment) represents the
cars, ships, planes or any other type of transportation equipment in millions
USD
Worldscope
machinesit machinery & equipment (period t) - 0.95 × machinery & equipment (period t− 1);
machinery & equipment (gross property plant and equipment) represent the
machines and machine parts needed by the company to produce its products in
millions USD
Worldscope
buildingsit buildings (period t) - 0.95 × buildings (period t− 1); buildings (gross property
plant and equipment) represent the architectural structure used in a business
such as a factory, office complex or warehouse in millions USD
Worldscope
landit land (period t) - 0.95 × land (period t− 1); land (gross property plant and
equipment) represents the real estate without buildings held for productive use,
is recorded at its purchase price plus any costs related to its purchase such as
lawyer’s fees, escrow fees, title and recording fees in millions USD
Worldscope
Firm Controls
employmenti average firm employment in thousands over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at
the top 1%; Compustat variable name: EMP
Compustat
salesi average firm sales in millions USD over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the
top 1%; Compustat variable name: SALE
Compustat
assetsi average firm assets in millions USD over the years 1995-1999, winsorized at the
top 1%; Compustat variable name: AT
Compustat
current ratioit current ratio is an indication of a firm’s market liquidity and ability to meet
creditor’s demands; defined as current assets divided by current liabilities
during a given year t (banker’s rule: >2 for creditworthiness); Compustat
variable names: ACT/LCT
Compustat
external dependenceit external dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures that are not financed by
internal capital flows during a given year t; Compustat variable names:
(CAPX− EBIT)/CAPX
Compustat
capital costit capital cost is defined as capital expenditures over liabilities during a given year
t; Compustat variable names: CAPX/LT
Compustat
sd(stock return)it standard deviation of the daily firm stock returns (Pd/Pd−1) during a given year t CRSP
Trade Variables
import competitionst ImpComp is defined as
ImpComp = importsWorld/
(
domestic shipments + importsWorld − exportsWorld
)
;
at the 3-digit US SIC level during a given year t
NBER CES data for
vship, UN
Comtrade for
exports and imports
export market exposurest ExpMarket is defined as
ExpMarket = exportsWorld/
(
domestic shipments + importsWorld − exportsWorld
)
;
at the 3-digit US SIC level during a given year t
NBER CES data for
vship, UN
Comtrade for
exports and imports
opennessst Openness is defined as
Openness = (exportsWorld + importsWorld)/domestic shipments; at the 3-digit US
SIC level during a given year t
NBER CES data for
vship, UN
Comtrade for
exports and imports
pre-WTO tariffs simple industry average tariff over the years 1995-2000 of the effectively applied
US tariff on imports from China; at the 3-digit US SIC level
UN Comtrade
Industry Controls
capital-intensityst total real capital stock in thousands USD per employee; at the 3-digit US SIC
level during a given year t; NBER CES variable names: CAP/EMP
NBER CES data
skill-intensityst share of compensation for non-production workers in total compensation; at the
3-digit US SIC level during a given year t; NBER CES variable names:
(PAY− PRODW)/PAY
NBER CES data
tfpst 5-factor NBER TFP index with base year 1995; t f p′95 = 1 NBER CES data
value addedst industry value added in millions USD; at the 3-digit US SIC level during a given
year t; NBER CES variable names: VADD
NBER CES data
Other Controls
economic crisis is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2007-2009
post 2000 is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2001-2003 and equal to 0 for the years
1999-2000
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Table C.3.: Alternative Financial Channels
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0330*** 0.0302*** 0.0319*** 0.0313*** 0.0331***
(0.00906) (0.00904) (0.00919) (0.00912) (0.00906)
Current Ratio * Depreciation 0.00963***
(0.00223)
External Dependence * Depreciation 0.000198**
(9.86e-05)
Capital Cost * Depreciation -0.200***
(0.0233)
Crisis * Depreciation -0.00795
(0.0187)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.237** 0.233** 0.229** 0.221** 0.241**
(0.0994) (0.0987) (0.100) (0.0989) (0.0993)
Current Ratio * Depreciation 0.00579
(0.0247)
External Dependence * Depreciation 0.00159*
(0.000821)
Capital Cost * Depreciation -2.116***
(0.290)
Crisis * Depreciation -0.260
(0.209)
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation yes yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,912 79,083 78,956 78,963 81,912
Firm Clusters 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Ma-
chines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). The order-
ing of categories resembles the ordering of depreciations rates. Investment expenses are either
derived from balance sheet data on assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Com-
puter) or taken from the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (Imp-
Comp) are imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports minus
exports. Financial controls are time varying at the firm level derived from Compustat: Current
Ratio is the total of current assets over current liabilities, External Dependence is capital expen-
diture net of EBIT over total capital expenditure, Capital Cost is capital expenditure over total
liabilities. Crisis is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2007-2009. Industry controls contain con-
trols for capital-intensity, skill-intensity, tfp and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard
deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway cluster-robust at the
firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table C.4.: Import Competition and Access to Foreign Markets
Dependent Variable: log(Investment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Measure of Depreciation: Ordering
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.0330*** 0.0767***
(0.00906) (0.0123)
log(ExpMarket) * Depreciation -0.0360*** -0.0814***
(0.00908) (0.0118)
log(Openness) * Depreciation 0.0146*
(0.00763)
Panel B: Measure of Depreciation: Depreciation rate
log(ImpComp) * Depreciation 0.237** 0.644***
(0.0994) (0.126)
log(ExpMarket) * Depreciation -0.489*** -0.847***
(0.0994) (0.117)
log(Openness) * Depreciation 0.0894
(0.0840)
Industry Controls * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
sd(Stock Return) * Depreciation yes yes yes yes
Investment FE yes yes yes yes
Firm-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 81,912 81,912 81,912 81,912
Firm Clusters 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Industry-Year Clusters 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Notes: Investment categories and assumed depreciation rates: Land (0%), Build-
ings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%) Computer (30%),
Advertising (60%). The ordering of categories resembles the ordering of depre-
ciation rates. Investment expenses are either derived from balance sheet data on
assets (Land, Buildings, Machines, Transportation and Computer) or taken from
the income statement (R&D and Advertising). Import competition (ImpComp)
are imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic production plus imports
minus exports. Export market size (ExpMarket) are exports at the sectoral level,
relative to domestic production plus imports minus exports. Openness is the
sum of exports and imports at the sectoral level, relative to domestic produc-
tion plus imports minus exports. Industry controls contain controls for capital-
intensity, skill-intensity, tfp and value added. Sd(stock return) is the standard
deviation of daily stock returns in a given year. Standard errors are twoway
cluster-robust at the firm and at the industry-year level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
IV. The Composition of Firm Investments
Calculation of the Marginal Effects
For every firm in our sample, we calculate the sum of expenses in each year. Then
we express the individual category investment as share of total firm investments for
each year. Next, we use these shares to calculate the average investment share of
each category across all firms and years in the sample. Because the resulting av-
erage shares do not add up to one, we re-weight the shares accordingly.25 We use
the resulting shares to construct an average depreciation rate, where we weight the
category specific depreciation rates with the respective average share in investment.
This way, we obtain an average sample depreciation rate of 23.1%, which implies
that the average firm investment lasts 1579.8 days [= (1/r)× 365].
Now we consider an increase in import competition of 60%. This corresponds
to the increase of the import competition variable in our estimation sample (from
22.4% in 1995 to 35.7% in 2009). We use the regression results to calculate the relative
change in each category. Because we do not know the level effect of import compe-
tition on investments, we additionally need to assume the investment elasticity in
one base category. Here, we use a 0% change in Land investments with respect to a
trade shock (when regressing import competition on Land investments and adding
firm and year fixed effects, we find Land investments to be inelastic with respect to
import competition).
Applying the relative percentage changes in each category, we can then construct
new after-trade-shock investment shares. As before, we use these shares to obtain
the new average depreciation rate (23.28% for specification (3) in panel B of table
IV.1). Investments now fully depreciate after 1507.8 days, implying that import com-
petition has reduced the duration of investments by about 72 days on average.
Note that these results depend on the critical values chosen for the increase in
import competition and the elasticity of Land investments with respect to import
competition. Thus, letting the percentage change in Land vary from -10% to +10%
(holding constant the increase in import competition at 60%) changes the reduction
in days from -79 to -66.1.
25See Figures C.4 and C.5 for the average investment composition in our sample.
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IV. The Composition of Firm Investments
Table C.5.: Depreciation Rates of Investments
Firm Investment Applied Depreciation Rate Duration Rank
advertising 60% 7
computer 30% 6
R&D 20% 5
transportation equipment 16% 4
machines 12% 3
buildings 3% 2
land 0% 1
Notes: Applied depreciation rates are obtained from Garicano and Steinwender (2016)
who derive the investment-specific depreciation rates from various sources of the ac-
counting literature.
Figure C.3.: Average Rate of Depreciation over Time
0.22
0.225
0.23
0.235
0.24
0.245
0.25
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Notes: The figure shows the average depreciation rate over the years for the firms in our sam-
ple. The average is constructed by weighting each investment specific depreciation rate with its
average investment share across all firms in a specific year. Investment categories and assumed
depreciation rates: Land (0%), Buildings (3%), Machines (12%), Transportation (16%), R&D (20%)
Computer (30%), Advertising (60%). See section Marginal Effects in this Appendix for a descrip-
tion of how these average depreciation rates are calculated.
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IV. The Composition of Firm Investments
Figure C.4.: Shares of Investment Categories in Total Investments
Transportation Computer
Land Advertising
Buildings Machines
R&D
Notes: The figure shows the sample average composition of investment categories.
Figure C.5.: Shares of Investment Categories in Total Investments over Time
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Notes: The figure shows the composition of investment categories over time.
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IV. The Composition of Firm Investments
Figure C.6.: Share of Chinese in Total US Imports
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Notes: The figure shows the average share of imports from China relative to total imports of
the US for the US SIC 3-digit industries in our sample.
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